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1. Introduction 
1.1. Motivation 
Per a practitioners’ study published by The Boston Consulting Group1 shortly after the 
American investment bank Lehman Brothers filed for bankruptcy on September 15th, 2008,2 
the management of working capital, i.e. the funds needed to finance the operating business, 
can be of great value to companies during an economic contraction, when faced with a 
reduced availability of external financing and sharp declines in sales. Putting it in the words 
of the authors of the study, “[d]uring a downturn, effective working-capital management 
can spell the difference between bankruptcy and solvency or between acquiring and being 
acquired” (p.1). 
The conventional wisdom on working capital management as a value-enhancing tool has 
nonetheless shifted in the wake of the worst economic crisis since the Great Depression of 
the 1930's: Traditionally, working capital management was understood as an activity largely 
overlooked during times of economic expansion and called upon only in times where 
economic conditions deteriorated. Nowadays, a new perspective has emerged among 
management consultancies, corporate executives and members of corporate boards of 
directors. Working capital management is now regarded as a key strategic and sustainable 
tool that needs to be embedded in a comprehensive framework: Cash is allegedly always 
king in tough times, however, as the economy gets out of recession, companies should make 
sure that their grip over the management of their working capital remains tight over the long 
term. Moreover, when working capital is being regarded both as a strategic priority and as 
an ongoing business process, rather than an exercise carried out in response to economic 
downturns, it leads to cash being freed up that can be used to finance investments internally 
while also delivering higher-than-expected results to shareholders. Interestingly, another 
practitioners’ study also sponsored by the Boston Consulting Group3 has shown, using a 
sample of 351 companies with complete data for the period 1999 through 2008, that it 
remains a challenging task for companies to improve and maintain the cash conversion cycle 
                                                
1 See Buchmann et al. (2009) 
2 This event was widely recognized among economists to have played a key role in the global financial crisis 
of 2007-2008 and its aftermaths. 
3 See Jung et al. (2010) 
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(CCC)4 continuously over a long period of time: While thirty-two percent of the companies 
in the sample managed to improve their cash conversion (or at least keep it steady) for four 
years in a row, only eight percent improved or maintained their cash conversion over a period 
of six years in a row, and a mere two percent improved or maintained their cash conversion 
over a period of eight years in a row. Not a single company managed to improve or maintain 
their cash conversion over the entire period of nine years. 
Nonetheless, this new conventional wisdom has yet to find its way into the world of 
academia, although the body of academic literature on corporate finance is focusing more 
and more attention on studying working capital management and its effect on firm 
profitability and value, particularly so in the aftermath of the global financial crisis of the 
late 2000's.  
Up until the mid-1960's to the early 1970's, researchers traditionally studied long-term as 
opposed to short-term financing decisions.5 In one of the earlier academic papers devoted 
solely to the topic of working capital,6 Walker (1964, p. 21) asks himself whether is it 
possible to develop a theory of working capital, pointing to the dearth of pertinent literature 
available at the time which might have led students of finance to “generally agree that a 
theory of working capital is not possible, or, perhaps, that such a theory, if developed, could 
not be practicably applied, and therefore would be useless”. Walker even goes so far as to 
state that “[p]robably the strongest argument that might be used in denial of the formation 
of a theory is that business is an art and not a science, and as such, the various business 
decisions cannot be guided by theory.” Fortunately, or unfortunately for Walker, thanks to 
improved technology, the availability of larger databases covering financial information 
about firms, and the use of new (empirical) research methodologies, it has been possible to 
develop a well-founded theory of working capital. This has ultimately led to closer ties 
                                                
4 The cash conversion cycle is as a metric that attempts to measure how fast a company can convert cash 
resources that are tied up in the production and sales process by following cash as it is first converted into 
inventory and accounts payable, through sales and accounts receivable, and then back into cash. This metric 
was initially developed by Gitman (1974) and later operationalized by Richards & Laughlin (1980). It is 
commonly regarded as the key measure of working capital management efficiency as it integrates the three 
pivotal components of working capital, namely account receivables, inventory and account payables. 
5 Sartoris & Hill (1983) suggest that the neglect of the study of short-term financing decisions was the result 
of the academic focus on market efficiency. They argue that short-term financial decisions are barely 
relevant in a world of perfectly efficient capital and product markets. To illustrate this argument, they cite 
a study by Lewellen et al. (1980), who show that it is largely futile for a firm operating in a competitive 
securities and product market environment to search for an optimal trade credit policy.  
6 To the best of my knowledge, the first noteworthy academic paper to have been published and that is directly 
related to a theory of WCM was that by Sagan (1955), in which the author discusses the role and function 
of the money manager. 
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between the academic world and practice, although there certainly remains room for 
improvement. Moreover, it is now widely recognized, from an academic point of view, that 
the working capital considerations play a crucial role in increasing the profitability and 
growth of a firm and that a sketchy planning and management of working capital is one of 
the prevalent causes of business failure.7 The focus, however, is not on the sustainability of 
working capital management – an aspect that is not only gaining increasing consideration 
among practitioners in response to heavy turmoil in the financial markets since 2007, but 
also requires thorough analysis from the part of academics. 
1.2. Aim 
This thesis aims to expand the existing body of literature by shedding light into the practices 
of working capital management of non-financial companies8 listed in the German DAX, 
MDAX, SDAX and TecDAX indices. Companies listed in these indices all belong to the 
Prime Standard, which offers the highest standard in terms of transparency not only of all 
segments at the Frankfurt Stock Exchange,9 but in the whole of Europe as well. This higher 
level of transparency implies a greater stock market efficiency10 and thus not only permits 
the analysis of a rather homogeneously structured set of balance sheet, cash flow and income 
statement figures,11 but also a possibility to relate these to stock price information with 
greater accuracy. 
The focus on Germany is motivated by the fact that the capital markets of many continental 
European countries, including Germany, are believed to be “underdeveloped in the sense 
that information and agency problems are particularly pronounced” (Deloof, 2003, p. 574). 
With respect to Germany, Theissen (2003) also shows that its financial system, which he 
qualifies as the “archetype of a bank dominated system” (p. 2), is underdeveloped - however 
only in terms of volume, not in terms of operational efficiency. Demirgüç-Kunt & 
Maksimovic (2002) indicate that in countries characterized by more developed banking 
systems, such as in the case of Germany, firms tend to grant more trade credit to their 
                                                
7 See Pass & Pike, 1984 
8 Excluding banks, insurance firms, financial institutions, and firms devoted to human resources consulting. 
9 Companies listed at the Frankfurt Stock Exchange can belong to three different standards, namely the Prime 
Standard or the General Standard for companies listed in the regulated market; or the Entry Standard for 
companies listed in the open market, all of which differ in terms of the transparency requirements. Further 
information on German stock market transparency standards is available at http://deutsche-boerse.com. 
10 Starcevic & Rodgers, 2011 
11 Since the year 2005, all European listed companies are required to use International Financial Reporting 
Standards (IFRS) as the framework for their financial reporting. 
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customers while at the same time being granted more finance from their own suppliers.12 
Although a trend can be observed in European countries of an international consolidation of 
their financial markets,13 implying an increasing degree of development, they can still be 
considered underdeveloped relative to the U.S. financial market. This suggests, taking into 
consideration the findings of La Porta et al. (1997), that the legal protection of both corporate 
shareholders and creditors remains relatively weak, which translates into a higher 
attractiveness of both bank financing and trade credit as sources of financing. Fisman & 
Love (2003), besides, advocate that, given the better ability of trade creditors to soothe the 
impact of weak creditor protection and imperfect information than that of formal lenders, 
firms in countries characterized by a lower degree of development of their financial systems 
tend to use informal credit provided by suppliers for the sake of growth financing. Therefore, 
the use of working capital management for the sake of financing their ongoing activities or 
their growth is likely to be of higher importance for German companies than for U.S. 
companies. 
More specifically, this thesis aims to explore whether the sustainable management of 
working capital, i.e. one that is long-lasting and insensitive, or to the least less sensitive to 
economic cycles than the short-term approach mostly adopted by firms, significantly 
enhances shareholder value. Indeed, strategies geared for example towards the reduction of 
the cash conversion cycle should free up cash that could be either reinvested in the company, 
used to service debt, or redistributed to shareholders via dividend payments and/or share 
buybacks. In either case, it is likely that the shareholders place some value on the extra cash 
arising from the adoption of a more efficient working capital management strategy. 
Faulkender and Wang (2006) have shown empirically that the value to equity holders of 
additional cash held by firms varies considerably depending on the cash regime adopted by 
the firm, i.e. whether the additional cash goes to servicing debt, is being redistributed to 
shareholders or is being used in funding capital expenditures. This thought, however, when 
put into relation with the management of working capital, neglects the fact that altering 
working capital, e.g. reducing inventory levels, offering less trade credit and/or reducing 
customer’s payment terms, while freeing up cash flow, might have a negative impact on 
future sales, which in turn will affect future (free) cash flows and, ultimately, shareholder 
                                                
12 Demirgüç-Kunt & Maksimovic (2002) mention that trade credit exceeds one quarter of corporate assets in 
Germany.  
13 See Theissen, 2003 
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value. On the other hand, firms that extend payment terms or offer a greater credit limit to 
their customers, while at the same time improving the management of the credit and default 
risks associated, may significantly improve future sales, which, supposedly, should have a 
positive impact on shareholder value.  
Thus, there is a trade-off that needs to be taken into consideration when analysing the effects 
of working capital management on shareholder value: the shareholder value of a firm could 
be positively affected by a reduction in levels of working capital since more free cash flow 
would be available in the short term that could be redistributed to shareholders. However, 
the same reduction in levels of working capital should have a negative effect on the pattern 
of future sales and therefore also on shareholder value. 
In fact, from an accounting (and therefore static) point of view, the value of a firm should 
not change just because capital which is tied in inventory and receivables is being turned 
into a free cash flow. It is the efficiency with which a firm operates and the pattern of future 
sales that are affected by a change in levels of working capital. This in turn will most 
certainly alter shareholder value. 
1.3. Contribution and Outline 
I present, in the first part of this thesis, how the theory of working capital management has 
evolved since it first appeared as a topic relevant to academia. The first part should thus be 
understood by the reader, and that would represent part of my contribution to the body of 
existing literature, as a compendium on working capital and its sound management which 
could be used as a guide to both practitioners and academics interested in the research area 
of working capital management. I should note here that this thesis offers a literature review 
which only covers a purposive sample, following Cooper's (1988) Taxonomy of Literature 
Reviews, in which I examine only the pivotal research articles in the field of working capital 
management that are of relevance to the second, empirical part of this thesis. Indeed, since 
a great amount of ink has been spilled in the writing of research papers covering this topic, 
the research outcomes and methodologies of which are very similar, it represents a better 
article selection approach than an exhaustive review of all the existing literature, which 
would be nothing more than repetitive. The literature review is organized both in a historical 
as well as a methodological format. The first part is outlined as follows: In sections 2 to 6, I 
present the concept of working capital, the main factors affecting the level at which a firm 
chooses to set its working capital, the methods the firm may use in managing its working 
capital, the factors which may affect a firm’s working capital management efficiency, as well 
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as the factors associated with the year-end decline in working capital, a topic of paramount 
importance which nonetheless is rarely taken into consideration in the existing empirical 
studies of working capital management. 
Since the focus in the second part of this thesis is on an empirical study of working capital 
management of non-financial companies listed in the German stock market and its 
association with shareholder value, the choice of a research methodology adapted to my 
purpose is of crucial importance. The empirical work and the findings I present in the second 
part of this thesis thus represent the other part my empirical contribution to the body of 
literature as there are, to the best of my knowledge, no empirical studies that specifically aim 
their attention at scrutinizing the link between working capital management and shareholder 
wealth for companies listed in the German stock market. Furthermore, I provide an 
alternative measure of working capital management which, given the nature of activity of 
the firms in my sample, turns out to be superior to existing measures commonly in use. The 
second part will begin with a review of the methods used in the most relevant empirical 
articles covering the link between profitability or shareholder wealth and the management 
of working capital.  
  
 
PART ONE 
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2. The Nature of Working Capital 
2.1. Definition 
First and foremost, a thesis about working capital management should define the concept of 
working capital before setting out the different approaches to its management. The concept 
of working capital can be illustrated using a typical balance sheet. Figure 1 presents a 
diagram of such a balance sheet, in which the left-hand side is divided into current and fixed 
assets and the right-hand side into current and long term liabilities and equity. While the 
assets characterize the investments that have been undertaken, the liabilities represent the 
way those assets have been financed. Current (or short-term) assets, which are generally 
expected to become liquid within one year, include items such as, among others, cash, short-
term bank deposits, marketable securities, trade receivables and inventories (consisting of 
raw materials, work-in-progress and finished goods awaiting sale and delivery), and differ 
from fixed (or long-term) assets such as property, plant & equipment (PPE) and goodwill, 
which are expected to take more than a year to become liquid. Similarly, current (or short-
term) liabilities, which are generally due within a period of one year, include trade credit a 
firm owes its suppliers of goods and services, wages and other obligations due to the firm's 
employees in exchange for labour, taxes due within a year and payment obligations on short-
term debt. Typically, the level of current assets represents the single largest investment of 
many firms, whereas firms finance these current assets in many instances for a large part 
through current liabilities (Smith, 1973).  
 Assets Liabilities and Equity 
Current assets, aj Current liabilities, lj 
Fixed assets, Aj Long term liabilities, Lj 
 Equities, Ej 
Figure 1: A Typical Balance Sheet (source: Smith, 1973)14 
Working capital relates to the categories 'current assets' and 'current liabilities' and is defined 
in standard corporate finance textbooks as the difference between these two categories, i.e. 
                                                
14 A subscript j on each balance sheet category points out to different specific accounts within each category. 
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Σ aj – Σ lj. It is also often referred to as Net Working Capital (NWC).15 It indicates how much 
cash and other liquid assets (i.e. assets that are expected to be converted into cash within a 
period of one year) are available to a firm to fulfil the cash requirements imposed by its 
current liabilities and can therefore be understood as a short-term concept: A positive 
(negative) working capital value indicates the firm’s (in)ability to pay off its current 
liabilities using its current assets. 
To summarize, working capital is a measure – widely used by accountants - of a firm’s net 
position of a firm’s both real and financial liquid assets.16 However, one should keep in mind 
here that a balance sheet provides only a static snapshot of the firm's investments and 
corresponding financing at a given moment in time. Though such snapshots can be analysed 
on different periodic bases and then compared to examine the evolution of a firm's working 
capital pattern over time,17 a dynamic view of working capital as a 'flow' value18 that takes 
into consideration what has happened between consecutive reports would provide a better 
understanding of its relation to the firm's evolution.  
2.2. Interpreting the Concept of Working Capital 
Although the definition set out above appears quite simple and straightforward, the concept 
of working capital remains complex in terms of its interpretation and both firm managers 
and owners have been found to be facing difficulty in applying it in practice.  As a matter of 
fact, understanding only the explicit equation does not in itself provide the deeper 
understanding required for practitioners to efficiently perform standard corporate finance 
duties related to the management of working capital. One can assert that working capital is 
closely related to the liquidity of a firm. Indeed, after a firm has bought the property, plant 
and equipment that allow it to begin its operating activities, the bulk of its cash flows are 
generated by investing in and selling current assets. The firm will purchase, using cash and/or 
trade credit from its suppliers, raw materials; it eventually might have value added to these 
and will then be able to sell finished products to its customers, perhaps offering them the 
possibility to pay as soon as the goods are sold at a discount or later. Since current assets 
typically account for a large part of total assets, one can easily figure the importance of 
                                                
15 As opposed to gross working capital, which refers to the value of all current assets. Gross working capital 
does however not reveal a firm’s true financial position. Thus, whenever the term Working Capital is 
mentioned in this thesis, it should be understood as Net Working Capital. 
16 See Fazzari & Petersen (1993) 
17 See Preve & Sarria-Allende (2010) 
18 See Pass & Pike (1984) 
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decisions related to working capital: holding too high a level of current assets may for 
instance translate in the underperforming of a firm’s investment. Moreover, if a firm holds 
inadequate levels of current assets, it may be faced with shortages and smoothly maintaining 
daily operations may prove difficult.19   
However, despite conventional wisdom, the value of working capital, as it is defined in the 
previous section, is not in itself so relevant when assessing the liquidity of a firm. It is 
nevertheless without any doubt commonly reported as a stand-alone value in corporate 
financial communications. What can nevertheless be asserted is that the value of working 
capital gives an investor hints as to whether a firm operates efficiently20 and whether it is in 
short-term financial health.21   
An alternative, novel interpretation of the concept of working capital is provided by Preve 
& Sarria-Allende (2010) and departs from the traditional accounting view described above. 
It starts from the insight that a firm requires to finance in some way its operating 
investments22 to maintain its commercial activities. Usually, part of these investments is 
financed by short-term operating liabilities, i.e. the credit provided by suppliers, employees, 
and the tax authority, which can be considered as spontaneous resources23 as they are 
generated by the sheer fact of doing business. The remaining part of the operating 
investments which are not financed by short-term operating liabilities is being funded by the 
financial needs for operation (FNO). As can be seen from Figure 2 below, working capital, 
i.e. the balance between current assets and current liabilities, covers part of these financial 
needs for operation, the other part being covered by short-term financial debt. Note here that 
working capital can be written down not only as the difference between current assets and 
current liabilities, but also as the difference between permanent capital (i.e. long-term debt 
and equity) and fixed assets. Thus, a decrease (increase) of a firm’s level of equity or long-
term debt or an increase (decrease) in its level of fixed assets leads to a decrease (increase) 
of its working capital. Viewed in this light, it becomes straightforward that the firm’s 
                                                
19 See Van Horne & Wachowicz (2009) 
20 Capital which is tied in inventories or receivables cannot be used to repay any of the firm's obligations. 
Therefore, a firm not operating in the most efficient manner, for instance by collecting receivables too 
slowly or keeping too high levels of inventories, will tend to have a tendency of increasing working capital 
from one period to the next. 
21 A firm's whose current liabilities exceed its current assets may face difficulties paying back its debts in the 
short term and thus faces a higher probability of bankruptcy. 
22 These include inventories, receivables and a minimum of liquidity required by a firm to operate. 
23 See Faus (1997) 
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decision about how much working capital it uses to fund short-term financial needs for 
operation is a highly strategic one which is long-term in nature as it is closely related to the 
decision regarding fixed assets as well as long-term debt and equity. 
 
Current assets 
Clients 
Inventories 
Other short-term assets 
   
 
 
Short-term operating liabilities 
Suppliers 
Employees 
Taxes 
    Short-term financial debt 
     
Permanent capital 
Fixed assets 
Machinery 
Plant 
Other fixed assets 
   Long-term debt 
 Bonds 
 Long-term bank debt 
Equity 
Figure 2: Financial Needs for Operation and Working Capital (Source: Preve & Sarria-Allende, 2010) 
2.3.  Working Capital Metrics 
I have mentioned in Section 2.1. that a positive (negative) working capital value indicates a 
firm’s (in)ability to pay off its current liabilities using its current assets. Sometimes, 
investors, financial analysts as well as financial managers use other financial metrics to 
evaluate a firm’s working capital position. 
2.3.1. Current Ratio – 3rd Degree Liquidity Measure 
One such indicator is the current ratio, also known as the working capital ratio, which is 
defined as the relative proportion of its current assets to its current liabilities: 
 
 	
 =    
	


 
 
Financial needs 
for operation 
Net working capital 
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It measures the working capital (or liquidity position) at the 3rd degree. A current ratio of less 
than 1 is commonly believed to be a strong indicator that a firm will face liquidity problems 
in the future. It can however be false to stick to this line of thinking: A current ratio of less 
than 1 is common in instances where firms are drawing down cash from a line of credit and 
cash balances are kept at a minimum, only being replenished when it is absolutely required 
to pay for short-term liabilities. Thus, in these instances, the presence of the line of credit 
renders it very unlikely that a firm will not be able to meet its short-term obligations. Though 
it is obvious that a higher current ratio points to a greater liquidity than a lower one, it is also 
judicious to compare a firm’s current ratio to that of its industry peers and to consider the 
trend of that firm’s current ratio over time. Moreover, it is important to take into 
consideration the composition of the current assets, since otherwise the current ratio can be 
misleading: It makes a great difference whether these current assets are predominantly in the 
form of inventories rather than in the form of cash, marketable securities or accounts 
receivable as the former can prove difficult to liquidate in the short term, particularly so in 
the case of a low inventory turnover ratio. A similar problem occurs when accounts 
receivables payment terms are quite stretched, which may indicate unrecognized bad debts. 
2.3.2. Quick Asset Ratio – 2nd Degree Liquidity Measure 
Another widely utilized measure of a firm’s working capital (or short-term liquidity) position 
is the quick asset ratio (QAR), which is also known as quick ratio or acid-test ratio and 
measures the firm’s liquidity at the 2nd degree. It is defined as: 
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It is more stringent than the current ratio as it further refines the current ratio by measuring 
a firm’s ability to meet its short-term obligation using its most liquid assets, therefore 
excluding inventories, which of all the various current assets, is generally understood to be 
the most difficult to convert into cash when a firm is being liquidated. 
 
2.3.3. Cash Ratio – 1st Degree Liquidity Measure  
The third and most stringent and conservative ratio measuring a firm’s liquidity (or working 
capital position) is the cash ratio. It measures the liquidity at the 1st degree and is given as: 
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This ratio only considers the most liquid short-term assets of a firm, i.e. those which can 
most easily be used to meet short-term obligations. It ignores both inventory and receivables 
as these obviously take longer to be converted into cash to meet current liabilities. However, 
it is highly unlikely and unrealistic that a firm holds enough cash and equivalents to fully 
cover current liabilities, since it is perceived as poor asset utilization from the part of a firm 
to maintain on its balance sheet high levels of cash and equivalents. This money could be 
instead returned to shareholders, used to reduce debt or used in other ways to generate higher 
returns. Thus, this ratio, while providing an interesting liquidity perspective, has limited 
usefulness and is therefore not often used neither by analysts nor in financial reporting. I 
have nonetheless added it to this section for the sake of completeness. 
2.3.4. Working Capital Requirements (WCR) and Net Liquid Balance (NLB) 
Though the current, quick and cash ratios presented above generally provide a good picture 
of a firm’s liquidity or working capital position, they tend to reflect the liquidity position of 
a firm from a liquidation perspective and not as a going concern, as noted by Shulman & 
Cox (1985, p.64). They further argue that “current assets such as account receivable are 
often tied up in the operating cycle, and failure to account for this may distort the 
corporation’s true liquidity picture. Consequently, current and quick ratio may imply a 
reasonable level of liquidity when in fact little exists.” Other authors24 have also questioned 
the adequacy of the current and quick ratios in assessing how efficiently a firm manages its 
working capital due to their being of static nature. Following Shulman & Cox (1985) line of 
thinking, Shin & Soenen (1998, p. 38) add that “[l]iquidity for the on-going firm is not really 
dependent on the liquidation value of its assets but rather on the operating cash flow 
generated by those assets.”  
Given those reasons, Shulman & Cox (1985, p. 64) have introduced a liquidity indicator 
aimed at measuring “the net amount of liquid financial assets and obligations along with an 
integrated expression that demonstrates the direct impact changes in operating resources 
have on a firm’s financial liquidity position.” They classify Net Working Capital (NWC) 
                                                
24 See for example Emery (1984) and Kamath (1989) 
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components into financial and non-financial items and refer to these as Net Liquidity 
Balance (NLB) and Working Capital Requirements (WCR) respectively. Thus, the integrated 
expression of net working capital is given as: 
 
NWC = NLB + WCR, 
 
NLB25 encompasses all liquid financial assets minus all liquid financial obligations and 
WCR26 are defined as the difference between current requirements and resources which 
represent spontaneous items associated exclusively with the operating cycle. A firm’s WCR 
are similar in terms of interpretation to its financial needs for operations described earlier 
(see subsection 2.2.). NWC, as expressed above, contrasts with the traditional measure of 
working capital, i.e. the difference between current assets and current liabilities, in that it 
provides a better understanding of the liquidity of the firm: While the traditional expression 
both (i) fails at explaining the effect on NWC of long-term corporate decisions and (ii) 
disregards the effect on a firm’s liquidity of changes in the operating cycle as well as the 
impact on the operating cycle of capital changes, the alternative characterization presented 
above “demonstrates that corporate liquidity is, in fact, a subset of net working capital and 
is directly affected by spontaneous changes in the operating requirements and operational 
resources of the firm.” (Shulman & Cox, 1985, p. 64) Besides, Shulman & Cox (1985) assert 
that the NLB, by focusing on liquid financial assets and financial obligations, allows a more 
representative assessment of a firm’s default potential than other standard liquidity 
indicators.27 
To conclude this section, it should be noted that most of the measures of working capital 
used in studies that I will henceforth present are, in one way or another, adaptations of the 
                                                
25 Shulman & Cox (1985) express NLB as Cash + Marketable Securities – Notes Payable.  
26 Shulman & Cox (1985) express WCR as (Accounts Receivable + Inventory + Prepaid Expenses) – (Accounts 
Payable + Net Accruals) 
27 To assess the consistency of the NLB, or rather the NLB relative to total assets as a measure of a firm’s 
default risk, Shulman & Cox (1985) have compared it to seven other ratios: Besides the ratio of cash to 
total assets, the other six are the standard solvency ratios used at the time of publishing of their study by 
Dun & Bradstreet, namely the current ratio, the quick ratio, the ratio of current liabilities to net worth, the 
ratio of current liabilities to inventories, the ratio of total liabilities to net worth and the ratio of fixed assets 
to net worth. I ought to mention here that Shulman & Cox (1985) have not compared the NLB to total assets 
ratio to the ratio of working capital to total assets, defined as (Current Assets – Current Liabilities) / Total 
Assets, frequently used in studies of corporate problems and which Altman (1968) has shown to be the most 
valuable measure of liquidity in terms of statistical significance – the other measures of liquidity Altman 
evaluated were the current and the quick ratio.  
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above presented measure of working capital requirements (WCR). These can alternatively 
be referred to as net operating working capital. 
2.3.5. Measuring Working Capital Management Efficiency 
In this subsection, I briefly introduce the commonly used measures of working capital 
management efficiency. I refer the reader to section 4 of this thesis for a more extensive 
discussion of issues related to the management of working capital. Working capital 
management performance is typically evaluated using one of the following metrics: 
 
. Days Sales Outstanding (DSO):  
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
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The DSO represent the (fiscal) year-end trade receivables net of allowance for doubtful 
accounts, divided by one day of average revenues. An increase in DSO represents a 
deterioration, a decrease an improvement. It is also known as the receivables conversion 
period (see Fig. 3) and as the number of days accounts receivable. 
 
. Days Inventories Outstanding (DIO): 
  
& =  &'
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The DIO represent the (fiscal) year-end inventory balance divided by an average daily cost 
of goods sold. An increase in DIO represents a deterioration, a decrease an improvement. It 
is also known as the inventory conversion period (see Fig. 3) and as the number of days 
inventories. 
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. Days Payables Outstanding (DPO): 
 
 =   -	'	
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The DPO represent the (fiscal) year-end payable balance divided by an average daily cost of 
goods sold. An increase in DPO represents an improvement, a decrease a deterioration. It is 
also known as the payables deferral period (see Fig. 3) or as the number of days accounts 
payable. 
 
. Cash Conversion Cycle (CCC):  
 
CCC = (DSO + DIO – DPO) 
 
The CCC, a metric related to the total cash cycle or operating cycle (see Fig. 3) initially 
developed by Gitman (1974) and later operationalized by Richards & Laughlin (1980), 
represents the overall working capital management performance in days as calculated above. 
It is an “additive function [and] measures the number of days funds are committed to 
inventories and receivables, less the number of days that payments to suppliers are 
deferred.” (Gentry et al., 1990, p. 90) It is indirectly linked to a firm’s valuation: A short 
CCC relative to a lengthy CCC is a typical indication that a firm is collecting cash quickly 
while at the same time paying its suppliers near the due date. This in turn results in the net 
cash flows and the value of the firm having a higher present value.28 Gentry et al. (1990) 
also suggest that a shorter CCC points to both a higher efficiency of a firm’s internal 
operations and a closer availability of net cash flows. This argument, I should note, was 
already brought forward earlier by Hager (1976), who suggest that a low cash conversion 
cycle not only points to (i) managers’ ability to curtail firms’ holdings of assets that are 
                                                
28 See Gentry et al. (1990) 
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relatively unprofitable, e.g. cash and marketable securities,29 but also (ii) sustains the firms’ 
debt capacity as less short-term debt is needed to maintain liquidity, and (iii) reflects a higher 
net present value of net cash flow from the firm’s assets.  The shortfall of the CCC, Gentry 
et al. (1990) argue, is however that it fails to take into consideration the timing of the cash 
flows as they are tied up in each step of the operating cycle. Another criticism of the CCC 
comes from Shin & Soenen (1998), who argue that because of it being an additive concept 
and that the denominators of it three components are not one and the same, adding these 
does not make a very useful measure. 
 
 
 
 
‘ 
 
 
Figure 3: Cash Conversion Cycle (Source: Richards & Laughlin, 1980) 
 
. Weighted Cash Conversion Cycle (WCCC) 
 
WCCC = WOC – WDAP 
 
In the above expression, WOC represents the weighted operating cycle and WDAP the 
weighted days in accounts payable. The weighted cash conversion cycle is a modified 
version of the cash conversion cycle developed by Gentry et al. (1990) that, unlike the CCC, 
“combines the weighted information related to purchases, production, distribution and 
collection minus the payables effect” (Gentry et al., 1990, p. 97). Specifically, WOC is 
determined by multiplying the weight of each component of the operating cycle, namely raw 
                                               
29 This argument is however not uncontroversial: Czyzewski & Hicks (1992), for instance, show firms with 
high relative concentration of cash assets to be successful, thereby suggesting that high levels of cash can 
lead to higher than average return on assets. 
R
es
o
u
rc
e 
P
u
rc
h
as
e 
Operating Cycle 
C
ash
 
R
eceiv
ed
 
Inventory 
Conversion Period 
Receivables 
Conversion Period 
Product Sales 
Payables 
Deferral Period 
Cash Outlay 
Cash Conversion 
Cycle 
21 
 
materials, work-in-progress, finished goods,30 and accounts receivable, with the length of 
time funds are tied up in each of these components.31 WPAD, which represents the payable 
effect, is obtained by multiplying the payable weight, a complex function reflecting the role 
played by suppliers in financing the raw material32, with the number of days that payment is 
deferred to suppliers. While being a more complete measure and thus providing a better 
appreciation of the complexities of the cash cycle than the CCC, the WCCC lacks practicality 
for a simple reason: the differentiation of inventories into its three components is not always 
readily available to outside investigators, e.g. academic researchers, investors or financial 
analysts, and can therefore not always be calculated. 
 
. Net Trade Cycle (NTC):  
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
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The NTC, being basically equal to the CCC save for the fact that the days accounts 
receivable, inventories, and accounts payable are all expressed as a percentage of revenues, 
represents an indication of the days sales available to a firm in order to finance its working 
capital under ceteris paribus conditions. In addition, it provides per Shin & Soenen (1998, p. 
38) “an easy estimate for additional financing needs with regards to working capital 
management expressed as a function of the projected sales growth.” Shin & Soenen (1998) 
also suggest that the NTC, similarly to the CCC, is closely related to the issue of shareholder 
value creation and firm valuation:  Shortening the NTC results in a higher present value of 
the net cash flows generated by the assets, thus in turn increasing shareholder value. Besides, 
they suggest that shortening the NTC increases the efficiency with which a firm manages its 
                                                
30 Note here that inventory is split into its three different components. 
31 See Gentry et al. (1990) 
32 The greater the payment deferral to suppliers and the larger the reduction in WOC, the larger the payable 
weight. (See Gentry et al., 1990) 
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working capital, in turn lowering the need for external sources of financing and increasing 
its financial performance.33 
 
. Cash Conversion Efficiency (CCE): 
 
 =  	ℎ 1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The CCE is calculated as cash flow from operations divided by sales. It measures a firm’s 
efficiency to convert its sales into cash: Typically, firms benefit from shortening 
(lengthening) all types of floats34 associated with cash inflows (outflows).35 It measures the 
efficiency with which a firm manages its working capital from a macro perspective and, in 
this respect, differs from the CCC or NTC measures of WCM efficiency. However, using the 
CCE as a measure of WCM efficiency may be misleading when comparing firms with one 
another as one needs to make sure every firm represented in one’s study calculates its cash 
flow from operations figure in the same way. The REL Consulting Company and the CFO 
magazine used to evaluate the WCM efficiency when they started their annual surveying of 
firm’s WCM efficiency in 1997 using the CCE, but later in 2003 it was dropped, giving way 
to the CCC, commonly considered to be the key measure of WCM efficiency. 
3. Key Determinants of Working Capital Decisions 
 
Before I turn to the different approaches to working capital management in the next section, 
I ought to provide a more complete understanding of the concept of working capital and 
what exogenous and endogenous factors determine its level. Specifically, I explore how the 
seasonality of a firm’s underlying business, its growth aspirations, the industry the firm 
operates in, the financial constraints it may face as well as whether it is in risk of financial 
                                                
33 In addition, Kamath (1989), in his examination of the firms operating in the retail grocery industry, also 
provides evidence of a negative association between the net trade cycle and operating performance, though 
his results do not hold true for every year under consideration in his study. 
34 Float is here referred to as the total time lapse from the purchasing of resources at the beginning of a firm’s 
operating cycle until payment for goods and services is received at the end of the firm’s operating cycle. 
(See Asaf, 2004) 
35 See Asaf (2004) 
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distress, the market power it enjoys impact on its working capital decision. I also explore 
issues relating working capital management to corporate governance as well to managers’ 
incentives to reduce levels of working capital at the fiscal year-end. 
Keeping in mind the aim of my study, i.e. to try to establish a relation of causality between 
working capital management and shareholder value using a sample of German publicly listed 
companies, it is key to consider these determinants of working capital to better address 
endogeneity concerns that may be present in the regressions that will be run. Another 
motivation for taking a closer look at the key factors affecting working capital management 
is that there has been scarce literature on the overall theory of working capital management. 
Finally, emphasizing on the determinants of working capital is also necessary as it provides 
a solid base for academics as well as practitioners to understand any issue they wish to 
scrutinize in relation to the field of working capital management. 36 
3.1.  Seasonality and Growth Effects on Working Capital37 
High seasonality is a feature intrinsic to a significant number of industries, meaning that the 
bulk of trade in these industries takes place during seasonal peaks clustered throughout the 
year. How does this feature affect the level of working capital required by a firm that goes 
through a peak season? One may assume that this firm will increase its level of cash to cover 
higher production and marketing costs. It will also most certainly hold higher levels of 
inventory during that period as well as build up more accounts receivables due to the higher 
turnover. On the other hand, these increases in operating investment will likely be funded by 
using trade credit granted to the firm by its suppliers, leading to an increase in account 
payables on the firm’s balance sheet. Although the firm entering the peak season will 
eventually increase its operating investment, it is not clear what the effect will be on the level 
of working capital. Following conventional wisdom, it would typically be expected that the 
seasonal peak calls for a higher net investment in current assets, thus increasing the level of 
working capital. This thought, which might be intuitively correct, is nevertheless wrong and 
part of the usual confusion.38 Indeed, taking into consideration the second definition of 
working capital presented in the previous section as the difference between fixed assets and 
permanent resources (i.e. long-term debt and equity), one can ask whether a higher operating 
                                                
36 Appuhami (2008) for instance notes that some firms are still struggling with the management of their working 
capital due to their lacking a sufficient understanding of the factors determining working capital.   
37 See Preve & Sarria-Allende (2010) 
38 See Preve & Sarria-Allende (2010), p. 27 
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activity in a short period would efficiently be financed by issuing new long-term debt or 
even equity. Given the agency, information and issuance costs that this would involve, it 
does not seem to be the most efficient solution. Thus, the permanent resources part of the 
working capital equation remains most probably unchanged throughout the year. The other 
part of the equation, fixed assets, will also most probably remain unchanged: It would not 
make much sense to invest in property, plant or equipment just to adjust to the high season’s 
requirements only to sell it back once the high season is over. This leads Preve & Sarria-
Allende (2010) to draw the following conclusion: Working capital, by construction, will not 
change throughout the year when a firm faces seasonal changes in its trading activity.39 What 
changes throughout the year in consequence of the higher level of activity due to seasonality 
are rather the financial needs for operation. This argumentation is summarized graphically 
in Fig. 4. A question that nevertheless remains to be answered is how the increased financial 
needs for operation are being financed when the long-term financing is not altered. Going 
back to Fig. 2 in the previous section, one can see that the financial needs for operation can 
be computed as the sum of working capital and short-term financial debt. It therefore 
becomes clear that the net operating investment (or financial needs for operation) can be 
financed through either working capital or short-term debt, “where working capital is 
interpreted not simply as an investment decision but also as a financing strategy.” (Preve & 
Sarria-Allende (2010, p. 29) 
Choosing the right level of working capital is nevertheless linked to the (seasonal) nature of 
a firm’s operations. Indeed, a firm that wants to avoid raising long-term debt to curtail the 
financing costs associated with unnecessary capital in periods of lower activity will choose 
a level of working capital equal to the minimum monthly financial need for operation. Thus, 
any increased operating investment required during the high season will be financed solely 
by short-term debt. In contrast, all the financial needs for operation will be covered by 
working capital during the low season (See Fig. 5). Following this strategy could turn out to 
be a cheap option for a firm under normal conditions characterized by low levels of 
uncertainty as it allows the firm to use less long-term capital, which, assuming a typical 
upward-sloping yield curve, is more expensive. 
Under riskier market conditions, such as those characterizing the economic environment our 
empirical study is embedded in, where for instance a credit crunch makes it difficult or even 
                                                
39 This implies that the level of working capital should change because of long-term rather than short-term 
changes in business activity. 
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impossible for firms to raise short-term debt, the strategy of keeping a low level of working 
capital would not only leave the firm facing a higher interest rate risk40, but it may also be 
unable to participate in the busy high season as a result, which in turn could lead the firm to 
suffer huge losses or even face bankruptcy. 
Alternatively, a firm can follow the opposite strategy and choose the highest level of working 
capital to finance its operations, therefore not using any short-term, but only long-term 
financial debt (See Fig. 6). This strategy, while allowing operating financial needs to be 
covered entirely by working capital, could turn out to be overly costly as the funds (sourced 
with long-term debt and/or equity, thus having a high cost associated to them) that are idle 
during a weak season, would require to be invested at a considerable return. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
Figure 4: Effect of Seasonality in Operating Activity (Source: Preve & Sarria-Allende, 2010) 
This could however not be achieved were these funds to be invested in short-term 
investments, which would guarantee their short-term availability. Taking into consideration 
the two extreme scenarios presented above, one might ask how firms engaged in seasonal 
businesses choose their level of working capital. Preve & Sarria-Allende (2010) argue that 
a firm’s choice of working capital is likely to be influenced by the firm’s debt capacity, its 
access to debt and perhaps even its location. A firm located in a country where financing 
opportunities are easily accessible would ideally opt for a lower investment in working 
                                                
40 Since the average investment over the course of year is higher than the lowest level of working capital the 
firm has chosen, the average life of the assets would not match the maturity of the corresponding financing 
source. (Preve & Sarria-Allende, 2010) 
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capital than if the same firm was in a developing country characterized by illiquid capital 
markets and regular liquidity crises. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
Figure 5: ‘Low Working Capital’ Strategy (Source: Preve & Sarria-Allende, 2010) 
In general, though, it is unlikely that firms will follow either of these two extreme strategies; 
rather, the optimal working capital strategy will likely lie somewhere in between (see Fig. 
7). What should nonetheless motivate the right level of working capital is the trade-off 
between the objective to minimize low-return investments and avoiding liquidity risk. 
Since most firms not only face seasonal variations in activity, but also grow or shrink over 
time because of external shocks or the firms’ own strategic decisions, the decision regarding 
the level of working capital is most probably dynamic in nature. How, then, is a firm 
expected to adjust its working capital when it is not just facing seasonality, but also a clearly 
upward or downward trend in its business activities? Understanding the theoretical 
implications of an economic slowdown on working capital is of interest in this study, as the 
empirical study presented in the second part of this thesis focuses on a period characterized 
by a major financial crisis.  
In the same way that a firm following a growth strategy can generate more sales by investing 
in working capital (e.g. by granting longer payment periods to its customers or by increasing 
inventory to meet a growing demand), it can, when faced with deteriorating economic 
conditions, liquidate its working capital by redoubling its endeavours to collect receivables 
or by toughening credit policies on new sales. As such, working capital can be considered a 
reversible tool, as emphasized by Fazzari & Petersen (1993). It is interesting to note here 
that following evidence disclosed by Meltzer (1960), firms with a constrained liquidity stock 
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Low return 
cut account receivables when facing “tight money”,41 whereas firms with a strong liquidity 
position42 don’t. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
  
Figure 6: ‘High Working Capital’ Strategy (Source: Preve & Sarria-Allende, 2010) 
 
  
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
Figure 7: ‘Intermediate Working Capital’ Strategy (Source: Preve & Sarria-Allende, 2010) 
In any case, one can generally expect firms to adapt their level of working capital not only 
to the current state of the economy they are facing, reducing it in times where the economy 
                                                
41 Meltzer (1960), p. 429 
42 The liquidity position, (or liquidity stock), is defined by Meltzer (1960) as the ratio of cash plus government 
securities to current liabilities and is comparable to the quick ratio [defined as the ratio of cash plus 
marketable securities plus accounts receivables to current liabilities] 
Working capital 
Financial  
needs for  
operation 
€ 
Time 
Short-term 
invesments 
Working capital 
Financial  
needs for  
operation € 
Time 
Short-term 
investments 
Short-term 
financial debt 
Liquidity risk 
28 
 
is in recession and increasing it again when the economy takes off, but also to their own 
growth strategy. Failing to do so will lead to a situation as the one depicted in Fig. 8 below, 
where the level of working capital is not adapted to the growth trend and the need to finance 
growing operating investments would have to be covered by short-term debt.43 
This implies that the firm that does not adapt its level of working capital to meet growth 
concerns, has unconstrained access to capital markets, which, in times of  tight money is far 
from being guaranteed and thus represents a very risky suboptimal strategy. Rather, firms 
ought to fund growth by adjusting their level of working capital in response to a well-defined 
long-term trend in the level of economic activity, as depicted in Fig. 9. 
 
 
 
 
 
  
   
Figure 8: Financing Growth I (Source: Preve & Sarria-Allende, 2010) 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
Figure 9: Financing Growth II (Source: Preve & Sarria-Allende, 2010) 
 
                                                
43 See Preve & Sarria-Allende (2010) 
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In conclusion, it is crucial for a firm that choose their level of working capital to distinguish 
between situations of seasonal fluctuations in economic activity and situations of actual 
growth. Failure to do so will lead the firm to “either take suboptimal financing risks 
(financing with short term debt investments that really call for long-term financing, resulting 
in the risk that some opportunities may not receive funding) or pay too high a required return 
on financial capital (financing short-term needs with long-term debt, resulting in idle funds 
upon which payments are due)” (Preve & Sarria-Allende, p.41). 
3.2. Industry Influence on Working Capital Decisions 
Another major determinant of a firm’s working capital decision relates to the industry it 
belongs to. Evidence given by Hawawini et al. (1986) in their study of the industry influence 
on corporate working capital decisions, which analyses a sample of a total of 1,181 firms 
from thirty-six industries over a period of nineteen years (1960 to 1979), has uncovered “a 
significant and persistent industry effect on a firm’s investment in working capital” (p. 15). 
Moreover, the results they report “are also consistent with the notion that there exist industry 
benchmarks within industry groups to which firms adhere when setting their working capital 
investment policies.” (Hawawini et al., 1986, p. 23) It should be noted here that the authors 
have based their study on the concept of Working Capital Requirement (WCR)44, which 
constitutes “a convenient accounting measure of the amount of capital a firm has tied up in 
its operating cycle [and] may prove to be a better measure than the traditional concept of 
Net Working Capital” (Hawawini et al., 1986, p. 16). Indeed, they argue that the traditional 
notion of working capital (i.e. the balance of a firm’s current assets and current liabilities) 
includes some items, such as cash and marketable securities, overdrafts and notes payable to 
the bank, that should be considered as decision variables which are purely financial in nature 
and thus are not closely related to a firm’s investment in its current operations. To illustrate 
this point, they provide an example in which the level of cash is raised temporarily due to 
long-term debt being issued to finance capital expenditures, which may hype up its NWC. 
Nonetheless, the results obtained by Hawawini et al. (1986) when performing the same tests 
using Net Working Capital are not significantly different from the results of the tests using 
Working Capital Requirement.45 
                                                
44 Working Capital Requirement is defined as the balance of the sum of accounts receivable and inventories 
and the sum of account payables and net accruals. Hawawini et al. (1986) 
45 On a side note, it should be mentioned that Hawawini et al. (1986) fail to mention in their article that the 
concept of WCR was first introduced by Shulman & Cox (1985), who defined WCR “as the difference 
between current operational requirements […], and current operational resources” (Shulman & Cox, 1985, 
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Hawawini et al. (1986) provide the following straightforward explanation as to why there is 
an industry effect of working capital decisions: The Working Capital Requirement of a firm 
is driven, per definition, by the amplitude of its four components, namely accounts 
receivable, inventories, accounts payable, and net accruals, which are themselves a function 
of the firm’s technology, its efficiency in managing the operating cycle, and of course its 
level of sales. The level of WCR will naturally also depend on the nature of a firm’s operating 
cycle: For example, a chain of grocery stores would need a lower WCR than a manufacturer 
of industrial equipment to sustain the same level of sales.46 There are thus constraints 
imposed by the industry a firm operates in on its investment in working capital. It is 
nevertheless imaginable that two firms with similar technologies and equal level of sales that 
belong to the same industry have different levels of WCR. This can happen for instance when 
one firm is more efficient than the other in managing its operations, e.g. by holding tighter 
control over the level of inventories and receivables, which in turn leads it to invest less in 
working capital than its competitor. Usually, however, firms that are involved in the same 
industry should be able to operate with analogous degrees of managerial efficiency and are 
moreover expected to use similar technologies: in markets characterized by reasonable 
competitiveness, the spread in the degree of managerial efficiency of firms within the same 
industry is not expected to be very wide. If, for example, one firm attempts to enforce stricter 
terms of payment to its customers to reduce its investment in accounts receivable, customers 
would eventually move to the firm’s competitors in the same industry. Thus, optimal industry 
standards in managerial efficiency should develop to which firms that form an industry are 
expected to adhere. As argued by Hawawini et al. (1986), assuming technology is the same 
for all firms that constitute an industry is also reasonable and consistent with the standard 
assumption of constant operational risks within an industry. In conclusion of their 
explanation, they argue that “[i]f the degree of managerial efficiency and technology is 
assumed to be the same for all the firms making up an industry, then the ratios of Working 
Capital Requirement to Sales47 of firms belonging to the same industry should not differ 
significantly and their average should constitute that industry’s benchmark WCR-to-Sales 
                                                
p. 65), both items they consider as spontaneous and exclusively related to the operating cycle: WCR = 
[Accounts Receivable + Inventory + Prepaid Expenses] – [Accounts Payable + Net Accruals]. 
46 Given that much of its operations is handled on a cash basis, the chain of grocery stores will most probably 
carry a relatively lower level of inventories and accounts receivable than the manufacturer of industrial 
equipment. Hawawini et. al. (1986) 
47 This ratio is assumed by Hawawini et al. (1986) to be the measure of efficiency with which the components 
of WCR are managed. 
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ratio. The industries’ mean WCR-to-Sales ratios should, however, be significantly different 
from one another.” (p. 18) 
Nonetheless, in an earlier empirical study by Nunn (1981) that covers the strategic 
determinants of working capital from a product-line perspective in the case of multi-
divisional corporations, evidence is given as to why working capital policies can also differ 
within, not only across industries. Interestingly, instead of focusing on the “temporary” part 
of working capital, i.e. the part shaped by weekly and monthly fluctuations in a firm’s 
business activities, which is undoubtedly a useful “short-term or tactical [mean in] 
determining such matters as the economic order quantities and the amount of credit to extend 
to a particular customer” (p. 207), Nunn (1981) is interested in the “permanent” part of a 
firm’s working capital investment, the levels of which “do not fluctuate with short-run 
changes, but persist year after year, continually representing a major portion of the asset 
structure” (p. 207).  Nunn (1981) uses data from 1971 to 1978 averaged over four years in 
his multiple regression model.48 In designing his working capital model, Nunn (1981) uses, 
in a first step, correlation analysis to filter out 166 independent model variables from roughly 
500 potential data base49 variables which he assumed may potentially explain the level of 
the “permanent” portion of working capital investment of a business.50 Since correlation 
analysis, while being useful as a screening method, is a limited tool as multivariate 
relationships are being ignored, Nunn (1981), in a second step, goes on to use factor analysis, 
a multivariate technique that allows the variable space under study to be reduced to a smaller 
number of factors. The ratio of Working Capital to Sales, set as the dependent variable, was 
regressed on the 43 orthogonal51 factors resulting from the factor analysis.52 It should be 
pointed out here that Nunn (1981), since his study models working capital from a product-
line perspective, defines working capital to include only accounts receivable and inventories, 
                                                
48 This method obviously allows for a reduction of the influence of short-term or yearly fluctuations in business 
activity. Nunn (1981) 
49 Nunn (1981) uses the Strategic Planning Institute’s Profit Impact of Market Strategy database, which 
“consists of information on the strategic experiences of 1700 plus businesses” (pp. 207-208), and thus 
“provides a unique cross-sectional resource, assembled from product-line businesses in many different 
industries.” (p. 207) 
50 Nunn (1981) defines a business “as a product-line, division, or other operating unit of a company, producing 
a well-defined line of products, and competing in a specific market” (p. 207) 
51 The selection of individual variables from orthogonal factors reduces the possibility of multicollinearity 
between these variables, thus taking into consideration concerns about possible endogeneity in the cross-
sectional model. 
52 The factor analysis led to 43 orthogonal factors being recovered and was performed in two steps: In a first 
step, the initial factors were recovered using principal component analysis. In a second step, a varimax 
rotation was performed. (see Nunn, 1981) 
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components typically controlled, as he argues, at the level of product-line managers. Other 
components, such as cash and short-term securities, were left out as they were supposedly 
not managed at the product line level but rather controlled directly at the level of the 
corporations’ headquarters.53 
In conclusion, the model designed by Nunn (1981), together with the empirical evidence 
provided in support of his model, explain “why working capital varies from one business to 
the next, i.e. why some product-lines have low working capital requirements and others very 
high ones. For example, determinants such as relative price, relative product image, and 
relative breadth of product-line explain why working capital vary among competitors within 
an industry.” (Nunn, 1981, p. 208)  
The difference in working capital requirement across industries is explained by other 
determinants such as industry exports and industry concentration: 
It is expected that export-oriented businesses are likely to carry higher raw material and 
work-in-process inventory and to maintain production facilities abroad, meaning that the 
receivables collection period is lengthened due to difficulties not only related to distance but 
also to different payment procedures in the host country. Similarly, businesses that rely 
significantly on the import of supplies are expected to carry higher buffer inventories to 
avoid the increased risk of interruptions in supplies. 
Besides, the more concentrated an industry is, the greater the risk of collusion (e.g. through 
price fixing) between the industry players is likely to be. In such oligopolistic circumstances, 
businesses are likely to display a higher price-to-marginal cost ratio than would be the case 
under more competitive market conditions (See Scherer, 1970, p. 237). “The more price 
exceeds marginal cost, the greater the benefits from carrying inventory relative to the cost 
and the more sensible it is to avoid shortages and dissatisfied customers by holding 
additional inventory. A similar argument could be made for extending generous credit.” 
(Nunn - 1981, p. 213) 
More recently, Filbeck & Krueger (2005) also provide significant empirical evidence of 
differences between industries in working capital measures as well as changes within 
industries across time. They base their study on data covering nearly 1,000 companies in the 
United States in the period 1996 to 2000 taken from the annual Working Capital 
Management Survey published by CFO magazine and use classical analysis of variance to 
                                                
53 This argumentation was certainly correct back in the days where Nunn (1981) published his article, when a 
non-integrative approach to working capital management (according to which each individual component 
of working capital was managed independently of the other components) was typically adopted by firms. 
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study industry rank difference within year as well as the Kendall’s Coefficient of 
Concordance to assess the performance of WCM across years. Filbeck & Krueger (2005) 
use the following two of the five measures of working capital efficiency identified by CFO 
magazine to determine the overall rank:54 
 
. Cash Conversion Efficiency (CCE) = (Cash flow from operations) / Sales 
. Days Working Capital (DWC) = (Receivables + Inventory – Payables) / (Sales/365)55 
 
Interestingly, they suggest the significant changes in the above measures over time to be 
partly explained by macroeconomic factors such as changes in interest rates, in the rate of 
innovation, and competition. This result, which is in line with commonly held expectations,56 
seems however not to hold true for small firms: A study by Lamberson (1995), who explored 
the linkages between changes in working capital positions and changes in levels of economic 
activity, measured using economic indicators, in a sample of 50 small U.S. companies 
covering the period 1980-1991, provides evidence suggesting that liquidity, measured by 
both the current ratio (defined as the ratio of current assets and current liabilities) and the 
quick ratio (defined as the ratio of cash, marketable securities and accounts receivable to 
current liabilities), “increased slightly for these firms during economic expansion with no 
noticeable change in liquidity during economic slowdowns.” Moreover, working capital 
investment of these firms, measured using the ratios of inventory to total assets and of current 
                                                
54 The other measures identified by CFO magazine, Days Sales Outstanding, defined as accounts 
receivable/(sales/365), Inventory Turns, defined as inventory/(sales/365) and Days Payables Outstanding, 
defined as accounts payable/(sales/365), are not considered by Filbeck & Krueger (2005) in their overall 
ranking criteria, given as (Highest overall CCE – Company CCE) / (Highest overall CCE – Lowest overall 
CCE) x (Lowest overall DWC – Company DWC) / (Lowest overall DWC – Highest overall DWC). 
55 Days Working Capital (DWC) corresponds to the Net Trade Cycle (NTC) developed by Shin & Soenen 
(1998) 
56 See Lamberson (1995). Sathyamoorthi & Wally-Dima (2008), for instance, also come to a similar result: In 
their analysis of domestic retail companies listed on the Botswana Stock Exchange in the period 2004 to 
2006, show that in times of high business volatility, firms tended to adopt conservative approach with 
regards to working capital, while an aggressive approach was more likely to be adopted in times 
characterized by low volatility. However, when looking at more mature capital markets, Chiou et al. (2006), 
who use quarterly data from the Taiwan Stock Exchange from 1996 to 2004, find no evidence in support of 
the effect of the business cycle on working capital management. Rather, they suggest a firm’s debt ratio 
and operating cash flow (among other variables such as a firm’s size, performance and age) to significantly 
impact their level of working capital, measured by the ratio of working capital requirements (WCR) to total 
assets. 
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assets to total assets, showed a relative stability during the period under study. (Lamberson, 
1995, p. 45) 
To conclude this section about the industry influence on working capital decisions, let me 
now present another noteworthy aspect related to the relative relationship between the degree 
of aggressiveness of a firm’s working capital policy and the industry it belongs to. Indeed, 
Weinraub & Visscher (1998), who explored the working capital characteristics of 216 firms 
in ten different industries using a Compustat data set of quarterly levels of current liabilities, 
current assets and total assets between 1984 and 1993, have found out empirically that the 
degree of aggressiveness with which firms follow their working capital policies depends 
significantly on the industry they are active in. Interestingly, they opt for a methodology that 
considers the current assets and current liabilities components of working capital 
individually and dissect the concept of working capital policy into current asset management 
on the one hand and financing policy on the other hand: An aggressive asset management 
thus leads to capital being downsized in current assets against long-term investments and 
results in higher profitability expectations but also in an increased liquidity risk. Conversely, 
a more conservative management of assets shifts relatively more capital in liquid short-term 
assets, therefore lowering liquidity risk to the detriment of profitability.57 
Similarly, a financing policy is defined as aggressive when more (less costly) short-term debt 
relative to long-term capital is utilized, thus lowering the cost of capital while increasing the 
short-term liquidity risk, whereas a conservative financing policy results in a higher use of 
capital (long-term debt or equity) relative to short-term debt, thus delaying the repayment of 
the debt principal or bypassing it completely by using only equity.58 
As in the study of Nunn (1981), Weinraub & Visscher (1998) mitigate the seasonality effect 
by adding and averaging quarterly data for all firms in each industry and by compiling 
calendar rather than fiscal year data, thereby also getting rid of the bias that may arise when 
different periods of financial reporting are considered. 
To determine whether statistically significant differences prevailed in the degree of 
aggressiveness in working capital policies across industries, Weinraub & Visscher (1998) 
performed one-way analysis of variance (ANOVA) tests on both the sets of 10 ten-year 
                                                
57 To measure the degree of aggressiveness in asset management, Weinraub & Visscher (1998) use the ratio of 
current assets to total assets, where a lower ratio translates into a more aggressive management. 
58 To measure the degree of aggressiveness in financing policy, Weinraub & Visscher (1998) use the ratio of 
current liabilities to total assets, where a higher ratio translates into a more aggressive financing policy. 
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average current assets to total assets ratio industry means and of 10 ten-year average current 
liabilities to total assets ratio industry means. The power of differences between industry 
values of both ratios (current assets to total assets and current liabilities to total assets) was 
further examined using Tukey’s HSD test, which compared the industry means on a paired 
sample basis. The results obtained in the one-way ANOVA tests indicate that statistically 
“significant industry differences do exist in the relative degree of aggressive/conservative 
working capital policies for both asset and liability management” (p. 13). Nonetheless, the 
result of both the ANOVA and a Tusk’s honest significance difference (HSD) test reveal that 
these differences in means are generally wider and more significant in the case of asset 
management than in the case of liability management. Furthermore, Weinraub & Visscher 
(1998) analysed the persistency of these relative differences over time using rank order 
correlations and found that both the asset management as well as the liability management 
aspects of aggressive/conservative working capital policies revealed a remarkable 
statistically significant persistence over time.59 Interestingly, when examining the 
relationship between aggressive asset management and aggressive financial management, 
again by ranking industries from low to high (high to low) ratios of current assets to total 
assets (current liabilities to total assets) and computing rank order correlations, Weinraub & 
Visscher (1998) found “that industries which pursued relatively aggressive asset policies 
simultaneously followed relatively conservative financing policies” (p. 16). 
3.3. Working Capital and Financing Constraints 
3.3.1. Empirical evidence from after the 2007-2008 global financial crisis 
The working capital regime adopted by a firm also chiefly depends on whether that firm 
faces financing constraints. A firm is facing financial constraints when its access to external 
funds (e.g. from credit markets) is limited, rendering these costlier thus increasing the debt 
expense burden on the firm (Kieschnick et al., 2013). This was particularly the case for 
smaller firms, during and after the global financial crisis of 2007-2008, a period covered in 
the timeframe of my empirical study. A study by Cole (2012), covering data for U.S. firms 
collected by U.S. banking regulators, indicates that bank lending to firms of all sizes 
plummeted by about 9 % from a peak of $2.14 trillion as of June 2008, to about $1.96 trillion 
in June 2011. The decline in bank lending was far more severe for small firms than for larger 
firms, falling by almost 18 % over the same period (from $659 billion in June 2008 to $593 
                                                
59 Although here again the revealed effect was strongest in the case of asset management. 
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billion in June 2011). This flight-to-quality pattern, characterized by credit flowing away 
from smaller, constrained firms towards larger, higher graded firms, has also been 
documented by Psillaki & Eleftheriou (2015) in the case of French small and medium-sized 
enterprises (SME) following the global financial crisis. They also provide evidence of the 
increasing significance of the complementary rather than substitutive role trade credit takes 
for small firms facing a credit crunch, a result which they argue is in support of the 
redistribution role of trade credit. This view had already been adopted by García-Appendini 
& Montoriol-Garriga (2013) in their empirical study of the impact of the 2007-2008 financial 
crisis on the provision of liquidity between firms. “Consistent with a causal effect of a 
negative shock to bank credit, [they] find that firms with high precrisis liquidity levels 
increased the trade credit extended to other corporations and subsequently experienced 
better performance as compared with ex ante cash-poor firms. Trade credit taken by 
constrained firms increased during this period. These findings are consistent with firms 
providing liquidity insurance to their clients when bank credit is scarce and offer an 
important precautionary savings motive for accumulating cash reserves.” (García-
Appendini & Montoriol-Garriga, 2013, p. 272) Interestingly, though, while constrained 
smaller firms were heavily reliant on trade credit rather than bank loans as a source of 
external financing during the financial crisis, unconstrained ones could still depend on bank 
loans, as shown by Carbó-Valverde et al. (2016) using a sample of Spanish SMEs. In an 
earlier study, Casey & O’Toole (2014) already obtained similar results using data from 
European SMEs since the 2007-2008 financial crisis. Specifically, their evidence points to a 
higher propensity of credit-rationed firms to use and apply for trade credit to finance their 
working capital, as opposed to smaller and younger firms self-rationing their borrowings due 
to high lending costs, turning instead to informal loans and inter-company loans as 
substitutes for bank loans.   
3.3.2. Working Capital Investment Behavior of Financially Constrained Firms 
In their 2010 survey of 1050 Chief Financial Officers (CFO’s) in 39 countries across the 
U.S., Europe and Asia, Campello et al. (2010) report that “financially constrained firms 
planned to cut more investment, technology, marketing, and employment relative to 
financially unconstrained firms during the crisis. [The authors] also show that constrained 
firms [, unlike unconstrained firms,] were forced to burn a sizeable portion of their cash 
savings during the crisis and to cut more deeply their planned dividend distributions. 
(Campello et al., 2010, p. 486) Another interesting finding is that firms facing financial 
constraints, again unlike unconstrained firms, strategically withdraw funds from their 
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outstanding lines of credit at an accelerated pace due to fears that their access to those lines 
may be restricted by their banks in the future. Other noteworthy findings include that almost 
90% of the CFO’s of constrained firms in their questionnaire-based survey report “that 
financial constraints restrict their pursuit of attractive projects” (Campello et al., 2010, p. 
486), that positive NPV investment projects were forcibly cancelled by over the half of these 
firms, and that these firms show a stronger tendency to liquidate existing assets as a means 
to generate liquidity throughout the crisis, thus relying on internal sources of funding. It 
should be noted here that the survey-based approach by Campello et al. (2010), while 
providing an innovative perspective on the effects of the global financial crisis of 2007-2008 
by allowing the authors to gather (ex-ante) information that cannot be gathered from 
financial statements,60 has limitations common to all survey-based approaches relating to 
replicability and selection biases.  
To fully understand how the above relates to a firm’s choice of working capital policy, it is 
useful to consider the basic argumentation set out in an often-cited empirical study by Fazzari 
& Petersen (1993) that emphasize “the often-neglected role of working capital as both an 
input and a readily reversible store of liquidity” (Fazzari & Petersen, 1993, p. 329) and relate 
a firm’s use of working capital to its investment smoothing efforts, especially when it faces 
financing constraints. Given the existence of agency costs, asymmetric information or 
transaction costs, it may be costlier for a firm to fall back on external (whenever available) 
rather than internal sources of finance to fund its investment projects.61 While insiders are 
fully informed of the prospects of a firm’s investments, outsiders are unable to tell the 
difference in individual firms’ quality. Asymmetric information, as argued by Stiglitz & 
Weiss (1981), may thus cause credit to be rationed by lenders in debt markets because of 
either moral hazard or adverse selection.62 A similar argument holds in the case of external 
equity markets, when firms’ managers are better informed about the value of the firms’ 
existing assets and their investment prospects than potential shareholders may be. In such a 
                                                
60 The large existing body of empirical literature that looks into how capital market imperfections impact 
corporate behavior commonly use archival data drawn from financial statements and other indirect 
measures such as asset size, ownership form, credit ratings, firm age (Oliner and Rudebusch, 1992), 
dividend payer status (Fazzari, Hubbard, and Petersen, 1988) and affiliation to conglomerates (Hoshi, 
Kashyap and Sharfstein, 1991) to identify firms as being either financially constrained or unconstrained. 
(Campello et al., 2010).  
61 See Gertler (1988) 
62 Stiglitz & Weiss (1981) use “the term credit rationing for circumstances in which either (a) among loan 
applicants who appear to be identical some receive a loan and others do not, and the rejected applicants 
would not receive a loan even if they offered to pay a higher interest rate; or (b) there are identifiable 
groups of individuals in the population, who, with a larger supply of credit, are unable to obtain loans at 
any interest rate, even though with a larger supply of credit they would.” (p. 394-395) 
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setting, new shares may forcibly have to be sold at a discount, should they find any buyers 
(Myers & Maljuf, 1984). 
It follows from the above argumentation that changes in internal sources of finance may 
affect firms’ investment decisions when external sources of finance are rationed or only 
available at a premium, a point which has been corroborated in many empirical studies using 
reduced-form regressions of investment on cash-flow63 as well as testing financial 
constraints using Euler equation methods.64 Both approaches however ignore, according to 
Fazzari & Petersen (1993), the possibility that financially constrained firms, when facing 
cash-flow shocks, will opt to smooth fixed investment with working capital. Investment 
smoothing may occur in response to the very nature of the investment projects firms need to 
undertake. Indeed, as was emphasized by Myers & Maljuf (1984), these can neither be stored 
nor delayed without difficulty: Firms operating in a fast-paced environment characterized by 
high levels of innovation and short product life cycles, such as the information and 
communications technology (ICT) industry, ought to undertake new investment 
opportunities as they arise. Failure to do so will lead their value to the firm to drop rapidly 
due for instance to the first-mover advantage from new technologies being commercialized. 
Furthermore, should the marginal value of perishable investment projects decrease with the 
number of firms undertaking them, “a firm that allows cash-flow fluctuations to dictate its 
investment spending would sacrifice projects with high marginal value in periods of below-
average cash flow only to undertake projects with comparatively low marginal value in 
periods of high cash flow” (Fazzari & Petersen, 1993, p. 330), which would clearly represent 
a suboptimal behavior in the presence of a mechanism that responded to cash-flow shocks 
by smoothing investment. Since investment projects are also often discrete and are 
completed over a lengthy period, cutting spending on an ongoing project following a 
temporary cash flow shortfall may turn out to be costly. (Fazzari & Petersen, 1993) 
                                                
63 See among others Fazzari et al. (1998), Gertler & Hubbard (1988), Devereux & Schianterelli (1990), Hoshi 
et al. (1991) and Oliner & Rudebusch (1992) which examine finance constraints on fixed investment using 
a conventional fixed-effects regression equation similar in essence to the one used by Fazzari & Peterson 
1993: 
    (& 5⁄ )78 = 9:;78< + 9=(1 5⁄ )78 + 97 + 98 + 78, 
where &78 represents plant & equipment investment for firm > at time , 8 the tax-adjusted measure of 
Tobin’s q (as defined by Fazzari et al., 1988) at the beginning of year t (as a control for changes in 
investment demand), CF the cash flow (defined as after-tax income plus non-cash charges such as 
depreciation and amortization) and is scaled by the firm’s stock of capital K at the beginning of the period 
t to control for heteroscedasticity, 97 and 98  coefficients capturing firm-specific and year fixed-effects and 78 random errors. (Fazzari & Petersen, 1993) 
64 See, among others, Gilchrist (1990), Himmelberg (1990), Hubbard & Kashyap (1992), Whited (1992) and 
Carpenter (1992) 
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Another rationale for the investment smoothing is given by Eisner & Strotz (1963) and Lucas 
(1967), who emphasize that “because marginal adjustment costs of acquiring and installing 
capital rise as the rate of investment increases […], firms will reduce long-run costs by 
maintaining stable investment over time, for any given long-run path of capital 
accumulation”. (Fazzari & Petersen, 1993, p. 330) This aim might be hindered in the 
presence of financing constraints in circumstances where cash flow fluctuations cannot be 
offset using external sources of finance without a cost. Financially constrained firms can 
however “offset the impact of cash-flow shocks on fixed investment by adjusting working 
capital, even setting working capital investment at negative levels. These actions release 
short-run liquidity, allowing firms to smooth fixed investment relative to cash-flow shocks. 
The marginal opportunity cost of adjusting working capital, and therefore the extent of 
investment smoothing, should depend on the firm’s initial stock of working capital.” (Fazzari 
& Petersen, 1993. P. 329) Therefore, by including working capital as an (endogenous) 
variable in the fixed investment regression,65 Fazzari & Petersen (1993), using a panel data 
of U.S. low-dividend paying66 manufacturing firms covering the period 1970-1979, predict 
and empirically find robust evidence of a negative relationship for financially constrained 
firms, meaning that “working capital competes with fixed investment for a limited pool of 
finance” (Fazzari & Petersen, p. 328). They also report evidence of working capital 
investment being highly sensitive to changes in cash flow.67 
                                                
65 The regression equation that includes working capital investment used by Fazzari & Petersen (1993) takes 
the following form: 
    (& 5⁄ )78 = ?:;78< + ?=(1 5⁄ )78 + ?@(∆B 5⁄ )78 + ?7 + ?8 + 78 ,  
where (∆B 5)⁄  represent working capital investment scaled by the firm’s stock of capital K at the 
beginning of period. To address the endogeneity concern of changes in working capital investment inherent 
in the above equation, various forms of it are estimated using (i) the beginning-of-period q, (ii) cash flow, 
(iii) the beginning-of-period stock of working capital scaled by fixed capital, (B 5⁄ )78, (iv) and the fixed 
time and firm effects as instrumental variables.  
66 Fazzari & Petersen (1993) use the database described in Fazzari et al. (1988) and focus on those firms that 
essentially follow a zero dividend-policy as they assume that these are most likely to be financially 
constrained. However, as in Fazzari et al. (1988), they also include firms that pay high dividends in their 
sample. 
67 Their first-stage OLS regression for changes in working capital, ∆B 5⁄ , leads to the following result (Fazzari 
& Petersen, 1993, p. 336, firm and year fixed not reported – t-statistics in brackets below the coefficients): 
 
 
(∆B 5⁄ )78 = 0.0064;78< +     0.883(1 5⁄ )78 − 0.217(B 5⁄ )78 + J7 + J8 
     (3.5)  (12.1)          (5.1) 
 
The above negative coefficient of the initial level of working capital, (B 5⁄ )78, also corroborates Fazzari 
& Petersen’s (1993) prediction that the marginal value of working capital decreases as its stock rises. 
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When looking at the relationship between investment in individual components of net 
operating working capital68 and the availability of credit from financial institutions, both 
Petersen & Rajan (1997) and Danielson and Scott (2004) provide evidence suggesting that 
financially constrained (small) firms make more use of trade credit to finance their 
operations despite the higher costs associated with this source of financing. In addition, 
Carpenter et al. (1998) expose evidence in corroboration of the argument that firms facing 
less financial constraints invest more in inventories. Finally, Atanasova & Wilson (2003) and 
Atanasova (2007), by estimating a model for trade credit that accounts for the influence of 
bank-borrowing constraints on the financing policies of corporations over the business cycle, 
expose evidence of an increased use of trade credit - which represents an unattractive as well 
as expensive substitute for bank credit - by bank constrained firms. 
3.3.3. Measuring Financial Constraints 
It is noteworthy to mention at this point a more recent empirical study by Baños-Caballero 
et al. (2014) which suggests that firm’s financial constraints affect the relationship between 
working capital investment and corporate performance and provide evidence that the optimal 
level of working capital is lower for firms that face a higher likelihood of being financially 
constrained. This result has been found to hold true under each of the classification 
schemes69 of financial constraints employed by Baños-Caballero et al. (2014) and is in line 
with the results obtained by both Fazzari & Petersen (1993) and Hill et al. (2010), who also 
conclude that “[f]irms with greater internal financing capacity and superior capital market 
access employ more conservative working capital policies” (Hill et al., 2010, p. 783). Since 
it is still open to academic debate as to which method of measurement is best suited to 
differentiate financially constrained from unconstrained firms,70 I ought to present here the 
different measures used in selected studies of the corporate finance literature: 
 
                                                
68 Net operating working capital (NOWC) is defined as INV+AR-AP and concerns solely the management of 
accounts receivable (in other words the extension of trade credit), the management of inventories and the 
use of trade credit. (See Hill et al., 2010 and Kieschnick et al., 2013) 
69 Baños-Caballero et al. (2014) classify firms “according to a variety of characteristics designed to measure 
the level of financial constraints borne by firms” (p. 333) 
70 According to Hadlock & Pierce (2010, pp. 1909-1910), this comes as no surprise as “each method relies on 
certain empirical and/or theoretical assumptions that may or may not be valid. In addition, many of these 
methods rely on endogenous financial choices that may not have a straightforward relation to constraints. 
For example, while an exogenous increase in cash on hand may help alleviate the constraints that a given 
firm faces, the fact that a firm chooses to hold a high level of cash may be an indication that the firm is 
constrained and is holding cash for precautionary reasons” 
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a) Dividends: As already mentioned in the presentation of the study of Fazzari & 
Petersen (1993) and in line with Fazzari et al. (1988), financially constrained firms, 
to reduce the likelihood of having to raise external funds in the future, tend to follow 
a zero-dividend policy or at least distribute a lower dividend to their shareholders. 
Thus, it makes sense to identify financially constrained from financially 
unconstrained firms by not only classifying them into zero-dividend and positive-
dividend groups, but also according to their dividend payout ratio (defined as the 
ratio of dividends to net profit) as in Almeida et al. (2004) and Faulkender & Wang 
(2006). It should be noted here that Kaplan & Zingales (1997) disagree with Fazzari 
et al. (1988), arguing that firms that pay out low dividends although they have the 
necessary funds to pay out higher dividends cannot be considered as financially 
constrained. Rather, Kaplan & Zingales (1997) use quantitative data as well as 
qualitative information included in firm’s financial communications “to derive as 
complete a picture as possible of the availability of internal and external funds for 
each firm as well as each firm’s demand for funds” (Kaplan & Zingales, 1997, p. 
170).71 Based on that complete picture, Kaplan & Zingales (1997) identify as likely 
constrained those firms that do not have access to more funds than required to 
finance their investment, and as never constrained those firms that have access to 
more funds than required to finance their investment. (See Moyen, 2004) 
 
b) Cash-flow: Keeping in mind the still unresolved debate introduced above, firms can 
also be classified into financially constrained and unconstrained depending on their 
level of cash flow, defined as the ratio of earnings before interest and tax plus 
depreciation to total assets (see Baños-Caballero et al., 2014). This follows the 
approach elaborated by Moyen (2004) who, in her successful effort to replicate both 
the results obtained by Fazzari et al. (1988) as well as by Kaplan & Zingales (1997), 
considers, as in Allayannis and Mozumdar (2004), the cash flow variable as a viable 
proxy for financing constraints. Unlike dividends, which “represent the residual of 
the firm’s cash flow […] after the firm’s investment […] and financial […] decisions 
[and thus] reflect both the state in which the firm finds itself at the beginning of the 
period and its decisions taken during that period [,] using cash flow focuses on the 
                                                
71 However, the direct approach advocated by Kaplan & Zingales (1997), i.e. using qualitative information to 
determine a firm’s financial constraint status, while being quite useful in principle, lacks practicality for 
large samples since it involves extensive hand data collection. (Hadlock & Pierce, 2010)  
42 
 
firm’s beginning of the period funds and abstracts from the current periods 
decisions” (Moyen, 2004, p. 2073). In this respect, firms – within a large sample – 
with a lower than average/median72 cash flow, as defined above, are considered as 
financially constrained, whereas firms – within the same sample – with a higher than 
average/median cash flow, are considered as financially unconstrained. 
 
c) Size: A whole range of empirical studies (among which Petersen et al., 1994, Almeida 
et al., 2004, Faulkender & Wang, 2006, Baños-Caballero et al., 2014) explicitly use 
size, mostly measured by the natural logarithm of sales, as an inverse proxy for 
financing constraints. The rationale behind the use of this variable is that smaller 
firms are expected to face both higher informational asymmetries as well as higher 
agency costs and therefore may have greater difficulty in accessing external capital 
markets (Baños-Caballero et al., 2014). This rationale is consistent with the argument 
brought forward by Whited (1992) that larger firms face lower costs of external 
financing as they have better access to financial markets, hence facing fewer 
borrowing constraints. 
 
d) Cost of external financing: Baños-Caballero et al. (2014) also use the cost of external 
financing, calculated as the ratio of financial expenses to total debt, as a proxy for 
financing constraints, and thereby follow the line of argumentation of Fazzari et al. 
(1988) who consider a firm to be financially constrained when its cost of external 
financing is too high. 
 
e) Whited & Wu Index: An often used measure of financing constraints is the index 
developed by Whited & Wu (2006) on the basis of a standard intertemporal 
investment model in which financing frictions are accounted for and which “predicts 
that external finance constraints affect the intertemporal substitution of investment 
today for investment tomorrow via the shadow value of scarce external funds” 
(Whited & Wu, 2006, p.531). 
The Whited & Wu (WW) Index of firm i in period t is calculated using the following 
                                                
72 In the paper by Moyen (2004), the average cash flow is used as the border to separate the financially 
constrained from the unconstrained firms, whereas Baños-Caballero et al. (2014) use the median to delimit 
both categories of firms. 
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formula: 
 
BBK8 =  −0.0911K8 − 0.062&M- K8 + 0.021//K8 − 0.044./K8
+ 0.102&*K8 − 0.035*K8, 
 
where CF is defined as the ratio of cash flow to total assets and represents a firm’s 
profitability, DIVPOS a dummy variable which takes the value of one if the firm 
pays dividends in cash and zero otherwise, TLTD the ratio of long-term debt to total 
assets, LNTA the natural log of total assets, ISG the firm’s three-digit SIC industry 
sales growth and SG the firm’s sales growth. (Whited & Wu, 2006) 
It is important to cluster out the advantage of designing an index based on a structural 
model rather than using traditional tests of financial constraints based, as in Fazzari 
et al. (1988), on regressions of investment on Tobin’s q: it avoids the complexity 
issue associated with the measurement of Tobin’s q, which basically renders the 
reduced-form regression approach cryptic, as exposed by Erickson & Withed (2000), 
Bond & Cummins (2001) and Cooper & Ejarque (2001). Furthermore, the Whited & 
Wu index is therefore better suited to measure financing constraints than is the 
Kaplan-Zingales Index,73 which is not only prone to measurement error due to the 
inclusion of Tobin’s q,74 but is also altogether based on a modelling flaw in that both 
the dependant and independent variables used to derive it include the same 
quantitative information, as the evidence reported in Hadlock & Pierce, (2010) 
suggests. 
 
f) SA-Index: Finally, the index developed by Hadlock & Pierce (2010) appears, as 
evidenced in their own study, to be superior to the previous measures presented here 
in determining whether a firm faces financial constraints. In their effort to design an 
alternative measure of financial constraints that addresses the endogeneity concern 
prevalent in measures that use leverage and cash flow variables, they show that both 
the variables firm size and age turn out to particularly useful in predicting financial 
constraints. Moreover, they present evidence pointing to the non-linear nature of the 
                                                
73 The Kaplan-Zingales Index is based on a five-factor model as described in Lamont et al. (2001) 
74 See Whited & Wu, 2006, p. 533 
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relationship between these variables and financial constraints.75 
Their SA index thus focuses solely on these two firm characteristics and is computed 
as follows: 
 
 − &+O: (−0.737 ∗ 
R) + (0.043 ∗ 
R=) − (0.040 ∗ S), 
 
where Size equals the log of inflation-adjusted to 2004 book assets, and Age is the 
number of years the firm is listed with a non-missing stock price on Compustat. In 
calculating this index, both Size and Age are winsorized at (the log of $4.5 Billion) 
and thirty-seven years respectively. Hadlock & Pierce (2010, p. 1938) strongly 
recommend using the SA Index over other approaches given that it “has substantial 
intuitive appeal and relies on factors that are surely more exogenous than most of the 
alternatives”, especially given the fact that firm size and age had been identified in 
previous research as valid predictors of financial constraints.  
3.4.  Working Capital and Financial Distress at the Firm Level 
Asquith et al. (1994), in their comprehensive study of how firms respond to financial distress, 
have shown poor firm-specific performance to be the major factor causing financial distress, 
followed by poor industry performance and high interest expenses. Therefore, an inefficient 
management of working capital, one which adversely affects a firm’s operating performance 
or its interest expenses, can cause the firm to run into financial distress or even bankruptcy 
if it fails to achieve a quick turnaround in its operating activities or fails to restructure. A 
prominent example illustrating this point is given by Shin & Soenen (1998), in which Kmart 
and Wal-Mart, both America’s leading retailing behemoths back in the mid-1990’s, who in 
1994 had a similar capital structure of about 31% debt financing, but differed in terms of 
both their cash conversion cycle (61 days for Kmart vs. just 40 days for Wal-Mart) and their 
profitability (Return on sales, assets and equity being respectively 0.87%, 1.74% and 4.91% 
for Kmart vs. 3.25%, 10.1% and 24.9% for Wal-Mart). Shin & Soenen (1998) argued, 
assuming, taking a cost of capital of 10%, that 21 extra days in the cash conversion cycle of 
Kmart should have cost it an additional $198.3 million in financing expenses, that the 
                                                
75 Hadlock & Pierce (2010) estimate (i) an essentially flat relation between these two firm characteristics (firm 
size and age) and financial constraints for very large or mature firms, (ii) a quadratic relation between size 
and financial constraints below certain cut-off points and (iii) a linear relation between age and financial 
constraints. 
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difference in profitability of the two companies could be in part due to higher financing costs 
triggered by a poor working capital management. Eventually, Kmart had to file for Chapter 
11 bankruptcy protection on January 22, 2002, a move partly attributed to the high costs of 
financing its inefficient working capital management, which contributed to its losses 
(Kieschnick et al., 2013).76 
Furthermore, the literature suggests that the argument runs both ways: adapting the net 
operating working capital behavior in response to a situation of financial distress a firm find 
itself in also helps it in redressing its financial situation. Molina and Preve (2009) for 
instance, not only expose evidence pointing to the particular relevance of trade receivables 
policies for U.S. firms facing financial distress, reporting “that drops in trade receivables 
account for at least one-third of the average drop in sales and stock returns experienced by 
firms in financial distress”77, but also “find that firms increase their level of trade 
receivables, presumably in an attempt to buy market share, when they have profitability 
problems, but change their policy when they are in financial distress, effectively reducing 
their investment in trade receivables”, noting however “that financially distressed firms in 
concentrated industries seem to have sufficient market power to enforce a less painful 
reduction in trade receivables, while financially distressed firms in competitive industries 
find it more difficult to reduce their trade receivables.” The authors explain this result (p. 
684) with “the fact the clients of firms in competitive industries are less pressured to 
maintain a reputation for reliable payment given the higher probability of supplier failure 
and the availability of alternative providers.” (See Molina & Preve, 2009, p. 684 for all 
aforementioned citations). 
In a second article published more recently, Molina & Preve (2012) extend and complement 
their previous work, which was concerned with the study of the investing behavior of 
distressed firms, turning their focus now towards the relationship between financially 
distressed firms and the credit behavior of suppliers towards these firms using a sample 
consisting of 85,727 firm-year observations of firms in Compustat with trade payable data 
available from 1978 to 2000. In general, trade credit granted by suppliers in commercial 
transactions is a commonly utilized source of short-term financing (Molina & Preve, 2012) 
                                                
76 According to Kieschnick et al. (2013), external debt capital is being tapped into to finance net operating 
working capital investments. 
77 This result also holds true in a setting in which financial distress is clearly exogenous to the firm’s 
performance, where instead of using a firm-level indication of financial distress, an alternative model based 
on Opler & Titman (1994) is considered where a firm is assumed to be in financial distress if it is highly 
leveraged when the industry it belongs to is hit by an economic shock. (Molina & Preve, 2009) 
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and is widely recognized as a substitute to financial credit in times of tight monetary 
conditions (Metzler, 1960) and widespread economic crises (Love et al., 2007) as well as in 
the case of smaller firms with weaker relations to banks (Petersen & Rajan, 1997). On a side 
note, this work by Molina & Preve (2012) is the first to quantify the effect of a firm’s 
financial distress on trade credit granted by the firm’s suppliers and can be related to other 
noteworthy academic literature pointing to the severely weakened ability of firms entering 
financial distress to enjoy trade credit (Baxter, 1967 and Andrade & Kaplan, 1998) – given 
the augmented default risk, as well as to the potential reluctance of suppliers to sell their 
products to financially distressed firms save in a significantly restricted way and at greater 
costs (Altman, 1984), thus eventually pushing these firms into bankruptcy once they “lose 
confidence” and no longer “foresee an acceptable probability of [their] survival” (Molina & 
Preve, 2012, p.203). This last point is illustrated by Molina & Preve (2012) using an article 
which appeared in the business press citing that “the Chapter 11 filing in US Bankruptcy 
Court in Boston by Waltham-based Molten Metal was triggered when suppliers refused to 
extend additional credit to the company, which had already slowed payment of its bills.”78 
The results obtained by Molina & Preve (2012) are manifold, suggesting not only that 
financially distressed firms make significantly more use of trade credit relative to healthier 
firms with easier access to financial credit,79 but also, consistent with Atanasova & Wilson 
(2003) and Atanasova (2007), that they “substitute financial debt and equity for trade 
credit”80 (Molina & Preve, 2012, p. 188) and that the overall significant reduction in their 
performance - as evidenced elsewhere in the literature, see for instance Altman (1984), Opler 
& Titman (1994) and Andrade & Kaplan (1998) - is attributable to more than one-third to 
the increased use of trade credit.  The influence of financial distress on trade credit is 
however less significant and smaller in the case of larger firms – thought, by Molina & Preve 
(2012, p. 188), to be superior to smaller firms in terms of “the quality of management, 
corporate governance, the quality of reported information, opaqueness, and access to 
financial credit”. 
                                                
78 See Molina & Preve (2012), footnote 2, p. 187, citing from Kimberly Blanton’s article in The Boston Globe 
(City Edition) dated 4th of December 1997. 
79 This result is consistent with the findings of a stream of literature on the theories of trade credit [Schwartz 
(1974), Emery (1984), Smith (1987), Biais & Gollier (1997), Frank & Maksimovic (2005) and Cuñat 
(2007)], according to which firms with easier access to financial credit will make use of it rather than of 
the costlier trade credit. Furthermore, Petersen & Rajan (1994, 1995) argue that trade credit is taken 
advantage of after all alternative cheaper sources of financing have been dried up. 
80 This results thus suggests that trade credit rates lower than other traditional financing sources in the pecking 
order (Myers & Maljuf, 1984) of financing options. 
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It should be noted here that both aforementioned papers by Molina & Preve (2009 and 2012) 
measure the cost underlying the trade credit policy of financially distressed firms, thereby 
implicitly assuming the trade credit behavior of healthy firms, i.e. firms not facing financial 
distress, to be optimal, further implying that firms deviating from this optimum when 
entering financial distress follow a suboptimal trade credit behavior. 
Consistent with the results obtained by Molina & Preve (2009 & 2012), Hill et al. (2010), in 
their examination of the drivers of a firm’s integrative operating working capital strategy,81 
i.e. which accounts for the net influence of receivables, inventories and payables, also find 
evidence, using an unbalanced Compustat data set of 20,710 firm-year observations for 
3,343 companies from 1996 to 2006, that the working capital requirement (WCR) 82 is 
negatively related to financial distress,83 inferring from that result “that distressed firms 
manage operating working capital more aggressively than nondistressed firms,” arguing 
further that following a more restrictive working capital strategy, i.e. reducing “investment 
in operating working capital by collecting on receivables, tightening credit terms, 
liquidating inventory, and stretching supplier credit” constitutes “a rational response to 
financial distress due to the limited financial slack and cash generating ability of distressed 
firms.” (See Hill et al., 2010, p. 798 for all above citations). This intuition is shared by Preve 
& Sarria-Allende (2010), who besides point to a gap in knowledge with respect to the relation 
between a firm’s inventory levels and financial distress. Preve & Sarria-Allende (2010) also 
offer interesting arguments concerning the hypothetical impact of financial distress on a 
                                                
81 Hill et al. (2010, p. 794) specify and estimate the following empirical model: 
BK,8 =  ?T + ?:*2ℎK,8U: +  ?=*-K,8U: + ?@	M	K ,8 +  ?V 1K,8U: + ?W  X⁄ K,8U:+ ?Y
RK,8U: +  ?Zℎ	K,8U: + ?[
K,8U: + ?7K,8 + \K 
where WCR is the ratio of the [annual sum of (accounts receivable and inventory) minus (accounts 
payables)] to sales, Growth the annual percentage change in sales during the previous year, GPM the gross 
profit margin computed as the ratio of (sales minus cost of goods sold) to sales, SalesVar represents the 
sales volatility and is computed as the ratio of the standard deviation of sales to net assets (defined as total 
assets minus cash and short-term investment), OCF is operating income before depreciation minus income 
taxes, scaled by net assets, M/B the ratio of the [sum of (market value of equity and total liabilities) minus 
payables)] to net assets, Size the natural logarithm of market value of equities in 2006 inflation-adjusted 
dollars, MktShare the ratio of annual firm-level sales to the industry’s annual sum of sales and Distress a 
dummy variable taking the value one if a firm is in financial distress and zero otherwise. The model also 
includes a set of binary annual variables to control for time-specific and macroeconomic factors influencing 
WCR.  
82 Hill et al. (2010) define the WCR as the sum of accounts receivable and inventories net of accounts payable. 
It is slightly modified from the definition given by Shulman & Cox (1985) in that prepaid expenses and 
accruals are not taken into consideration. Hill et al. (2010) use the simplified version as (i) it parallels with 
the cash conversion cycle and (ii) “the theoretical implications of holding prepaid expenses and accruals 
are not well developed in the extant literature” (See Hill et al., 2010, footnote 3, p. 784)   
83 Hill et al. (2010) estimate their model using the same three proxies of financial distress (see footnote 56) 
than Molina & Preve (2009) and come to a similar result, both in terms of quality and quantity. 
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firm’s working capital policy: Since firms that find themselves in a situation of financial 
distress are, per definition, suffering losses,84 their equity’s book value starts to diminish, 
rendering it quite likely that their equity’s market value will also drop. This in turn suggests 
that financially distressed firms are likely to exhibit a decrease in their equity level, should 
they refrain from issuing new equity. With respect to debt-financing considerations, it is 
unlikely the firm will be able to raise long-term debt unless it can convince its investors to 
buy its long-term debt. The financially distressed firm will then most probably have to turn 
to the (fire) sale85 of part of its fixed assets to be able to increase its working capital, although 
the price it obtains from their sale does not reflect their fair market value. The overall effect 
of financial distress on the working capital of the firm, however, will without any doubt 
greatly depend on both firm- and industry-specific features. Preve & Sarria-Allende (2010, 
p. 140) “hypothesize that, on average, financially distressed firms tend to observe a decrease 
in the level of working capital relative to FNOs, increasing the gap between the two,” 
meaning that firms in financial distress would require more short-term financing from 
financial institutions, which in turn would lead to a worsening in their overall financial 
health. 
3.5. Working Capital and Market Power 
The market power a firm enjoys is also thought to be directly linked to its net operating 
working capital behavior. Indeed, as suggested by Hill et al. (2010), more relevant customers 
are in a better position to negotiate credit terms in their favour with their suppliers, not to 
mention that stretching credit terms offered by their suppliers is not likely to lead to much 
repercussion, mostly so when smaller suppliers are highly dependent on the contracts they 
have with industry leaders. This argumentation is in line with the observations of Wilner 
                                                
84 The two most commonly used measures of financial distress are those developed by Asquith et al. (1994) 
and, more recently, DeAngelo & DeAngelo (1990), both of which rely on some form of negative profit: 
While Asquith et al. (1994, p.628) consider a firm “as financially distressed if in any two consecutive years 
[…] the firm’s earnings before interest, taxes, depreciation, and amortization (EBITDA) is less than its 
reported interest expense; or, if in any one year, EBITDA is less than 80 percent of its interest expense”, 
DeAngelo & DeAngelo (1990, p. 1426) identify in their sample covering the period 1980 to 1985 a firm as 
financially distressed if it “reported three or more years of negative net or operating income during” that 
period. 
A third proxy for financial distress, also used by Molina & Preve (2009,2012), takes the form of a dummy 
variable taking the value of one if a firm, in addition to fulfilling the conditions set out by Asquith et al. 
(1994), is in the top two deciles of industry leverage in a given year (following Opler & Titman, 1994). 
This measure is better suited to recognize firms in distress because of high leverage, according to Molina 
& Preve (2012).  
85 See Pulvino (1998) 
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(2000), who considers the level of bilateral dependency between trade creditors and their 
debtors to influence the debtor’s use of trade credit as “larger firms and firms that are in 
industries in which they can choose among a large number of clients are likely to enforce 
their market power in a trade relation and enjoy a bargaining advantage” (Molina & Preve, 
2012, p. 190) A similar argument is brought forward by Hill et al. (2010) according to which 
strong ties to vendors enable firms enjoying greater market power to hold lower levels of 
inventory.  
Turning their attention to the situation where firms are in a stronger position relative to their 
customers, Hill et al. (2010) propose two explanations as to why shorter credit terms are 
likely to be negotiated with their customers: Not only is the likelihood of losing customers 
over a decrease in credit terms diminished for firms with large market share as it faces less 
competition from rival firms, but switching suppliers is implied to be associated with higher 
costs for customers as suppliers with greater market power are more likely to have built 
stronger ties with their client base. These costs are referred to in the literature as consumer 
switching costs and include learning and transactions costs.86  
Though Hill et el. (2010) “expect firms with greater negotiating powers to have more 
payables, fewer receivables, and less inventory” (p. 787), and thus the working capital 
requirement (WCR) to be negatively correlated to market power, measured as the lagged 
ratio of annual sales of a firm to the total annual sales in the industry the firm belongs to, 
they however only find evidence of a weak negative correlation between WCR and market 
share, which furthermore lacks robustness.87 
4.  Working Capital Management (WCM) 
As briefly mentioned previously,88 the effective management of working capital is basically 
concerned with satisfying the conflicting goals of profitability, which may alternatively be 
expressed in terms of shareholder wealth maximization, and liquidity. On the one hand, the 
decision of a firm to invest in current or long-term assets is dependent on whether these offer 
positive net present values “when discounted at their individual risk-commensurate costs of 
                                                
86 See Chevalier & Scharfstein (1996) and Klemperer (1987) for more detailed information on consumer 
switching costs.  
87 Hill et al. (2010) mention that this insignificant result may be due to the possibility that the effect of 
negotiating ability, which they proxy using a lagged measure of market share, is absorbed by the firm-
specific heterogeneity.  
88 See Subsections 1.2 and 2.3.1. 
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capital” (Pass & Pike, 1984, p.1). On the other hand, the firm must make sure that it can 
meet its financial duties while carrying on going concern. However, choosing the level of 
components of working capital in such a way as to maximize a firm’s profitability tends to 
negatively affect liquidity, whereas a too high focus on liquidity impedes its profitability. 
Thus, working capital “[m]anagement must seek to establish the optimal trade-off between 
profitability of net current assets employed and the ability to pay current liabilities as they 
fall due – given a clearly defined risk policy of which a firm’s liquidity level should be a 
function.” (Pass & Pike, 1984, p.1) 
4.1. Theoretical Approaches to WCM – The Beginnings 
Given the dual objective of WCM, there obviously exist many different approaches 
managers can follow to plan and control for working capital. In his article entitled State of 
the Art of Working Capital Management, Smith (1973) has classified these in eight distinctly 
different approaches which can be grouped into (i) partial models, which are deterministic 
in nature, (ii) models that stress future uncertainty and interdependencies, and (iii) models 
that have a wider, systematic focus. I will briefly present these eight approaches below: 
 
(i) Partial models 
 
a) Aggregate guidelines 
This first approach, as its name bespeaks, sets guidelines on when to use short 
instead of long-term financing to cover net asset requirements89 However, 
Smith (1973) himself argues that such aggregate guidelines, although being 
correct in principle, perhaps do not offer much valuable practicality. 
 
b) Constraint set 
This approach considers working capital as a constraint set for the broader 
challenge of cost minimization or firm value maximization and treats 
                                                
89 Following the terminology already used in Figure 1, the variable of interest in this approach for short-term 
considerations is the level of short-term financing and is given by  = ;∑ 	7∗ + ∑ 7 − ∑ 7∗< −
;∑ 7 + ∑ 7<, where ∑ 	7∗ excludes short-term marketable securities and ∑ 7∗ excludes short-term financial 
debt. The term in the first bracket defines the net asset requirement (NAR), the term in the second bracket 
defines the long-term sources of financing (LTSF). If NAR > LTSF, then short-term financial debt is 
required. Conversely, if LTSF > NAR, funds in excess should be used to invest in short-term marketable 
securities. 
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“working capital requirements as a component of a larger mathematical 
representation for financial management” (Smith, 1973, p. 51) While studies 
using this approach (see Smith, 1961, and Vickers, 1968 to name just two 
outstanding studies90) highlight the crucial role of working capital in broader 
financial decision-making, they implicitly consider (net) working capital to 
be a single entity, thereby ignoring the fact that it is constituted by “a series 
of interacting accounts on both sides of the balance sheet” (Smith, 1973, p. 
51) 
 
c) Cost balancing 
In the cost-balancing approach to analyse working capital, the problem to be 
solved takes the following form: 
 
   


3
R
	7  [:;	7< + =;	7<+ . . . +^;	7<], 
 
where the decision variable, 	7, is a specific current asset and K;	7< are the 
costs associated with an investment in that current asset. These multiple cost 
components typically move in different directions when 	7 is altered. One 
area where this approach is prominently being used relates to the economic 
order quantity (EOQ) model first presented by Harris (1913), in which the 
decision variable of interest is the level of inventory. Similarly, this approach 
can be used to determine the level of appropriate accounts receivables or cash 
holdings. The shortcoming of these cost balancing approaches is “that they 
usually focus on only a single current asset, without giving due consideration 
to important interrelationships with other current assets and with current 
liabilities” (Smith, 1973, p. 51) 
                                                
90 While the problem Smith (1961) offers to solve is the minimization of total production cost subject to the 
requirements of money capital, which include fixed assets and net working capital (defined as ∑ 	7 − ∑ 7 = ` −  ∑ ßKBKbKK  , where S represents firm sales, bK the number of units of production resource i, BK the 
resource’s unit price and ` and ßK appropriate constants), Vickers (1968) in his classic work on production, 
capital and finance, sets the problem as the maximization of the firm’s equity value subject to its money 
capital constraint, which also included the net working capital requirement he defined as ∑ 	7 − ∑ 7 =S(), where  represents the firm output. 
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(ii) Uncertainty and interdependencies models 
 
a) Probability models 
The next approach to managing working capital relies on probability models, 
in which the same variables than mentioned earlier are considered, with the 
difference that some of them follow random patterns, thus allowing for risk 
and uncertainty to flow into working capital considerations. Beranek (1963), 
for instance, in his attempt to analyse credit policy, has designed such a model 
to include random sales and collection patterns. 
 
b) Portfolio theory 
Similarly, portfolio theory, the focus of which is on the uncertainty as well as 
the interrelationships among items, and more specifically the capital asset 
pricing model (CAPM), which offers a compelling tool for analysing risk-
return relationships in a great number of important financial decisions, can be 
used to provide guidelines related to WCM. 
When considering the right mix of current assets in a portfolio context, firms 
could want to solve the following optimization problem:91 
 
	O
3

	7  [∑ 	77 − c ∑ ∑ 	K	7dK7], 
 
where 7 is the expected profitability per unit of current asset, dK7 is the 
covariance between current asset 	K and 	7, and c is an appropriate risk-return 
constant. 
Similarly, the CAPM, which has gained enormous attention since its inception 
in the 1960’s, can also be applied in the field of WCM, although very scant 
attention has been directed towards that goal in the finance literature,92 a fact 
                                                
91 See Friedland (1966) 
92 See Pringle & Cohn (1974) for an adaptation of the CAPM to working capital management.  
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that might surprise since (i) “the capital asset pricing model is a single-period 
model that is close[r] to the horizon of working capital decisions” than to that 
of long-term investments decisions (Smith, 1973, p. 52) and (ii) because 
“much of the working capital is ‘permanent’ in the sense that there always 
exists a portfolio of current assets and current liabilities” (Pass & Pike, 1984, 
p. 6). 
Nonetheless, although both the portfolio theory in general and the CAPM in 
particular provide useful groundworks for the conceptualization of the 
management of a firm’s (current) assets,93 they “would seem to offer little 
operational help in controlling specific asset level over time.” (Smith, 1973, 
p. 52) Furthermore, given that one of the key conclusions of the capital asset 
pricing theory is that diversification by the firms themselves may be far less 
effective than diversification by its stakeholders, the portfolio approach to 
working capital management get its potential value somewhat diluted. 
 
(iii) Systematic models 
 
a) Mathematical programming 
One of the more interesting features of models based on mathematical 
programming is that working capital can be dealt with in a direct manner 
while also taking into consideration the numerous interrelationships between 
the determinants of working capital such as cash, accounts receivable or 
accounts payable. One of the more prominent such models addressing the 
issue of short-term financial planning under uncertainty using a mathematical 
linear programming framework is the one developed by Robichek et al. 
(1965), in which the objective is to minimize the short run financing costs 
subject to a set of limitations on different types of financial debt, as formally 
set out hereafter: 
 
                                                
93 The major contribution of the CAPM being the specification of a market risk premium, it is of great help 
when analysing investments in cash, marketable securities and other current assets generally assumed to be 
of lower risk than investments in permanent assets and enables a superior risk assessment of the different 
kinds of short-term assets and liabilities. (See Pass & Pike, 1984)  
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7  [∑ e(7)e ], s>  )K(7) ≤ K∗, 
where 7 represent different types of borrowing, e(7) the relevant financing 
cost components that make up the objective function and )K (7) the constraints 
used to place limits K∗ on types of indebtedness. Others designed 
mathematical programming models that consider accounts receivable and 
cash balances (see Beranek, 1963) or addressed cash management 
considerations within a dynamic programming context (see Mao, 1969). 
Although models based on mathematical programming can accommodate for 
the different components of working capital, their shortcoming is that they 
usually focus on a single goal, be it for instance profit maximization or cost 
minimization. 
 
b) Multiple goals 
 
As suggested by its name, this approach to working capital management 
includes multiple goals (instead of one as in the previous approaches). The 
decision-making problem of a firm can, for example, be formally written as: 
 
	O
3
R
, g h;	7, 7<, g;	7 , 7<i , 
   
Here,  represents a utility function that “summarizes management’s feelings 
about the relative importance of the liquidity, ;	7 , 7<, and profitability, 
g;	7, 7<, goals” (Smith, 1973, pp. 52-53). Though being difficult to 
implement in practice,94 this approach to working capital management 
“probably come[s] closer than any alternatives to capturing the decision-
                                                
94 Specifying such a utility function to solve the maximization problem in practice would not be easy and not 
only requires assumptions about its shape, but also depends on the nature of the underlying business as well 
as the investment and financing opportunities available to the firm. Krouse (1974) has suggested to solve 
the problem by optimizing a set of goals ranked hierarchically in the order of their relative importance to 
the firm. After the management of the firm has determined the optimal level of the first goal, a specific 
satisficing level for that goal is chosen as a constraint in the optimization of the second goal and so on. This 
enables management to ‘see’ the trade-offs between the various goals at each step of the optimization 
procedure. 
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making process actually employed by financial managers” (Smith, 1973, p. 
53), because it captures the trade-off between the profitability and liquidity 
goals inherent to any working capital consideration. 
 
c) Financial simulation 
 
Models based on financial simulation for the purpose of developing a 
consistent working capital policy are meanwhile employed by many firms 
(Pass & Pike, 1984) as they not only take into account both the uncertainty of 
the future as well as the many interdependencies between the components of 
working capital and other balance sheet accounts, but also allow for the 
inclusion of multiple goals without having to neither be explicitly specified 
into an objective function nor incorporated in an optimization algorithm. 
Several noteworthy papers have been published that propose a financial 
simulation approach to working capital management. Lerner (1968), for 
instance, points out how the simulation of cash budgeting, using both the 
expected value and the standard deviation of forecasted cash balances, helps 
an informed judgement not only of “the size of the buffer stock of cash, 
liquidity, or bank line [a firm] needs to meet the uncertainties that surround 
[its] activities”, but also of “the effect of […] a change in receivable policy, 
payable policy, or the timing of purchases that enter the production process” 
(Lerner, 1968, p. 80). Similarly, Van Horne (1969), Warren and Shelton 
(1971) and Mao (1969) have designed probabilistic simulation models of the 
interdependencies between components of a firm’s working capital, which all 
account for the uncertainties in these components future patterns. 
4.2. An Integrated Approach to WCM 
Although since the publication of Smith’s (1973) article a great amount of highly interesting 
research has been undertaken, covering, in isolation, individual aspects of working capital 
management such as e.g. the management of cash balances and marketable securities (e.g. 
Mauer et al., 1998) and the use and management of trade credit (see, among others, Schwartz, 
1974, Emery, 1984, Biais & Gollier 1997, Peterson & Rajan, 1997, Frank & Maksimovic 
2005, Cuñat, 2007, Gianetti et al., 2008), it would nowadays be unthinkable to research the 
field of working capital management without taking a generalized approach that integrates 
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all aspects of working capital management, as emphasized primarily by Schiff & Lieber 
(1974), Sartoris & Hill (1983) and Kim & Chung (1990).95 This not only allows to consider 
the interdependencies of the individual components of working capital, but also better 
reflects the evolved information and communication technology (ICT) capabilities of firms 
with regards to working capital accountability, given their increased use of enterprise 
resource planning (ERP) software as a management tool. Such a tool is, on a side note, of 
great help to firms in following a cross-functional approach to working capital management, 
involving the firm’s sales, supply chain, treasury and finance functions. It nevertheless 
remains struggling for many firms “to break down barriers that prevent functions from 
working together on process improvements.” (APQC Report, 2011, p. 22). Still, the firms’ 
focus on issues of working capital management decisions is no longer driven by 
“compartmentalization”, i.e. where “each element of short-term finance is managed by an 
organizationally separate entity” (Sartoris & Hill, 1983, p. 349), as it used to be before the 
turn of the century.96 Indeed, a study by Gilbert & Reichert (1995) concerning the practices 
of financial management among Fortune 500’s corporations in the United States clearly 
shows the compartmentalization thinking that was prevalent during the 1980’s and the early 
1990’s as the models used by these firms as a tool in WCM were categorized into either cash 
management models, security portfolio models, accounts receivable management models or 
inventory management models. 
Given the preceding argumentation, the following only reviews the prior research that 
emphasizes on an integrative approach to WCM. 
4.2.1. Modelling the Interrelationship Between Inventory and Receivables Policies 
In this section, I briefly describe the integrative dynamic model designed by Schiff & Lieber 
(1974) for the management of receivables and inventory. I include it in my work as it 
provides a rationale for how choosing the right credit policy in conjunction with the right 
inventory policy can lead a firm to optimize its profits and eventually its value to 
shareholders over time, and is thus of relevance to my own work. Underlying the model are 
                                                
95 A few other studies attempting to examine working capital decisions using an integrative approach include 
Beranek (1967), who points out to the interdependencies between inventory, order-quantities and the 
opportune time to settle accounts payable, and Schiff (1972), who, as in Schiff & Lieber (1974), examines 
the inventory and accounts receivables investments jointly. Mehta (1974), using a linear programming, and 
Mao (1969) and Sartoris & Spruill (1974), using a goal programming framework, also provide attempts to 
treat elements of working capital decisions simultaneously.  
96 Similarly, Schiff & Lieber (1974) also highlight that inventory management was typically considered as 
being part of production management whereas credit management fell under the treasurer’s or the 
controller’s duties.   
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several assumptions of which the more relevant are that a firm, operating in a continuous, 
finite time interval (0, T) produces one product it sells at a constant price P. It faces the 
demand, D, which is determined by time, t, terms of credit, q, and inventory level, x. A longer 
credit period, q, used as a measure of credit terms, as well as a higher level of inventory are 
assumed to increase the demand for the product. Moreover, the demand function for the 
product is assumed to be linear, non-stationary and may be subject to arbitrary fluctuations 
over time, thus allowing for seasonality or trend effects.97 Schiff & Lieber (1974) also 
assume the interest rate to be accumulated linearly relative to the level of accounts 
receivables.98 The cost of accounts receivable is given by Schiff & Lieber (1974) as rqPD, 
where r is the interest rate, i.e. the cost of holding one unit of accounts receivable for one 
unit of time, q the length of the credit period.99 The marginal effect of increasing the credit 
period q on the cost of accounts receivable is therefore given as: 
 
jklmn(l,o,8)
jl = -(, O, ) + -	:, 
 
	: being the marginal effect of credit terms on the quantity demanded. The above equation 
implies a twofold effect of an increase in the length of the credit period by one unit: The first 
term on the right-hand side of the equation, -(, O, ), represents the increased cost of 
credit associated with lengthening the credit period. The second term on the right-hand side 
of the equation, -	:, represents the additional cost associated with the increase in sales 
resulting from the increase of the credit period by one unit. 
                                                
97 The demand function  is given by Schiff & Lieber (1974) as ((), O(), ) = 	:() +  	=O() + (), 
where () is the credit period for the amount sold at time , O() is the level of inventory at time  (the 
level of inventory might be negative, thus allowing for the possibility of backlogging),  	: and 	= are 
marginal effects of credit terms and inventory, respectively, on the quantity demanded and () an arbitrary 
function of time (p. 135). Schiff & Lieber (1974) assume, to avoid complexity, that changing the credit 
terms over time is not associated with any costs. 
98 According to Schiff & Lieber (1974), this assumption should hold true in many cases taking into account the 
proportion of accounts receivable to total assets, as many firms for which this proportion is relatively small 
should be “able to obtain funds at the same interest rate to finance incremental investments in accounts 
receivable” (p. 135)  
99 Selling D units of the product leads to an increase of the accounts receivable by the amount PD, which is 
associated with an interest cost of rPD for each unit of time and rqPD over a credit period length of q. 
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Schiff and Lieber (1974) then include a production cost function, 1(()), where () 
represents a decision variable concerning the rate of production at time  ,and a holding cost 
(of inventory) function, ℎ(O()),100 to devise the firm’s objective function as follows: 
 
	O p[-((), O(), 
r
T
) − 1;()< − ℎ;O()< − ()-((), O(), )]+ 
 
The above objective function represents the net profits of the firm over the planning horizon, 
which the firm ought to maximize. Moreover, Schiff & Lieber (1974) introduce the rate of 
change in inventory, x’(t), as the difference in production rate and demand101, or: 
 
Os() = () − ((), O(), ), so that 
 
O() =  OT + p[(t)
8
T
− (t)]+t 
 
Substituting the above equation in the maximization problem leaves the firm with two 
decision variables, namely () and (), or in other words its production and credit policy 
to choose from to maximize its profits. Solving this problem provides a unique solution, 
which varies only due to seasonality and upward or downward trends in demand (which was 
introduced through the term b(t) in the demand function).102 Fluctuations in demand will 
thus result in an adjustment of both the inventory and credit policies followed by the firm. 
                                                
100 Both functions are assumed by Schiff & Lieber (1974) to be strictly convex and twice continuously 
differentiable, with the holding cost function taking a value of 0 for values of O ≤ 0, implying zero holding 
costs for backlogging. The demand function however implicitly includes penalty costs for backlogging, i.e. 
a high backlogging is associated with a lower demand for the product. 
101 Both the production rate and the credit period length are subject to a non-negativity constraint (i.e. v(t) ≥ 0 
and q(t) ≥ 0) in the model of Schiff & Lieber (1974), the latter excluding the possibility of prepayment in 
the model (however allowing for prepayment leads to a similar solution to the maximization problem 
according to the authors). A terminal constraint is also imposed so that all demand must be met at the end 
of the planning horizon, i.e. no backlogging is allowed (x(T) ≥ 0). 
102 The reader interested in how the solution is derived should refer to the article of Schiff & Lieber (1974), as 
outlining each step of the solution is not relevant to the aim of this thesis. 
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This implies that changes in credit terms ought to be contemplated in an environment of 
changing demand, e.g. due to seasonal fluctuations.  
It should be noted, moreover, that two effects crystallize out of this model with regards to 
inventory. The first effect, which Schiff & Lieber (1974) name the service effect, considers 
that “[b]y holding inventory the firm can better service its customers, thus directly affecting 
quantity demanded”; the second effect, titled transaction effect, considers that “if inventory 
and backlogging are not accumulated, the production schedule must equal demand, and 
hence, high fluctuations are introduced in production, resulting in relatively high production 
costs. The smoother the production pattern is for a given demand pattern, the lower [the] 
production costs”103 (Schiff & Lieber, 1974, p. 136)  
To conclude this section, I shall note that the model outlined above rightly calls for an 
integrative and coordinated view of the credit and inventory management functions, both 
key components of a firm’s working capital management policy. 
4.2.2.  A Cash Flow Approach to Working Capital Management 
Though the dynamic model developed by Schiff & Lieber (1974) I described in the previous 
subsection provides a useful starting point on which firms can build their working capital 
management decisions, as it allows for the joint consideration of credit and inventory 
policies, there remained a need, up until the early 1980’s, to develop an approach to short-
term financial decisions which not only incorporated the various elements of working capital 
but the goal of which would be to maximize a firm’s net present value, thus taking into 
account cash flows rather than using accounting variables in the decision problem. The work 
by Lieber & Orgler (1975) remains pioneering in this respect by being the first to embed the 
credit policy in a firm’s net present value maximization problem104 and has inspired the 
previously cited articles by Sartoris & Hill (1983) and later Kim & Chung (1990) I will 
briefly describe hereafter. In these studies, the concept of net present value is extended to 
include the interdependencies between the various elements of working capital, thus 
providing integrative “models that focus on how the joint management of a firm’s credit 
policies and inventories influences firm value” (Kieschnick et al., 2013, p. 1830) and being 
of relevance to my own study. Firm value is here to be related to the standard free cash flow 
                                                
103 This smoothing argument is similar in terms of interpretation to the investment smoothing argument brought 
forward by Fazzari & Petersen (1993). 
104 Other, such as Kim & Atkins (1978), Hill & Riener (1979) and Sartoris & Hill (1981) have followed in the 
same footpath. 
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(FCF) valuation model and is expressed in standard corporate finance textbooks, such as that 
of Erhardt & Brigham (2009), as: 
 
MuKkv =  ∑ wxwy(:z{|xx)y}8~:  , 
 
where FCF = NOPAT − ∆NOWC −  ∆Fixed Assets, NOPAT being the net operating 
profit after tax at time t, ∆NOWC the investment in net operating working capital at time t, 
∆Fixed Assets the investment in long-term assets, and WACC the weighted average cost of 
capital.105 
4.2.2.1. Joint Management of Credit and Receivables Policies 
Let me begin by exposing the work of Sartoris & Hill (1983), who in a first step devise the 
cash flow timeline (see Fig. 11) as the framework on which they build their model, which 
focuses on changes in that timeline due to managerial decisions. 
Sartoris & Hill (1983) rightly point out that given that many organizational borders such as 
cash, credit, inventory and payables management are being crossed within this timeline, the 
use of such an approach permits to focus on changes affecting both the amount and timing 
of cash inflows and outflows along the whole timeline rather than changes in single 
components of working capital, such as accounts receivables. 
They also stress the importance of considering the interrelationships between the timing and 
amount of the cash flows in order to correctly assess the effect of a working capital policy 
decision on the firm’s value.106 In a second step, Sartoris & Hill (1983) develop a model in 
which cash flows associated with any working capital policy decision are assumed to be 
known with certainty,107 with regards to both their timing and amount, and in which all 
production costs are variable in nature and can be written as a percentage of sales. They 
                                                
105 It becomes clear from that expression that net operating working capital is an essential determinant of firm 
value; however, “it does not make it clear what its relationship is because investments in net operating 
working capital are like investments in long-term assets in that they reduce current free cash flow while 
influencing future free cash flow” (Kieschnick et al., 2013, p. 1829) 
106 Since short-term financial decisions are usually a blend of unrelated and intertwined decisions, some 
decisions will have an isolated impact on the timing of one set of the operating cash flows, while others 
will impact the timing and/or amount of a group of sets of the operating cash-flows. (Sartoris & Hill, 1983) 
107 Sartoris & Hill (1983) also introduce uncertainty in the model for working capital decisions which they 
suggest to deal with using one of three methods: (1) simulation, (2) explicit pricing and (3) neutralization. 
The interested reader is referred to their original article for more details relating to this issue. 
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identify as relevant cash flows “the payment for factors of productions (materials and labor), 
the collection of credit sales during a cash (or early payment) discount period, and the 
collection of the remainder of the credit sales” (Sartoris & Hill, 1983, p. 351), and set a 
planning/decision horizon of N days. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 10: The Cash Flow Timeline (Source: Sartoris & Hill, 1983) 
 
Given the above assumptions and following the cash flow timeline depicted in Fig. 10, the 
timing and amount of the operational cash flows can also be depicted (see Fig. 11). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 11: Operating Cash Flows (Source: Sartoris & Hill, 1983) 
 
In Fig. 11, 8  is the cash outflow, realized in , related to the payment for the production 
factors, where  is the variable cost of production denominated as a percentage of sales 8. 
In , customers making use of the cash discount pay the firm (1-d)q8, where d represents 
the discount and q the percentage of sales paid at discount. The last inflow of cash, equal to 
(1-q)(1-b) 8, happens in , where b represents the fraction of uncollected, non-discount 
sales, i.e. foul debts. 
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Given a risk-free interest rate of r, Sartoris & Hill (1983) then express the net present value 
of the cash flows from operations for day t as: 
 
.-M8 = −8Uk8 + (1 − +)8Uk8 + (1 − )8(1 − )Uk8  
 
Furthermore, they assume the level of future sales to follow any generalized growth path 
over time, thus 8 = T)(), where T is the amount of sales a t = 0 and f(t) is a continuous 
and non-negative function of t representing the time pattern of sales.108 
Finally, Sartoris & Hill (1983) provide the below mentioned expression for the total net 
present value of operating cash flows over the entire planning period: 
 
.-M =  p(

T
− Uk8 + (1 − +)Uk8 + (1 − )(1 − )Uk8 )T)()Uk8 
 
By using this integrative cash flow valuation approach, a firm can analyse, in principle, 
whether a proposed change in its working capital policy is beneficial, i.e. would change the 
amount and timing of its operational cash flows in such a way that their total net present 
value, as expressed above, is increased. However, as Sartoris & Hill (1983) highlight, since 
any working capital policy may affect both the time pattern of sales, f(t), one “must examine 
the sales growth which would occur over the indefinite planning horizon before [one] can 
establish whether the old or the proposed working capital policy will result in the higher 
NPV. To evaluate the change in general, [one] need[s] to know both the planning horizon 
over which the policies are to be evaluated, and the time pattern of sales that will result from 
the alternative policies.” (Sartoris & Hill, 1983, p. 353) 
4.2.2.2. Accounting for the Inventory Policy 
While the cash flow based model developed by Sartorius & Hills (1983) rightly calls for a 
working capital management that integrates different working capital components, it does 
                                               
108 Though they assume a generalized growth pattern over time in the model, i.e. not specifying the exact form 
of the function f(t), Sartoris & Hill (1983) point out to several possible and realistic growth patterns, of 
which one follows a constant growth rate g, where f(t)= 8, one that allows for seasonal growth, where 
f(t)= (8)8 , g(t) being some function of time, one mimicking product lifecycle growth, where f(t) is 
polynomial, and one modelling declining sales, i.e. allowing for negative growth rates. 
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not concern itself with the decision regarding a firm’s inventory policy, which it considers 
as given in its formulation, thus leaving room for further evaluation.109 Said further 
evaluation is given by Kim & Chung (1990), who present a model in which both the 
inventory and the credit policy are evaluated jointly based on the maximization of the cash 
flow based net present value. Their model relies on a finished goods inventory system110 and 
addresses the relevant policy questions regarding the optimal batch size of each shipment as 
well as its corresponding terms of sale. Kim & Chung (1990, p.384) underlie their model 
with the following assumptions: 
 
 1. Uniform rate of production of U units per time 
2. Goods held in inventory until sold in a batch (at the end of each inventory cycle) at a 
price of P dollars per unit 
3. Cash discount (d) offered for early payment 
4. Rate of sales at cash discount, (r(d)), is a function of the discount’s magnitude 
5. Continuous cash outflows related to production expenses of $CU per unit of time 
6. Inventory carry costs proportional to the level of inventory, i.e. equal to $hCUt at time t 
7. Cash outflows of selling costs E (e.g. shipping and insurance costs) when goods are sold 
and shipped at the end of the inventory cycle 
Given the above assumptions, Kim & Chung (1990, p. 385) express the NPV of the cash 
outflows related to production costs (PC), out-of-pocket inventory carrying costs (IC), and 
selling expenses (SE) respectively as follows: 
 
- =   (Ue8)+rT , 
 
& = ℎ  (Ue8)rT +, 
                                                
109 Kim & Chung (1990) 
110 With regards to manufacturing firms, inventories can be categorized into raw materials, work in process and 
finished goods, i.e. completed products that are expected to be sold. Kim & Chung (1990) argue that “most 
consumer and industrial products are manufactured and stored in inventory to meet forecasted future 
sales.” (p. 384) Failing to hold finished goods in inventory would be highly impractical and for the least 
overly costly, as in such an instance the pattern of sales would have to follow exactly the rate of production.  
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 = (Uer), 
 
where T represents the cycle time, k the opportunity cost of funds per time unit, and h the 
out-of-pocket inventory carrying costs expressed as a percentage of inventory level. 
Let me now turn to the net present value of the cash inflows from sales, i.e. the sales revenue 
(SR), the timing and magnitude of which are dependent on both a firm’s credit and inventory 
policies, and which Kim & Chung (1990, p.385) express as: 
 
 = (1 − +)(+)-/{Ue(Ur)} + {1 − (+)}(1 − )-/{Ue(Ur)}, 
 
the first term being the present value of the cash discounted sales revenue while the second 
term represents the present value of the revenue from credit sales. In the above equation, M 
and L represent the cash discount and the credit periods respectively, and b the fixed bad 
debt loss proportion of the sales not cash-discounted. 
Thus, in the first inventory cycle, the net present value of the cash in- and outflows is 
expressed as: 
 
.-M = −- − & −  + . 
 
Based on this model, the goal of the decision maker(s), whoever that may be within a firm, 
is then to choose both the inventory as well as the credit (i.e. receivables) policies to 
maximize the net present value of all future cash flows, that is 
 
.-M (∞) = .-M  (U^er)
}
^~T
 
 
Solving the above optimization problem leads Kim & Chung (1990) to infer that the optimal 
accounts receivables and inventory policies are intertwined, thus calling for their joint 
evaluation in a working capital management framework based on a NPV-maximizing cash-
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flow approach.111 More specifically, they assert that the isolated evaluation of these 
interrelated working capital components, namely inventories and accounts receivable, will 
result in suboptimal solutions,112 and conclude that the model they develop represents “a 
theoretically correct and conceptually straightforward alternative to both the traditional 
cost minimization approach to inventory decisions, and to the isolated analysis of accounts 
receivable policies.” (Kim & Chung, 1990, p. 388) 
5. Does Good Governance Boost WCM Efficiency? 
The previous section was concerned with how a firm should approach its working capital 
management. Specifically, the literature presented suggested that a firm should adopt a 
policy that evaluates all the components of working capital jointly, as opposed to 
individually. In this section I will present a few relatively recent academic articles that try to 
answer the question of whether good quality corporate governance can enhance the 
efficiency of its working capital management policy. Following Eljelly (2004), the 
management of a firm’s working capital is efficient when current assets and current liabilities 
are planned and controlled in such a way that the risk of the firm falling short of meeting its 
due short-term obligations is eliminated and excessive investment in current assets is 
avoided. Taking a closer look at the above-mentioned question is relevant for my own study 
for the following reason: If it is the case that corporate governance - which is commonly 
referred to as the set of explicit and implicit rules and practices by which a board of directors 
makes sure that a firm’s relationship with all its stakeholders is dealt with in a fair, 
accountable and transparent manner - is positively related to the efficiency of the firm’s 
working capital management policy, eventually translating in a shareholder wealth increase, 
then one could set forth the hypothesis that establishing a corporate governance of the 
highest quality serves a firm to follow a WCM policy that is not only geared towards 
delivering higher returns to its shareholder, but also allows a sustainable approach to WCM. 
                                                
111 The reader interested in the exact solution for the optimal batch sales volume, Q*, and the optimal cash 
discount, d*, as well as in their derivation is kindly referred to the appendix in Kim & Chung (1990, pp. 
388-389). 
112 According to Kim & Chung (1990), taking an isolated view of inventory and accounts receivable 
management may be due to one of two reasons: Either the management of inventory could (i) be considered 
not to be under the direct supervision of the financial manager, or (ii) be done using the traditional cost 
minimizing EOQ method, since a large body of literature on inventory management, up until the publication 
of the article by Kim & Chung (1990), (falsely) suggested that the said method and the NPV maximizing 
method will lead to more or less the same results for all kinds of inventory systems (see, e.g., Hadley, 1964, 
Trippi & Lewin, 1974, Thompson, 1975, Gurnani, 1983).  
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This argument should also be placed in the current context of Germany, the geographical 
focus of my empirical study, where the topic of corporate governance, the soft legal 
framework of which is embedded in the German Corporate Governance Code (GCGC),113 
has gained significant attention over the last decade. 
5.1.  Setting the Corporate Governance Benchmark 
Let me remind the reader at this point that corporate governance can be thought of as a 
common agency problem involving an agent, e.g. a firm’s chief executive officer (CEO), and 
that agent’s multiple principals, e.g. its shareholders, creditors, customers, employees, 
suppliers, and other third parties the CEO maintains a business relationship with on his firm’s 
behalf. 114 This view is by all means compatible with Jensen & Meckling’s (1976) definition 
of an agency relationship115 and their description of a firm as “one form of legal fiction which 
serves as a nexus for contracting relationships.” (Jensen & Meckling, 1976, p. 311) Thus, 
rules of corporate governance can be considered to result from the process of contracting 
between the CEO, as the agent, and the various principals involved in the common agency 
problem.  
The main issue in corporate governance, as argued by Becht et al. (2003), then concerns 
itself with understanding which outcome this contracting process is likely to lead to, and 
whether this outcome will differ in practice from the efficient contracting benchmark.116 
Becht et al. (2003) discuss whether the notion of shareholder value maximization, a criterion 
                                                
113 The German Corporate Governance Code presents essential statutory regulations for the management and 
supervision (governance) of German listed companies, which are mainly referring to the Aktiengesetz 
(AktG) – the German stock corporation act “[and] clarifies the obligation of the Management Board and 
the Supervisory Board to ensure the continued existence of the enterprise and its sustainable creation in 
value.” (GCGC, 2015, p. 1) Although this code, through the annual declaration of conformity pursuant to 
§161 AktG, represents a legal framework, compliance to it is not mandatory as firms can opt to deviate 
from its suggestions (marked by the wording “should”) and recommendations (marked by the wording 
“shall”) when in the interest of good governance – though being obliged to disclose and justify any deviation 
from the recommendations (Comply or Explain). (GCGC, 2015) 
114 See Bernheim & Whinston (1985,1986a, 1986b) 
115 Jensen & Meckling (1976, p. 308) „define an agency relationship as a contract under which one or more 
persons (the principal(s)) engage another person (the agent) to perform some service on their behalf which 
involves delegating some decision making authority to the agent.” 
116 Becht et al. (2003) correctly distinguish between ex-ante and ex-post (or Pareto) efficiency: While a 
corporate charter is ex-ante efficient when it delivers the maximum joint surplus to all parties affected by 
the corporate action, a corporate charter is Pareto efficient when no other charter exists that makes any one 
of the parties involved better off without making at least one of the involved parties worse off. In the 
presence of unrestricted side transfers between the parties involved, a Pareto efficient charter is also surplus 
maximizing. However, in practice side transfers are not seldom restricted by wealth or borrowing 
limitations.    
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repeatedly defended as an efficient benchmark in articles on corporate governance,117 and 
one that is of crucial interest in my study, can actually form the basis for such an efficient 
contracting benchmark:  
Following the argumentation of Jensen & Meckling (1976) and assuming that (i) all contracts 
with principals other than shareholders which form the above mentioned nexus are complete, 
(ii) only contracts with shareholders are open-ended, thus only granting claims on residual 
returns to shareholders after fulfilment of all other contractual obligations, and (iii) agency 
problems are non-existent, it is straightforward that corporate governance rules should be 
devised with the exclusive objective of protecting and promoting shareholder value 
maximization.  
However, managerial agency problems make such an exclusive focus on shareholder wealth 
maximization inefficient since it may, as noticed by Jensen & Meckling (1976), lead to 
manager taking excessive risks or even underinvest in consequence of a debt overhang, a 
problem first addressed by Myers (1977) and which may bring a firm on the edge of financial 
distress.  Moreover, following Becht et al. (2003), taking into consideration the fact that 
relationships between a firm and its principals other than the shareholders are usually 
governed by incomplete contracts, corporate governance rules geared exclusively towards 
shareholder value maximization do not guarantee efficiency. Rather, they argue that 
explicitly accounting for the interests of the constituencies other than the shareholders of the 
firm when designing of such rules is more likely to guarantee efficiency. It is interesting to 
note here that, in the case of German corporations, the rules of corporate governance are 
designed in such a way as to balance the shareholders’ and employees’ interests.118 Although 
it is still open to debate whether, in an environment of incomplete contracts, shareholder 
value maximization should be the exclusive focus when designing efficient rules of corporate 
governance or whether the interests of other constituencies than shareholders should be 
taking into consideration, Becht et al. (2003) argue that it is in the best interest of firms to 
                                                
117 See, for instance, Williamson (1984, 1985), who argues that corporate governance rules should be geared 
primarily at protecting a firm’s shareholders since these enjoy less protection than other of the firm’s 
principals such as creditors and employees. 
118 The GCGC (2015, p. 1) states that “[t]he Members of the Supervisory Board are elected by the shareholders 
at the General Meeting. In enterprises having more than 500 or 2,000 employees in Germany, employees are 
also represented in the Supervisory Board, which then is composed of employee representatives to one third or 
one half respectively. For enterprises with more than 2,000 employees, the Chairman of the Supervisory Board, 
who, for all practical purposes, is a representative of the shareholders, has the casting vote in the case of split 
resolutions. The representatives elected by the shareholders and the representatives of the employees are 
equally obliged to act in the enterprise’s best interests.” 
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design a corporate governance framework – one that is imposed by regulations119 – that (i) 
overcomes the problem of collective action prevalent when ownership is dispersed120 and 
(ii) that accounts for the interests of all relevant constituencies. Moreover, they identify five 
tools as mentioned below (see Becht et al., 2003, p. 18) which aim to mitigate collective 
agency problems, with emphasis on shareholders’ collective action problems: 
 
(1) Election of a board of directors representing shareholders’ interests, to which the 
CEO is accountable 
(2) When the need arises, a takeover or proxy fight launched by a corporate raider who 
temporarily concentrates voting power (and/or ownership) in his hands to resolve a 
crisis, reach an important decision or remove an inefficient manager 
(3) Active and continuous monitoring by a large blockholder, who could be a wealthy 
investor or a financial intermediary, such as a bank, a holding company or a pension 
fund. 
(4) Alignment of managerial interests with investors through executive compensation 
contracts. 
(5) Clearly defined fiduciary duties for CEOs and the threat of class-action suits that 
either block corporate decisions that go against investors’ interests, or seek 
compensation for past actions that have harmed their interests. 
5.2.  Linking Corporate Governance to WCM Efficiency 
The previous subsection concerned itself with the question of how to design rules of 
corporate governance in an efficient way and thus allows to distinguish the characteristics 
                                                
119 Becht et al. (2003, pp. 16-17) argue that regulatory intervention is necessary primarily since in the absence 
of regulations imposing governance rules, the founder of a firm or its shareholders, which could then “design 
and implement any corporate charter they like, […] will tend to write inefficient rules since they cannot feasibly 
involve all the parties concerned in a comprehensive bargain.” Besides, “even if firms initially have the right 
incentives to design efficient rules, they may want to break or alter them later. A problem then arises when 
firms do not have the power to commit not to change (or break) the rules down the road. When shareholders 
are dispersed and do not take an active interest in the firm it is possible, indeed straightforward, for 
management to change the rules to their advantage ex post.” 
120 Dispersed ownership is not limited to shareholders (similarly, bondholders or creditors can also be 
dispersed) and represents a major source of corporate governance problems. It arises, among shareholders, for 
a number of reasons: (i) an individual shareholder’s wealth may be relatively insignificant, making it difficult 
to take a large stake in a firm, (ii) for risk diversification purposes, shareholder able to take a large stake in a 
firm may choose to invest less, (iii) a shareholder may face difficulties selling a large stake in the secondary 
market, and (iv) regulations may be in place in an effort to protect minority shareholders, which makes it 
costlier to hold large stakes in a firm. Due to these reasons, it may neither be realistic nor desirable to solve the 
problem of collective action prevalent among dispersed shareholders. (Becht et al., 2003)  
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of good governance when trying to establish its link with the efficiency of WCM. A few 
studies have attempted to establish such a link and suggest that efficient corporate 
governance rules influence the efficiency of a firm’s management of its working capital. 
Kieschnick et al. (2006), who address the question of whether US corporations over-invested 
in working capital and to what extent that over-investment would be caused by agency 
problems, provide evidence, using panel data from 1990 through 2004, of a significantly 
negative relationship between the market value of a firm, as defined by Fama & French 
(2002), and its corresponding investment in working capital, a result which is consistent with 
working capital over-investment for the US corporations under study.121 Moreover, the 
results of their analysis of the factors influencing the management of working capital suggest 
that “managerial incentives and the monitoring of management are significant influences on 
a firm’s working capital management performance.”122 (Kieschnick et al., 2006, p. 2) More 
specifically, the proportion of outside directors on the firm’s board123 as well as the CEO’s 
current compensation and share ownership have significant influence on its working capital 
                                                
121 In order to find out whether firms over-invest in working capital, Kieschnick et al. (2006) base their analysis 
on the DCF valuation framework presented by Kaplan & Ruback (1995), and write the current value of the 
firm, -Mw(0), as: 
-Mw(0) = (0) +  1()(1 + )8
}
8~:
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where (0) is the current value of its cash assets, 1 the capital cash flows, &.M the investment in 
long term assets, &.M  the investment in net working capital (equal to accounts receivable plus inventories 
less accounts payable and accrued expenses), and r the discount rate. If one assumes that investments in net 
working capital mainly affects the level of sales in the current period, then the value of a firm is maximized 
when an additional dollar invested in net operating capital generates the same dollar in sales. An over-
investment in net working capital would obviously not lead to this result. Moreover, the present value of a 
firm a time t, -Mw(), can be re-written, assuming, as Kieschnick et al. (2006) do, that a firm’s capital cash 
flows grow at a constant rate, g, as: 
-Mw() =  () +  [ 1( + 1) − &.M( + 1) − &.M ( + 1)]( − S)  
The marginal effect of an investment in net working capital on the present value can then be written as: 
 
jm¡¢(8)
j£¡¤(8) = !
j¥xw(8)
j£¡¤(8) − 1% ¦
:
kU§. Kieschnick et al. (2006) estimate this marginal effect in one of their 
regression models of the market value of a firm on net working capital investment. Therefore, since 
( − S)U: is positive and the level of net working capital investment is optimal if the estimated coefficient 
is insignificantly different from zero, a positive (negative) estimated coefficient implies an under- (over-) 
investment in net working capital. The above argumentation also holds true when Kieschnick et al. (2006) 
extend Kaplan & Ruback’s (1995) concept of capital cash flows to include incremental investment in cash 
and marketable securities. 
122 Apart from these corporate governance related factors, Kieschnick et al. (2006) also show a firm’s working 
capital management inefficiency to be positively correlated with its size and its expected sales growth and 
uncorrelated with its industry’s concentration. These results suggest that firms are not using the full 
potential of their market power to render their working capital management practices more efficient, but 
rather follow those prevalent in their industry. 
123 According to Fama (1980), the inclusion of outside directors on the board reduces the likelihood of collusive 
arrangements between the inside directors on the board that would be detrimental to the wealth of security 
holders. In that sense, outside directors serve a management monitoring role. 
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policy: A larger proportion of outside directors on a firm’s board as well as a larger total 
current compensation124 of the CEO lead to a better performance of the firm’s working 
capital management. However, that performance decreases with the size of the CEO’s share 
ownerships. Interestingly, the evidence reported by Kieschnick et al. (2006) suggests neither 
the size of a firm’s board,125 measured by the number of directors, nor corporate charter 
provisions, measured by the governance index (GINDEX) developed by Gompers et al. 
(2003) and alternatively by several indices Kieschnick et al. (2006) created by grouping 
governance features by intended purpose,126 to have a significant influence on its working 
capital management performance. 
Coming back to the topic of CEO compensation and its relation to working capital efficiency, 
it is interesting to pinpoint a recent working paper by Aktas et al. (2015a), in which the 
authors investigate whether and to what extent firms provide the right compensation 
incentives to its executives (i.e. CEO, CFO and other executives), the aim of which is to 
mitigate managerial slack when deploying corporate resources to working capital. They 
estimate, using data covering a large sample of U.S. firms over the period 1992-2012, the 
sensitivity of different components of realized executive compensation to realized working 
capital performance.127 They hereby consider, after adjusting for scale, a positive working 
                                                
124 Kieschnick et al. (2006) measure of total current compensation includes CEOs’ current period salary and 
bonus. The CEOs’ stock compensation component, measured using the CEOs’ unexercised stock option 
positions rather than the current period stock option grants, is also used in their attempt to apprehend the 
alignment of managerial incentive with the interests of shareholders. However, though a negative influence 
of the unexercised stock option holdings on the cash conversion cycle is evidenced, it is not significant.  
125 Kieschnick et al. (2006) expected a laxity of larger boards with respect to the monitoring of management, 
which in turn was expected to be associated with longer cash conversion cycles than those of industry peers. 
126 Kieschnick et al. (2006), in their effort to include corporate charter provisions in their regression model, 
first follow Harford et al. (2008) and include the Gompers, Ishii and Metrick’s governance index 
(GINDEX) as an additional regressor and do not find it to significantly influence a firm’s working capital 
management performance. However, Kieschnick et al. (2006) argue that using the GINDEX in their 
regression assumes all charter provisions to have the same influence on the cash conversion cycle, an 
assumption which has not gone uncriticised in recent literature on corporate governance (see Bebchuk et 
al., 2009). Therefore, Kieschnick et al. (2006), to assess whether the result they obtained using the GINDEX 
is correct, run the regression using several component indices they created, each characterising a specific 
kind of provisions (i.e. internal provisions, external provisions, compensation & liability provisions, 
minority voting provisions, and state laws) and find that “none of the coefficients of the different corporate 
charter indices are statistically significant.” (Kieschnick et al., 2006, p. 15) 
127 Aktas et al. (2015a) design two kinds of specifications providing estimates for (i) compensation incentives 
aimed at improving working capital performance as well as (ii) compensation incentives aimed at 
maintaining an already good working capital performance relative to industry peers. The first specification 
is estimated using a regression of the following form: 
 
(i)      K¨78 =  7` + `8 + ? × .B78 +  9 × b78 + \K78  , 
 
where the dependent variable  K¨78  represents the (ex-post observed) compensation that executive i receives 
from firm j for year t (the authors consider salary, bonus and equity-based pay in the form of stock and 
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capital performance to be either a reduction of working capital128 from one year to the next 
or a low working capital level in any given year relative to industry peers. Their baseline 
argumentation goes as follows: A disciplined management of working capital, i.e. 
eliminating excess inventory, improving collections from customers, and negotiating 
favourable payment terms with suppliers, typically proves difficult.129 This holds true not 
only because a disciplined working capital management demands serious attention and 
coordination among different functional group within an organization, as already mentioned 
earlier in this thesis. Another reason Aktas et al. (2015a) bring forward is that managing 
working capital in a disciplined manner barely draws media attention that is personally 
beneficial to those managers involved.130 Given the above, and in accordance with the 
traditional recognition in economics and finance that managerial compensation represents 
an internal governance tool,131 managers ought to be given the right incentives so that their 
interests are aligned with those of shareholders. Otherwise, the managers’ preferences for 
the ‘quiet life’ may lead them to avoid personally challenging decisions and effort in 
managing resources.132 This, following the results obtained by Aktas et al. (2015a), also 
holds true for corporate resources allocated to working capital. Indeed, the authors provide 
empirical evidence of a significant sensitivity of short-term bonus payments to working 
capital performance.133 Interestingly, inventories and accounts payables are those 
                                                
options as the different components of compensation), 7`  and `8 are, respectively, firm and year fixed 
effects.  .B78 represents net working capital scaled by sales and adjusted for the median net working 
capital ratio in the industry, following the 49 Fama-French industry definitions. ? measures the strength of 
compensation incentives for improving working capital performance: A negative value for ? provides an 
indication that managers are rewarded for reductions in the level of working capital. b78  represents a matrix 
of control variables that include time-varying firm characteristics as well as performance measures and \K78 
represents an error term. 
The second specification is estimated by replacing firm and year fixed effects by industry fixed effects, thus 
using a regression equation taking the form: 
 
(ii)       K¨78 =  `e8 + ? × .B78 +  9 × b78 + \K78  , 
 
where `e8 are industry fixed effects. In this setting, a negative value for the regression coefficient ? 
indicates that managers are being rewarded for operating with a lower working capital level relative to 
industry peers faced with similar market conditions. 
128 Aktas et al. (2015a) use net working capital, defined as Inventories + Receivables – Payables, as they argue 
that “shareholders care about net resource commitments to working capital” (p. 8) 
129 See Ek & Guerin (2011) 
130 See Malmendier & Tate (2009). Moreover, Holmström (1999) argues that success or failure in the context 
of working capital management is unlikely to be a source of reputational motivation for managers. 
131 See Jensen & Meckling (1976) 
132 See Hicks (1935) and Bertrand & Mullainathan (2003) 
133 Salary and equity-based compensation, the other components of executive compensation considered by 
Aktas et al. (2015a), display little to no sensitivity to working capital performance. 
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components of working capital that account for the largest contribution on executive bonus 
payments. Other interesting results of the study of Aktas et al. (2015a) are that (i) executives 
of firms facing financial constraints are been given strong incentives to maintain working 
capital at a low level relative to industry peers. This result is consistent with large benefits 
from a disciplined management of working capital for such firms, and that (ii) the executives 
of firms facing a lower exposure to external threats of being taken over are being granted 
stronger working capital incentives. As an implication for policy, I can note that Aktas et al. 
(2015a) conclude their study by highlighting the importance of short-term bonuses in 
executive compensation and suggesting that “[r]ewards based on performance metrics such 
as net working capital, which managers know with high precision how their actions will 
affect, may guide managerial behavior more efficiently than rewards based solely on stock 
prices” (Aktas et al., 2015a, p. 22) 
Another noteworthy article134 relating working capital management efficiency to corporate 
governance is that of Gill & Biger (2013), in which the authors focus on empirically 
documenting the impact of corporate governance characteristics, such as CEO tenure & 
duality, board size, and audit committee on the efficiency of WCM135 in the case of American 
manufacturing firms, while controlling for other firm-specific factors such as its sales growth 
pattern, its size, its performance, and whether it operates internationally.136 Although the 
empirical approach used by Gill & Biger (2013) uncovers significant linkages between 
characteristics of corporate governance and different measure of working capital 
                                                
134 Other empirical studies looking at the association of the quality of corporate governance with the efficiency 
of working capital management are those by Palombini & Nakamura (2012), Achchutan & Kajanathan 
(2013), Goel et al. (2015) and Jamalinesari & Soheili (2015), who focus on the Brazilian, Sri Lankan, Indian 
and Iranian markets respectively.    
135 Gill & Biger (2013) use the following commonly used variables to express working capital efficiency: (i) 
accounts receivable, measured as (accounts receivables/sales) x 365 days, (ii) inventory, measures as 
(inventory/costs of goods sold) x 365 days, (iii) accounts payable, measured as (accounts payable/costs of 
goods sold) x 365 days, (iv) the cash conversion cycle (CCC), measured as (i) + (ii) - (iii), (v) the cash 
holdings, measured as the log of average cash, (vi) the current ratio, measured as current assets/current 
liabilities, and (vii) the cash conversion efficiency, measured as cash flow from operations/sales.  
136 The regression equations take the form bK,8 =  ` +  ?:/.K,8 + ?=K,8 + ?@XK,8 + ?VK,8 +  ªK,8 , where X 
is one of the seven variables defined in the previous footnote, TN is the CEO tenure, measured as the number 
of years serving as a CEO, CD is the CEO duality, taking the value 1 if the same person occupies the post 
of CEO and chairman of the board, 0 otherwise, BS is the board size, measured as the number of directors 
serving on the board, AC is the audit committee, measured as the number of audit committee members. The 
control variables are the sales growth, measured as (current year sales – previous year sales)/previous year 
sales, the internationalization of the firm, taking value 1 if the firm is international and 0 otherwise, the firm 
size, measured by the log of average assets, and the firm performance, measured as the net income after 
tax/revenue. 
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management efficiency137, a limitation of their research design is that a clear causal inference 
(i.e. good corporate governance improves the efficiency of WCM) can not necessarily be 
established. They however offer the following conjectures as to the reasons that could justify 
such a causality: they argue that poor corporate governance leads to inefficient WCM 
policies, ultimately affecting shareholders’ wealth negatively. It should be noted that Gill & 
Biger (2013), in contrast to Kieschnick et al (2006), consider the efficient use of cash for 
daily operational purposes as essential in the management of working capital, and that poor 
corporate governance may lead to the accumulation of unnecessary financial slack138 and in 
turn not only adversely affects the cash management,139 but ultimately the management of 
inventories, accounts receivable, and accounts payable, all of which are key components of 
WCM. This calls for a strong corporate governance to avoid this problem. More specifically, 
Gill & Biger (2013) emphasize the role of CEO duality,140 board size,141 and audit 
committee142 in improving the efficiency of working capital management. For my own 
purposes, controlling for CEO duality is unnecessary as there is no such thing as CEO duality 
in Germany. Furthermore, since the size of a board of a German corporation is tightly 
regulated in the §7 MitbestG (Co-determination act), the direct implications for policy 
deriving from the study of Gill & Biger (2013) with regards to the board size are limited. 
Finally, forming audit committees as a governance tool geared, among other objectives, 
                                                
137 Gill & Biger (2013) provide, among other (significant) results, significant evidence of: (i) a positive 
(negative) relationship between internationalization (board size) and the cash conversion cycle, (ii) a 
positive relationship between the current ratio and CEO duality, firm size and financial performance 
respectively and a negative relationship between the current ratio and board size, and (iii) a positive 
relationship between both CEO duality and financial performance on the cash conversion efficiency. Other 
results, though significant, are omitted here as I focus on an integrative view of working capital 
management. 
138 Maintaining unnecessary high levels of financial slack may be a result of a risk-aversion by a firm’s 
management, thus leading to an agency problem as the interests of both the CEO and the board of directors 
are not geared towards the maximization of shareholders’ wealth. (see Gill & Shah, 2012) 
139 Following Harford et al. (2008) 
140 Gill & Shah (2012) argue that CEO duality is useful in maintaining a convenient level of working capital 
and can thus enhance WCM efficiency: Although, as argued by Fama & Jenson (1983), a board’s 
effectiveness in monitoring top management is thwarted when decision management and control are 
concentrated in one individual, Rechner & Dalton (1991) argue that when a CEO is also the board’s chair, 
it gives him the opportunity to take decisions and undertake projects without being influenced excessively 
by bureaucratic structures. (see Gill & Biger, 2013) 
141 Both Lipton & Lorsch (1992) and Yermack (1996) suggest that a large board of directors is less effective in 
the decision-making process than a small board of directors. (see Gill & Biger, 2013) 
142 Kyereboah-Coleman (2007) argues that the role of an audit committee is to improve the quality of a firm’s 
financial management by serving as an additional internal governance mechanism. Its independence is said 
to be improved when it is composed of at least three members. In turn, an independent audit committee, the 
function of which is to audit cash accounts, accounts receivable, accounts payable as well as inventory 
accounts, can reduce agency problems and costs and thus contribute to improving the efficiency of working 
capital management. (see Gill & Biger, 2013) 
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towards achieving more efficient WCM policies might be very useful when the goal is to 
achieve a sustainable working capital management that maximizes shareholder value. Köhler 
(2005, p. 230), in her survey-based study of characteristics of German audit committees, has 
noted that “due to its institutional and legal setting143, audit committee formation in 
Germany is quasi mandatory […] in the sense that stakeholders of a company perceive 
noncompliance with the [German Corporate Governance] Code as an adverse signal. 
Therefore, […] Supervisory Board members have no ‘free’ choice” with regards to the 
formation of an audit committee. She also draws the interesting conclusion that while 
German audit committees seemingly have a great potential to enhance both the efficiency 
and effectiveness of monitoring, they exhibit an extreme diversity with regards to their 
member characteristics as well as to their responsibilities. The question that follows from 
this conclusion is whether the mere fact of having an audit committee up and running sends 
the right signal to the capital market that an efficient decision-making process with regards 
to, among other aspects, working capital management, is in place, or rather whether audit 
committees, at their own discretion, should define specific duties and responsibilities geared 
towards, among other things, elaborating an integrative and sustainable working capital 
management framework the ultimate goal of which would be to contribute to shareholder 
value maximization. 
6. Fathoming the Year-End Working Capital Decline144 
 
Given that financial analysts monitor levels of working capital for the sake of foreseeing the 
future profitability of firms,145 it is reasonable to expect an inclination from the part of 
managers to “exert effort to reduce working capital at times where working capital levels 
draw the most attention” (Frankel et al., 2016, p.1), especially since lower working capital 
levels, ceteris paribus, are generally understood as an indication of a firm’s greater 
                                                
143 Section 5.3.2 of the German Corporate Governance Code, (as amended on May 5, 2015, p. 10) states that 
“[t]he Supervisory Board shall set up an Audit Committee which – in so far as no other committee is 
entrusted with this work -, in particular, handles the monitoring of the accounting process, the effectiveness 
of the internal control system, risk management system and internal audit system, the audit of the Annual 
Financial Statements, here in particular the independence of the auditor, the services rendered additionally 
by the auditor, the issuing of the audit mandate to the auditor, the determination of auditing focal points 
and the fee agreement, and compliance. The chairman of the Audit Committee shall have specialist 
knowledge and experience in the application of accounting principles and internal control processes. He 
shall be independent and not be a former member of the Management Board of the company whose 
appointment ended less than two years ago” 
144 See Frankel et al. (2016) 
145 See Pulliam, 2004 
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operational efficiency. Besides, a handful of academic and anecdotal evidence exists146 
pointing to a greater attention on fiscal year rather than quarterly measurements. Taking that 
into consideration, Frankel et al. (2016) conjecture a higher focus by managers on levels of 
working capital at fiscal year-end compared to any other fiscal quarter-end. They provide 
evidence of a significant temporary decrease of fourth fiscal quarter levels of working 
capital, beyond what may be justified by seasonal changes in a firm’s economic activity. 
This decrease is immediately being reversed in the first quarter of the following fiscal year. 
Their evidence also confirms that firms manage the fiscal year-end understatement in the 
level of working capital through the medium of actions geared at increasing year-end 
operating cash-flow (as opposed to actions aimed at reducing income through accruals).147  
Interestingly, Frankel et al. (2016, p. 20) show that “[a] nontrivial portion of the temporary 
decrease and the subsequent reversal is explained by incentives originating in bonus 
contracts and the horizon of analyst cash flow forecasts and by firms’ ability to extract the 
concessions from business partners.” 
6.1. Hypotheses Development 
To help the reader better understand and interpret the last statement, I ought to provide a 
brief display of the model specified by Frankel et al. (2016). They begin by setting the 
following hypotheses: 
 
Hypothesis H1 – Year-end working capital management: 
“Noncash working capital decreases significantly between the third and fourth quarters and 
subsequently increases significantly between the fourth quarter of a fiscal year and the first 
quarter of the following fiscal year.” (Frankel et al., 2016, p. 4) 
 
                                                
146 See, among others, Givoly & Ronen (1981), Jacob & Jorgensen (2007), Das et al. (2009), and Fan et al. 
(2010) for academic studies, and White et al. (2003), Palepu & Healey (2008), and Penman (2010) for 
popular texts relating to financial statement analysis in which quarterly numbers are seldom used. (Frankel 
et al., 2016) 
147 Frankel et al. (2016) identify two methods of reducing working capital levels: by the means of accrual based 
working capital management, i.e. a set of actions geared at reducing income through accruals, such as 
writing down inventories or overstating bad debt, and by the means of cash flow-based working capital 
management, i.e. a set of actions geared at increasing cash flow from operations, such as expediting the 
collection of account receivables from customers or putting off payments to suppliers. While the former 
results in a reduction of shareholder equity and therefore total assets (used as the denominator in measuring 
operational efficiency), the latter shifts funds from the working capital to the cash account and has no effect 
on total assets. Moreover, the cash flow-based method is more consistent with a perceived increase in 
efficiency. 
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Hypothesis H2A – Compensation contracts: 
“The temporary fourth-quarter decrease in noncash working capital is accentuated for firms 
that use cash flow/working capital based measures to evaluate managers’ performance for 
compensation.” (Frankel et al., 2016, p. 4) 
 
Hypothesis H2B – Analysts cash flow forecast horizon:  
“The temporary fourth-quarter decrease in working capital is larger when the number of 
analysts issuing annual cash flow forecasts is greater than the number of analysts issuing 
quarterly cash flow forecasts for the firm” (Frankel et al., 2016, p. 5) 
 
Hypothesis H2C – Firm market power: 
“The temporary fourth-quarter decrease in working capital increases with the market power 
of the firm” (Frankel et al., 2016, p. 5) 
 
With regards to the rationale underlying the first above-mentioned hypothesis (H1), it is 
grounded on the results from previous research that identified instances of window-dressing, 
i.e. the manipulation of reported financial figures, through the management of reported cash 
flows, such as Brown & Caylor (2005), Lee (2012), and Gordon et al. (2013).148 Specifically, 
Lee (2012) explores situations in which a firm might be exposed to –  such as distress, having 
its debt rated near the investment-grade threshold, having its cash-flows forecasted by 
analysts or for which a high correlation is apparent between its stock performance and 
operating cash flows. He identifies such situations to represent incentives for managers to 
manipulate the reported operating cash flow levels. Besides, Frankel et al. (2016) 
interestingly expose the minutes of a conference call between Ed Pliner, CFO and senior 
vice president of Raytheon Company, and George Shapiro, analyst at Solomon Smith 
Barney,149 which not only exemplifies the attention given by both managers and analysts to 
components of working capital as a tool to evaluate firm performance, but also underscores 
                                                
148 These studies provide evidence of the manipulation of reported figures beyond earnings. Other studies cited 
by Frankel et al. (2016) document the manipulation of earnings using either accruals, e.g. DeFond & 
Jiambalvo (1994), Jones (1991), McNichols & Wilson (1988), and Healy (1985), or through real activities, 
i.e. by linking actions that are likely inefficient to achieve earnings goals, e.g. Levy & Shalev (2016), 
Lemayian (2013), Cohen & Zarowin (2010), Cohen et al. (2008), Roychowdhury (2006), Bushee (1998), 
and Baber et al. (1991). 
149 See FD Wire, 2004 
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the prioritization on the fiscal year-end. Frankel et al. (2016, p. 3) summarize that exchange 
by stressing that “[t]hough Pliner rejects Shapiro’s characterization of Raytheon’s activities 
as window dressing of working capital accounts, he acknowledges a recurring focus on year-
end accounts receivable balances and […] that one of the reasons for this is to improve 
fourth-quarter cash flow performance.”  
With respect to the hypothesis H2A, Frankel et al. (2016) establish it as an explanation 
regarding why managers may have the incentive to increase the fiscal year-end levels of 
operating cash-flows. Such conjectures are realistic as, on the one hand, executive pay is 
customarily based on a firm’s full fiscal-year performance.150 On the other hand, an 
increasing tendency to use performance measures in CEO bonus plans linked to cash-flow 
figures151 and even, for some firms, to changes in annual noncash working capital152 has 
been documented. Taken together, since executive compensation contracts that include fixed 
and variable components are negotiated under the consideration of annual performance, 
managers may be inclined to curtail working capital levels or artificially inflate reported 
fourth quarter operating cash flow figures as this may induce higher current pay. 
The rationale behind hypothesis H2B set forward by Frankel et al. (2016) is inspired by the 
results of the following few studies. First, DeFond & Huang (2003) document that the 
increasing popularity of operating cash flow in the evaluation of the performance of a firm 
leads more and more analysts to issue forecasts of cash flow. Although there is no consensus 
among academics as to the economic meaningfulness of cash flow forecasts,153 Lee (2012) 
provides interesting evidence that the issuance of such analysts’ forecasts for a firm is 
associated with a tendency of that firm to manage operating cash flow in an upward fashion. 
Given that, Frankel et al. (2016) suggest that if analysts’ cash flow forecasts indeed serve as 
incentives to manage the cash flow from operations, such forecasts, when they are issued 
annually rather than quarterly, represent a stronger enticement for managers to aim their 
attention at the fiscal year-end. Hence, “when analysts predominantly issue annual cash flow 
forecasts, firms are more likely to try to increase fourth fiscal quarter operating cash flow. 
These efforts to increase fourth fiscal quarter operating cash-flows result in a temporary 
decrease in fourth fiscal quarter working capital.” (Frankel et al., 2016, p. 4) 
                                                
150 See Holthausen et al. (1995) 
151 See Huang et al. (2014), Shalev et al. (2013), Perry & Zenner (2001), and Murphy (2000) 
152 See Banker et al. (2004) 
153 See Frankel et al. (2016) 
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Finally, the motivation Frankel et al. (2016) advance for their last hypothesis, H2C, is 
straightforward: any action geared towards reducing levels of working capital without 
altering income, such as speeding up the collection of receivables from customers, 
postponing the purchase of inventory and/or delaying settlement of payables to suppliers, 
forces costs upon business counterparts. These costs can be reflected in a reduction of these 
counterparts’ cash flow, delays in the delivery of their products or involuntary changes in 
their schedules of production. It is therefore not unrealistic to assume that the more market 
power a firm enjoys, the more likely it will be able to disrupt its business counterparts when 
performing such actions. I can already mention at this point that Frankel et al. (2016), who 
measure a firm’s dominance in its industry as the firm’s share of the total sales of its four-
digit Standard Industrial Classification (SIC) code industry, indeed provide evidence in 
corroboration of this hypothesis. 
It is interesting to note that Frankel et al. (2016) define working capital rather broadly as 
current assets net of cash minus current liabilities net of current portion of long-term debt 
(i.e. current assets – cash – current liabilities + current portion of long-term debt).154 They 
justify their choice of such a measure by contending that managers, in their efforts to 
persuade shareholders that their goal is the maximization of value creation, aim at 
minimizing the “excess” reported invested capital and at maximizing the cash flow from 
operations. 
6.2. Defining the Baseline Regression Model 
Let me now expose to the reader how Frankel et al. (2016) go upon to test their hypotheses. 
Their baseline regression model takes the following form: 
 
∆Bl =  ?T +  ?:4l +  ?=1l +  ?@.&l + ?VU:T∆lUV,lz= + ?::U:Z∆.&lUV,lz= +
?:[U=TBlUV,lU= +  \l, 
 
where Bl  represents working capital in quarter q, as defined above and deflated by total 
assets at the end of quarter q, ∆Bl  represents the change in the ratio of working capital to 
total assets between quarter q – 1 and quarter q, 4l and 1l represent dummy variables 
                                                
154 This measure is analogous to that employed by Sloan (1996), with the difference that taxes payable, which 
can be interpreted as a kind of noninterest-bearing debt, are not being deducted by Frankel et al. (2016). 
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equal to 1 when the quarter is the fourth quarter and first quarter respectively, and 0 
otherwise, .&l represents the ratio of net income to total assets in quarter q, ∆l 
represents the change of the ratio of sales to total assets between quarter q – 1 and quarter q, 
∆.&l represents the difference in the ratio of net income to total assets between quarter q – 
1 and quarter q, and \l represents the error term. 
As can be seen from the regression equation set out above, Frankel et al. (2016) consider 
variables for lagged levels of working capital as well as both lead and lagged variables for 
net income and sales. This allows them to identify and isolate abnormal changes in levels of 
working capital at the end of the fiscal-year, i.e. only those changes that are not related to 
seasonality in a firm’s levels of activity.155 
6.3. Relevant Empirical Results and Economic Interpretation  
6.3.1. Evidence of the Temporary Year-End Working Capital Decline 
Let me now present some of the more relevant results obtained by Frankel et al. (2016): 
Including the dummy variables 4l and 1l in their regression model allow Frankel et al. 
(2016) to test and corroborate hypothesis H1: indeed, they estimate a combination of a 
significant negative coefficient ?: together with a significant positive coefficient ?=. In other 
words, they document a significant decrease in the level of working capital between the third 
and the fourth quarter of a fiscal year together with a significant subsequent increase of the 
same between the fourth quarter and the first quarter of the following fiscal year. It should 
be noted that Frankel et al. (2016) observe this pattern (decrease in fourth quarter – increase 
in subsequent first quarter) in nearly 40% of the firms in their sample, a result that is, besides, 
significantly higher than would be expected by mere chance (25%).156  
                                                
155 Frankel et al. (2016) provide the example of firms for which sales are concentrated in the fourth quarter. 
They argue that these firms will probably sustain higher levels of inventory at the end of the third quarter, 
whereas the levels of inventory at the end of the fourth quarter are likely to drop. Ceteris paribus, these 
changes in inventory levels would be reflected in an increase in the level of working capital from the ends 
of the second to the third quarters as well as a decrease in the level of working capital from the ends of the 
third to the fourth quarters. Though the relationship between levels of income and actions that trigger 
changes in working capital levels is less straightforward, the authors nonetheless consider the effect of 
changes in levels of activity on all earning components in their regression model. This, they argue, is 
indispensable when a vast range of seasonal effect is to be excluded in modelling working capital changes. 
Moreover, it enables to effectively control, though not in a perfect manner, for manipulations of working 
capital involving accrual-based actions such as the writing down inventory or the overstating of bad debt 
expense. 
156 Considering four possible sequences of changes in working capital levels in the fourth quarter and the first 
quarter of the following year, i.e. increase – increase, increase – decrease, decrease – increase, and decrease 
– decrease. (See Frankel et al., 2016) 
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Other results the authors obtain from estimating the baseline model suggest changes in the 
level of sales in current and subsequent periods to be significantly positively related to 
current period changes in working capital levels. Changes in the level of sales taking place 
in the preceding quarter, on the other hand, are significantly negatively related to changes in 
the current levels of working capital. These results are consistent with the expected actions 
of managers with respect to seasonal variation in economic activity, e.g. the building-up of 
inventory in the current quarter in response to an anticipation of higher sales in subsequent 
quarters. In contrast, Frankel et al. (2016) identify a negative relation between changes in 
net income and changes in working capital in lead quarters, implying that current quarter 
increases in levels of working capital are linked with a decline in profitability. 
Frankel et al. (2016) dig even deeper in their aim at corroborating their prediction of 
managers’ endeavour to manage year-end levels of working capital: They do so by 
decomposing the working capital in its components,157 and estimating the model set out 
above (see subsection 6.2.) using the changes in the ratios of each component of working 
capital to total assets between quarter q – 1 and quarter q as dependent variables. The 
motivation behind this, Frankel et al. (2016, p.9) argue, is that managers who seek to 
manipulate year-end levels of working capital might presumably conceal their actions by 
“diffusing adjustments across the working capital accounts. Small changes in each working 
capital account that subsequently reverse can elude detection by investors and may be 
perceived as inconsequential by managers.” The results they obtain when decomposing 
working capital into its components and estimating the regression are significant, albeit 
small,158 for all working capital accounts, except for other current liabilities, in the direction 
they expect.159 
Hence, it appears that firms dedicate supplementary effort in the fourth fiscal quarter to 
collect receivables from customers while at the same time delaying payments to suppliers. 
Given that the latter is purportedly the most aggressive method associated with the highest 
                                                
157 Namely accounts receivable, inventory, accounts payable as well as other noncash current assets and other 
current liabilities net of the current portion of long-term debt. 
158 Although the magnitude of the fourth-quarter effects obtained by Frankel et al. (2016) are relatively small 
(given that working capital as defined by the authors nets three asset accounts and two liabilities accounts), 
making even small alterations to individual working capital accounts aggregates to a significant effect. 
159 Estimating the regression model using changes in the ratios of components of working capital to total assets 
naturally changes the expected signs for the coefficients of the dummy variables 4l and 1l depending 
on whether changes in an asset or a liability is estimated. For instance, while Frankel et al. (2016) expect 
accounts payable to increase – leading to a decrease in working capital - in the fourth quarter and to decrease 
in the subsequent first quarter, they logically expect accounts receivable to decrease in the fourth quarter 
and increase in the subsequent first quarter. 
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cost with respect to suppliers, and that it is not possible to manage account payables 
rigorously through accruals, the results of the regressions using the change in the working 
capital accounts as dependent variables provided by Frankel et al. (2016) represent “clear 
evidence that firms manage working capital downward through transactions that also 
increase operating cash flow.” (Frankel et al., 2016, p. 9) 
6.3.2. Identifying the Factors Influencing the Year-End Working Capital Decline 
In a second step, Frankel et al. (2016) identify those factors (other than seasonality) they 
believe have an influence on the managers’ tendency to follow actions that translate in 
temporarily decreasing the fourth fiscal quarter level of working capital. They then carry out 
cross-sectional analyses for the sake of corroborating their hypotheses H2A and H2B. Their 
attention is aimed at two kinds of incentives: The first is related to CEO bonus schemes and 
the second to analysts’ cash flow forecasts horizon. 
6.3.2.1. CEO Bonus Schemes 
Following the rationale grounded in their hypothesis H2A, Frankel et al. (2016) investigate 
a subset of firms disclosing the weights assigned to cash flow- and/or working capital-based 
measures of performance in CEO bonus schemes.160 They observe a steady increase over the 
period 1994 to 2010 in the number of firms that disclose such weights,161 with a pronounced 
increase after 2007 due to the 2006 U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission executive 
compensation publication obligations. Additionally, they provide statistics of within-firm 
changes over time in the weight given to cash flow- and working capital-based measures of 
performance. This allows the authors to gauge if these changes over time raise or reduce a 
manager’s incentive to borrow cash from the future. Indeed, as argued by Frankel et al. 
(2016, p. 12), since the fourth fiscal quarter reduction in working capital is being reversed 
in the subsequent first quarter, “managers who actively increase cash-flow at year-end t 
simply borrow cash from year t+1. An incentive to borrow from the future exists because of 
the time value of money or because the manager may lose her job. […] Evidence that, 
conditional on a positive weight on cash flow/working capital at year t, the weight is more 
likely to go down (up) than up (down) at year t+1 would suggest an increased (reduced) 
incentive to borrow cash from the following year.” Given that argumentation and from the 
                                                
160 Performance measures based on working capital may include such measures based only on a single account 
of working capital. (See Frankel et al., 2016) 
161 According to the statistics presented by Frankel et al. (2016), that number goes from 33 firms in 1994 to 
669 firms in 2010. 
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observations of the authors,162 they conclude that the highly probable weight decline coupled 
with the discrepancy in size between weight declines and weight increments could entice 
managers to switch future cash flows to the current period. 
With respect to the regression analysis, Frankel et al. (2016) test and corroborate the 
hypothesis H2A by including a dummy variable in the baseline regression model taking the 
value 1 when a positive weight on cash flow/working capital-based performance measure is 
included in the bonus scheme of the CEO and 0 otherwise. Moreover, this binary variable is 
being interacted with the variables 4l and 1l and the two variables obtained from that 
interaction are added to the regression model. Doing so allows the authors to provide 
evidence that the inclusion of a performance measure based on cash flow or working capital 
is associated with a temporary decline in the fourth quarter level of working capital that is 
75% greater than when no such measure is included. Furthermore, their results show that 
43% of the temporary fourth quarter reduction in levels of working is explained by the 
presence of a cash flow- or working capital-based performance measure in the CEO bonus 
scheme in the subsample of firms which disclose performance-measure weights.163 
6.3.2.2. Analysts’ Cash Flow Forecast Horizon 
To test and corroborate hypothesis H2B, Frankel et al. (2016, p. 12) use a subsample of firms 
for which cash flow forecasts exist and design a dummy variable taking “the value 1 if the 
number of analysts issuing annual forecasts is equal to or greater than the number of 
analysts only issuing quarterly forecasts and 0 otherwise.” The authors also interact this 
variable with the variables 4l and 1l and anticipate a more conspicuous temporary 
decline in the fourth quarter levels of working capital for the interaction variables. The 
results reported by the authors advocate that the magnitude of the decline in fourth fiscal 
                                                
162 From the analysis of the observations on the change between year t and year t+1 in the weight given to cash 
flow or working-capital conditional on positive weight on cash flow/working capital in year t (see Frankel 
et al., 2016, Panel B of Table 5, p. 11), the authors deduct that the likelihood of a reduction in the subsequent 
year of the weight on cash flow/working capital performance measures in bonus plans is more than twice 
that of an increase in the same. 
163 Given that measures of performance in CEO bonus schemes may be related to firm characteristics that 
correlate with changes in components of working capital over time, Frankel et al. (2016) follow the one-to-
one nearest neighbour propensity-score matching technique developed by Heckmann et al. (1997) for the 
sake of matching each firm disclosing a positive weight assigned to cash flow/working capital performance 
measures (taken from the treatment group) with a firm disclosing zero weight (taken from the control 
group). The first-stage regression Frankel et al. (2016) estimate includes variables, i.e. firm size, leverage, 
market-to-book ratio and industry, that have been documented to explain disparities in compensation plans 
(e.g. De Angelis & Grinstein, 2015), as well as variables aimed at capturing the noise in earnings and cash 
flow, i.e. earnings volatility and cash flow volatility. Frankel et al. (2016) reasonably expect the latter 
variables to be linked to variations in working capital levels. The results Frankel et al. (2016) obtain are 
consistent with their previous finding. 
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quarter levels of working capital is lessened when analysts’ cash flow forecasts shift toward 
a quarterly horizon. 
6.4. Implications for Policy 
The reason I have spilled much ink presenting the study of Frankel et al. (2016) is that its 
findings shed light on several issues that have been mostly ignored, let alone neglected in all 
previous studies of working capital management. Let me briefly recapitulate the main 
findings: First, levels of working capital decrease significantly in the last quarter of the fiscal 
year. This decrease goes beyond what may be explained by seasonal changes in a firm’s 
economic activity. Second, there is a subsequent reversal of working capital levels in the first 
quarter of the following fiscal year.  Third, this manipulation of working capital levels in the 
fourth fiscal quarter and subsequent first quarter of the following year is, for a non-negligible 
part, a result of incentives emanating from the design of CEO bonus schemes, the analysts’ 
cash flow forecasts horizon as well as from the capacity of a firm to reap concessions from 
business counterparts. “Finally, the relatively small temporary decrease exhibited by the 
major assets and liabilities composing a firm’s working capital […] suggest that working 
capital management can go undetected by investors, even though the aggregate effect of the 
changes on working capital and operating cash flow can be significant.” (Frankel et al., 
2016, p. 20) 
Moreover, the findings enumerated above have profound implications for working capital 
management policy, specifically when the management of working capital is required to be 
sustainable, geared towards maximizing shareholder value and manipulation-proof: The 
most realistic way to achieve that goal would be to design CEO compensation contracts in 
such a way as to weaken the incentives to manipulate levels of working capital, for instance 
by considering such measures on a quarterly base. This policy implication is, by the way, 
also compatible with the findings of Aktas et al. (2015a) I presented in section 5.2. of this 
thesis. Au contraire, forcing the trend among analysts to switch their focus toward a quarterly 
horizon when forecasting cash flow or breaking up market power appears indeed quite 
unrealistic. 
 
I should note here that although I have spent much time on sections 5 and 6 for the sake of 
completeness, the issues of corporate governance and managerial incentivization with 
respect to WCM will not be considered in the second part of this thesis, as doing so would 
go beyond the scope of my capabilities in terms of both workload and availability of data.
  
 
PART TWO 
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7. Working Capital Management and Profitability 
 
As previously announced, I now turn the attention first to studies that investigate the relation 
between working capital management and profitability, be it only to get a better 
understanding of the research designs commonly used to that end and of their limitations. 
Since a plethora of studies covering that specific research area exist, I will focus only on the 
most prominent ones and decorticate the research designs adopted in these. Apart from the 
study by Shin & Soenen (1998), which is one of the first164 and most cited studies 
investigating the link between efficient working capital management and corporate 
profitability,165 and whose large data sample covers U.S. listed companies for the period 
1975-1994, the other studies I present in this section exclusively work on samples covering 
financial data of companies headquartered in Europe, i.e. Belgium (Deloof, 2003), Greece 
(Lazaridis & Tryfonidis, 2006) and Spain (García-Teruel & Martínez-Solano, 2007, and 
Baños-Caballero et al., 2012 & 2014). 
7.1. Shin & Soenen (1998) 
7.1.1. Variables under Study 
As already mentioned earlier in this thesis (See subsection 2.3.5.), Shin & Soenen (1998) 
employ the net trade cycle (NTC) as a measure of working capital management efficiency.166 
They measure a firm’s profitability using operating income plus depreciation, whereas they 
scale it by total assets (i.e. IA = [operating income + depreciation]/total assets) as well as by 
net sales (i.e. IS = [operating income + depreciation]/net sales). Furthermore, they consider 
                                                
164 An earlier study is that by Jose et al. (1996). In that study, the authors investigate, applying both 
nonparametric and multiple regression analysis on a large cross-section of firms over a twenty-year period, 
the link between alternative measures of profitability and the cash conversion cycle as proxy for the 
management of a firm’s ongoing liquidity needs. Both industry and size are controlled for in their analysis. 
They provide strong evidence of a profitability enhancing effect of aggressive working capital policies, 
although documenting exceptions for specific firms and industries. However, given that it is not nearly as 
often referred to in subsequent research related to working capital management as is the study of Shin & 
Soenen (1998), I refrain from presenting it in detail.  
165 Another prominent study is that of Wang (2002), covering Japanese and Taiwanese firms, in which the 
methodology used by Jose et al. (1996) is applied. Specifically, operating returns on assets and pre-tax 
returns on equity are used as measures of operating performance. In addition, Wang (2002) uses Tobin’s q 
as proxy for corporate value and controls for industry influences. Besides providing evidence of a 
significant negative relationship between both measures of operating performance and the cash conversion 
cycle, Wang (2002) documents aggressive liquidity management to be associated with higher corporate 
value. 
166 The reader should refer to subsection 2.3.5. of this thesis for the formal definition.  
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Jensen’s Alpha (ALPHA)167 as well as the Treynor Index (TI)168 as risk-adjusted measures 
of stock returns. The current ratio (CR), the ratio of total debt to total assets (DR) as well as 
the sales growth (SG) are used as control variables. Calculating both Pearson’s r correlation 
and Spearman rank correlation coefficients169 for the level and first differences in variables 
allows Shin & Soenen (1998) to document a significant negative relationship between the 
net trade cycle and the measures of corporate profitability and risk-adjusted stock returns 
respectively. Therefore, this indicates that a shorter trade cycle is generally associated with 
a higher corporate profitability and suggests that reducing working capital leads to an 
increase in the risk-adjusted stock returns. As always, using correlation matrices, while 
documenting the nature of the relationship between two variables (positive, nil or negative), 
does not permit any causal inferences.   
7.1.2. Regression model 
To investigate deeper how both corporate profitability and risk-adjusted stock returns are 
respectively associated with the length of the net trade cycle, Shin & Soenen (1998) use 
regression analysis and design the following baseline model: 
 
-)
	

'8 = ?T + ?: ∗ ./8 + ?= ∗ 8 +  ?@ ∗ 8 +  ?V ∗ *8 
 
Shin & Soenen (1998) first run a series of pooled and year-by-year cross-section regressions 
of the variable Profitability on NTC, CR, DR, and SG using measures of corporate 
profitability (IA and IS) as well as measures of risk-adjusted stock returns (ALPHA and TI) 
as dependent variables. They also examine, using first differences, whether year-on-year 
changes in corporate profitability and risk-adjusted stock returns are influenced by year-on-
year changes in the net trade cycle and the other control variables. In a third step, Shin & 
                                                
167 See Jensen, 1968 
168 See Treynor, 1965 
169 In contrast to the widely-used Pearson r correlation test measuring the degree of relationship between 
variables that are assumed to be linearly related, the Spearman rank correlation test, developed by Spearman 
(1904), is non-parametric in nature and does therefore not make any assumptions regarding the distribution 
of the data. It is the appropriate correlation analysis tool when the variables are measured on a scale that is 
at least ordinal. The following formula is used to calculate the Spearman rank correlation coefficient: 
 
« = 1 − 6 ∑ +K
=
(= − 1) 
 
where « is the Spearman rank correlation coefficient, +K represents the difference between the ranks of 
corresponding values bK and K¨, and  the number of observations in each dataset. 
87 
 
Soenen (1998) take into consideration the industry effect I discussed earlier and regress the 
risk-adjusted Jensen’s ALPHA on the NTC for the eight industries characterized by the 
largest sample size. 
7.1.3. Main Results of Regression Analysis 
Shin & Soenen (1998) provide powerful evidence of a negative relationship between the net 
trade cycle and their proxies for profitability. Their results entail a firm with a relatively short 
net trade cycle to be both more profitable as well as having a greater risk-adjusted stock 
return per unit of total risk. Reducing the NTC for the sake of increasing working capital 
management efficiency, the authors argue, thus represents one potential way for a firm to 
achieve higher value for shareholders. Besides, the results they obtain hold true even after 
having the ratio of profits over sales controlled for, as the documented “negative relation 
between profits on sales and NTC could be explained by market power or market share, i.e. 
a shorter NTC because of bargaining power with suppliers and/or customers as well as 
higher profitability due to market dominance.” (Shin & Soenen, 1998, p. 41) Not 
surprisingly, the authors find the profitability to be significantly negatively related to the 
current ratio, a measure of a firm’s liquidity. When regressing the first difference in 
profitability measures and the first difference in measures of risk-adjusted stock returns 
respectively on the first difference in the net trade cycle and all other control variables, Shin 
& Soenen (1998) show the coefficient on NTC to be significantly negative in all regressions. 
In other words, shortening the net trade cycle from one year to the next increases the 
profitability and the risk-adjusted stock return in the same period. Finally, when considering 
the industry effect in the regression of Jensen’s ALPHA on NTC, the authors document a 
significant and negative relation between the length of the NTC and Jensen’s ALPHA for 
five out of eight industries. Interestingly, it is the specificities of those three industries for 
which Shin & Soenen (1998) have found the net trade cycle not to be significantly related 
with Jensen’s ALPHA that explain their results. The communications industry and the oil 
and gas extraction industry, for instance, display the shortest net trade cycle on average in 
the sample used by Shin & Soenen (1998). The authors explain this by the relatively low 
levels of inventory firms belonging to these industries require for their operations. At the 
same time, these low inventory levels restrain their capacity to shorten the net trade cycle. 
Similarly, firms belonging to the agricultural production industry are characterized by 
having, on average, the lowest accounts payable days, meaning that their capacity to shorten 
the net trade cycle using payables is also limited. In an earlier paper, Soenen (1993) has also 
demonstrated that the relationship between the net trade cycle and corporate profitability, as 
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measured by the return on assets, is not consistent for a wide range of industries. It therefore 
makes much sense to always consider the specificities of each industry with regards to 
working capital management benchmarks.  
7.2. Deloof (2003) 
Another often cited empirical study related to the role of working capital management in 
enhancing a firm’s profitability is that of Deloof (2003), who investigates a sample of large 
Belgian firms. Deloof (2003), who recognizes that a level of working capital that maximizes 
the value of a firm may exist, summarizes perfectly well the trade-off, mentioned earlier in 
this thesis, faced by firms when trying to optimize their working capital management. 
Therefore, I allow myself to reproduce his summary hereafter: 
“On the one hand, large inventory and a generous trade credit policy may lead to higher 
sales. Larger inventory reduces the risk of a stock-out.170 Trade credit may stimulate sales 
because it allows customers to assess product quality before paying […].171 Because 
suppliers may have significant cost advantages over financial institutions in providing credit 
to their customers, it can also be an inexpensive source of credit to customers […].172 The 
flip side of granting trade credit and keeping inventories is that money is locked up in 
working capital. 
Another component of working capital is accounts payable. Delaying payments to suppliers 
allows a firm to assess the quality of the products bought, and can be an inexpensive source 
of financing for the firm. On the other hand, late payment of invoices can be very costly if 
the firm is offered a discount for early payment.” (Deloof, 2003, pp. 573-574) 
7.2.1. Variables under Study 
In contrast with the work of Shin & Soenen (1998), Deloof (2003) uses the cash conversion 
cycle173 (CCC) as comprehensive measure of a firm’s working capital management. He also 
                                                
170 Stock-outs may cause walkouts, as documented by a study of survey data carried out by Gruen et al. (2003) 
covering the consumer products industry. In that study, the authors reveal five specific reactions of 
consumers to stock-outs: “When they can’t find the precise product they’re looking for, consumers typically 
do one of five things. They find a substitute of the same brand, they substitute a different brand, they delay 
their purchase until the item’s back in stock at that particular store, they don’t buy the item at all, or, worse 
for retailers, they buy the item at another store. […] Depending on the product category, […] 21% to 43% 
[of consumers] will actually go to another store to buy the item” (Corsten & Gruen, 2004, p. 26)  
171 Deloof (2003) refers here to Long et al. (1993) and Deloof & Jegers (1996) 
172 Deloof (2003) refers here to Petersen & Rajan (1997) 
173 Deloof (2003) performs all regressions using alternatively the net trade cycle as a measure of working capital 
management as in Shin & Soenen (1998). All results he obtains therewith allegedly confirm the estimation 
results obtained using the cash conversion cycle in the regressions. Furthermore, due to the unavailability 
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considers individually each component of the cash conversion cycle, namely the numbers of 
days accounts receivable, days inventories and days accounts payable174 as measures of a 
firm’s trade credit and inventory policies. As a measure of a firm’s profitability and 
dependent variable, Deloof (2003) uses its gross operating income scaled by total assets net 
of financial assets.175 Interestingly, he does not consider financial assets when scaling a 
firm’s gross operating income. The reason behind this is that financial assets represent a 
significant chunk of the total assets of several firms in his sample. Considering these 
financial assets, respectively using return on assets as a measure of profitability, would be 
misleading as the operating activities of a firm with a relatively large portion of financial 
assets will not contribute much to the global return on assets. Furthermore, stock market 
valuation based measures of profitability, such as those used in Shin & Soenen (1998), are 
not being considered as only a few Belgian firms have their shares publicly listed.  
As control variables in his regression analysis, Deloof (2003) considers the size of a firm, 
proxied by the natural logarithm of its sales, its one-year sales growth, the ratio of its 
financial debt to its total assets, the ratio of its fixed financial assets176 to its total assets as 
well as the variability, or standard deviation, of net operating income 177 scaled by total assets 
net of financial assets, over the period 1991-1996. 
Using Pearson r correlation test, Deloof (2003) documents a negative association between 
his chosen measure of corporate profitability, gross operating income, and all measures of 
working capital management, namely number of days accounts receivable, inventories and 
accounts payable as well as cash conversion cycle. Again, although this observation is 
consistent with the conventional wisdom that decreasing the time lapse between 
disbursement for raw material purchases and receipt of funds from the sales of finished 
products leads to an increase in profitability, it does not allow to discern causes from 
consequences. It may for instance be, as Deloof (2003) correctly points out, that profitability 
influences accounts payable, and not vice versa, in the case of less profitable firms who are 
believed to take longer to meet their payments obligations towards their suppliers  
                                                
of the necessary data, Deloof (2003) is not able to use the weighted cash conversion cycle developed by 
Gentry et al. (1990). 
174 The reader should refer to subsection 2.3.5. of this thesis for the respective formal definitions. 
175 Gross operating income = (sales – cost of sales + depreciation & amortisation). 
176 Deloof (2003) defined these assets as loans granted to or participations held in affiliated or other businesses 
for the sake of contributing on the longer term to the firm’s main activities. 
177 Net operating income = (sales – cost of sales) 
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7.2.2. Regression Model 
Deloof (2003) estimates the impact of working capital management on corporate 
profitability using fixed effects as well as ordinary least squares (OLS) regression models.  
Using a fixed effects regression model allows Deloof (2003) to seize the impact of those 
variables of interest that are firm-specific and stable over time, thereby focusing on 
differences within firms. In principle, estimating the fixed effects model is performed by first 
calculating each variable’s mean for each firm, then subtracting from each variable the 
obtained firm means and finally running the regression on the mean-adjusted variables. 
Thus, estimation using fixed effects explains variations in the variables from their firm-
specific means, not why firm means diverge from one another. Fixed effects estimation 
however comes with a disadvantage as it wipes out from the model anything time-invariant. 
Thus, the variability of net operating income over the period 1991-1996 cannot be 
considered in the fixed effects model. 
On the other hand, using common OLS regressions in estimating the influence on 
profitability of working capital management allows Deloof (2003) to consider the standard 
deviation of net operating income over the period 1991-1996 together with all other variables 
already considered in the fixed effects model. In addition, Deloof (2003) includes 4 year 
dummies as well as 37 industry dummies in the OLS-regression.  
7.2.3. Main Results of Regression Analysis 
Table 1 on next page summarizes the estimation results Deloof (2003) obtains from the fixed 
effects and standard OLS regressions he runs. The standard errors, or p-values, given in 
parenthesis, are computed using White’s heteroskedasticity correction in all his regressions. 
For the sake of completeness, I should note that the author uses balanced panel data 
consisting of 5,045 firm-year observations related to 1,009 large Belgian non-financial firms 
covering the period 1992-1996 period. I purposely present all the results of his regressions, 
as opposed to those of other studies, to illustrate to the reader how the choice of a regression 
technique can greatly affect the explanatory power of the underlying models. Indeed, the 
adjusted R² values of the fixed effects regressions are much higher than in the case of the 
OLS regressions, meaning that “[t]he regression models explain a much higher portion of 
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Dependent Variable:
Regression Model:
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Ln (Sales) 0.045 0.048 0.044 0.051 0.006 0.007 0.007 0.006
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Sales growth 0.016 0.015 0.017 0.015 0.052 0.053 0.053 0.052
(0.005) (0.008) (0.004) (0.007) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Financial debt -0.151 -0.153 -0.175 -0.154 -0.030 -0.034 -0.041 -0.026
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Fixed financial assets 0.147 0.158 0.158 0.161 0.141 0.142 0.146 0.138
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Variability - - - - 0.277 0.322 0.321 0.305
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Days accounts receivable -0.48 - - - -0.44 - - -
10
-3
10
-3
(0.000) (0.000)
Days inventories - -0.12 - - -0.25 - -
10
-3
10
-3
(0.015) (0.000)
Days accounts payable - - -0.54 - - -0.22 -
10
-3
10
-3
(0.000) (0.000)
Cash conversion cycle - - - -0.17 - - - -0.27
10
-4
10
-3
(0.668) (0.000)
Adjusted R² 0.73 0.72 0.73 0.72 0.22 0.22 0.21 0.22
Gross Operating Income
Fixed Effects OLS with Industry and Year Dummies
 
Table 1: The Determinants of Corporate Profitability (Source: Deloof, 2003, pp. 582-583) 
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the variations in profitability within firms than between firms.” (Deloof, 2003, p. 581) 
The main findings in Deloof (2003) are that all the components of the cash conversion cycle 
display a significant negative relation with gross operating income when using both fixed 
effects and OLS regression. The coefficient on the cash conversion cycle, although being 
negative in both the fixed effects and the OLS regressions, is only significantly different 
from zero in the latter. Other noteworthy and highly significant results the author obtains are 
a positive association between gross operating profit and firm size (proxied by the natural 
logarithm of sales), sales growth and fixed financial assets respectively and a negative 
association between gross operating profit and financial debt. Although the regression 
methodology used in Deloof (2003) is straightforward and the results of his estimations seem 
to corroborate conventional wisdom concerning the profitability-enhancing effect of 
efficient working capital management,178 the author properly addresses the issue of causality. 
Putting it in his own words, “[i]t cannot be ruled out that the negative relation between 
WCM and profitability is to some extent a consequence of profitability affecting WCM, and 
not vice versa. Indeed, the most plausible explanation for the negative relation between 
accounts payable and profitability is that less profitable firms wait longer to pay their bills. 
A negative relation between inventory and profitability can be caused by declining sales, 
leading to lower profits and more inventory. 
An alternative explanation for the negative relation between accounts receivables and 
profitability could be that customers want more time to assess the quality of products they 
buy from firms with declining profitability. However, finance based models explaining trade 
credit (e.g. Schwartz, 1974) argue that firms able to obtain funds at a low cost will offer 
trade credit to firms facing higher financing costs. Emery (1984) sees trade credit as a more 
profitable short term investment than marketable securities. These models imply that higher 
profits should lead to more accounts receivable, because firms with higher profits have more 
cash to lend to customers.” (Deloof, 2003, p. 584) 
7.3. Lazaridis & Tryfonidis (2006) 
Many subsequent studies follow closely the methodology used by Deloof (2003) when 
investigating the relationship between working capital management and corporate 
                                                
178 To avoid any confusion, allow me to remind the reader that an efficient working capital management is 
believed to be achieved when efforts are undertaken to reduce the chosen measure of working capital 
management, be it the cash conversion cycle, the weighted cash conversion cycle, the net trade cycle or the 
cash conversion efficiency. 
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profitability for firms both listed179 and non-listed180 firms in their respective geographical 
markets of interest. All those studies come to the same conclusion that corporate profitability, 
however it may be measured based on the balance sheet specificities of the firms in the 
underlying sample, is significantly negatively associated with working capital management 
as measured by the cash conversion cycle and/or its components.  One such study is that by 
Lazaridis & Tryfonidis (2006), who base their work on a sample of 131 companies listed in 
the Athens Stock Exchange and covering the period 2001-2004. Interestingly, their choice 
to focus on listed firms in Greece, a member country of the European Union, pinpoints to an 
unusual incentive related to working capital management and to the reliability of financial 
statements for listed firms. They argue that to increase the attractiveness of their shares, firms 
listed in the Athens Stock Exchange are inclined to present profits should those exist. In 
contrast, Greek firms which are not listed “have less of an incentive to present true 
operational results and usually their financial statements do not reflect real operational and 
financial activity. Hiding profits in order to avoid corporate tax is a common tactic for non 
listed firms in Greece which makes them less of a suitable sample for analysis where one can 
draw inferences, based on financial data, for working capital practices.” (Lazaridis & 
Tryfonidis, 2006, p. 27) Unfortunately, the authors do not make full use of the potential of 
their sample and focus only on an accounting measure of corporate profitability. They do not 
consider, as they could easily have done, stock market valuation based measures of 
profitability as in Shin & Soenen (1998). 
7.4. García-Teruel & Martínez-Solano (2007) 
The studies presented above have focused their attention on samples of large firms. In 
contrast, García-Teruel & Martinez-Solano (2007) undertake their analysis of the effect of 
the cash conversion cycle on corporate profitability using a sample of small and medium-
sized enterprises (SMEs). Efficient working capital management is of notable importance 
for SMEs181 given the relative high portion of their current assets to their total assets. What 
is more, SMEs current liabilities represent an essential point of supply of external financing 
given the financing constraints182 and the difficulties SMEs face in getting long-term capital 
                                                
179 E.g. Mathuva (2010) covering Kenyan listed firms or Raheman & Nasr (2007) covering firms listed in the 
Karachi Stock Exchange (Pakistan). 
180 E.g. Padachi (2006) covering small manufacturing firms in Mauritius  
181 As argued by Peel & Wilson (1996) 
182 As argued by Whited (1992) and Fazzari & Petersen (1993) 
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funding.183 The other remarkable aspect that differentiates the study of García-Teruel & 
Martinez-Solano (2007) from previous studies presented in earlier sections is the application 
of robust tests as part of the authors’ effort to tackle possible endogeneity problems. This 
allows them to make causal inferences from the negative association they empirically find 
between corporate profitability and the cash conversion cycle. It therefore makes much sense 
to get a closer look at the research methodology they employ. 
7.4.1. Sample Selection and Variables of Interest 
García-Teruel & Martinez-Solano (2007) use a sample covering the period 1996-2002 and 
consisting of small and medium sized enterprises from Spain, a country characterized by less 
developed capital markets184 and the high significance of financial intermediaries in 
channelling financial resources.185 The authors selected the firms in their sample following 
the criteria established by the European Commission’s recommendation 96/280/CE, dated 
April 3rd, 1996, on the definition of small and medium enterprises. Thus, in a first step, only 
firms that for at least three years had fewer than 250 employees, annual sales of no more 
than €40 million and whose total assets did no exceed €27 million were selected to be 
included in the sample. In a second step, the sample was trimmed, i.e. observations from 
firms displaying anomalies in their accounts and those exhibiting unrealistic signs were 
thrown out of the sample. In addition, 1 % of extreme observations in were also eliminated 
from the sample. They classify firms in their sample as belonging to one of eight distinct 
industries.186 
As their dependent variable and measure of corporate profitability, García-Teruel & 
Martinez-Solano (2007) choose the ratio of return on assets (ROA)187 to total assets. 
Measures of working capital management include the number of days accounts receivable 
(AR), the number of days inventory (INV), the number of days accounts payable (AP) and 
the cash conversion cycle (CCC). Furthermore, the authors control for firm size (SIZE), sales 
growth (SGROW) and leverage (DEBT) using as proxies the logarithm of assets,188 the 
                                                
183As argued by Petersen & Rajan (1997) 
184 As per La Porta et al. (1997) 
185 As per Pampillón (2000) 
186 These are the agriculture, mining, manufacturing, construction, retail trade, wholesale trade, transport & 
public services, and services industries. 
187 Defined as earnings before interest and tax. 
188 The results García-Teruel & Martinez-Solano (2007) obtain do not change when using the logarithm of sales 
instead. 
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yearly growth in sales and the ratio of debt to liabilities respectively. They also consider the 
annual growth in Spain’s gross domestic product (GDPGR) to control for the effect of the 
economic cycle on corporate profitability. In contrast to the study of Deloof (2003), García-
Teruel & Martinez-Solano (2007) do not consider the ratio of fixed financial assets to total 
assets nor the ratio of gross operating income to total assets net of financial assets – instead 
using the ROA - as (fixed) financial assets do not represent a significant part of total assets 
for SMEs in their sample. 
The correlation matrix presented by the authors reveals, in line with expectations and 
previous studies’ results, a significant negative correlation between the measure of 
profitability, ROA, and each of the individual components of CCC as well as CCC itself. 
The authors also rightly test for potential multicollinearity issues between pairs of 
independent variables, finding high values merely between CCC on the one hand and AR 
and INV respectively.  
Interestingly, unlike prior studies relating working capital management to corporate 
profitability, García-Teruel & Martinez-Solano (2007) include an intermediate step in the 
analysis of their data. Before running their regressions, they conduct a univariate analysis 
for the sake of determining whether significant differences were apparent in the variables 
under study between the most and least profitable firms in their sample. To do so, they 
calculate in a first step average values of the variables of interest for each quartile of variable 
ROA and carry out a student’s t parametric difference of means test to check for significant 
difference between average values of the first and fourth quartiles. The results they obtain 
suggest the mean values of the variables under study to be significantly different between 
the most and least profitable firms, meaning that relative to the least profitable firms in the 
sample, a shorter number of days accounts receivable, days inventory, days accounts payable 
and cash conversion cycle are observed for the most profitable firms in the sample. Although 
the results are consistent with those obtained from their correlation analysis, variations in 
average values for many of the variables under study do not appear monotonic when moving 
from one quartile to the next. Thus, merely carrying out a univariate analysis turns out to be 
insufficient to clarify the link between return on assets and the independent variables under 
consideration, calling instead for regression analysis. 
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7.4.2. Regression Model 
Using panel data methodology to measure the direction and amplitude of the linkages 
between corporate profitability and working capital management, García-Teruel & 
Martinez-Solano (2007) estimate the following baseline model: 
 
 K,8 =  ?T + ?:bK,8 + ?=&¬K,8 + ?@* BK,8 + ?VX/K,8 + ?W*-*K,8 + ­K + c8
+ ®K,8 
 
In the above equation, X represents the independent variable, being either AR, INV, AP or 
CCC in each of the four models estimated by the authors. η° represents a time-invariant 
unobservable heterogeneity measure of characteristics specific to firm i. Furthermore, the 
time dummy variable λ captures variations over time that are equal for all firms in every 
year under consideration in their study. I allow myself to note that including the time dummy 
variable λ in the regression model makes the use of the annual variable GDPGR redundant 
as it is not firm-specific. 
The methodology used by García-Teruel & Martinez-Solano (2007) presents several 
remarkable benefits: “These include the fact that panel data methodology assumes that 
individuals, firms, states or countries are heterogeneous. Time-series and cross-section data 
studies not controlling for this heterogeneity run the risk of obtaining biased results. 
Furthermore, panel data give more informative data, more variability, less collinearity 
among variables, more degrees of freedom and more efficiency.”189 (García-Teruel & 
Martinez-Solano, 2007, p. 171) 
There are however a few requirements that need to be taken into consideration when efficient 
estimation of the model set out above is to be achieved, particularly so in the presence of 
endogeneity concerns. As the authors rightly point out, it should be determined whether the 
unobservable heterogeneity measure η° of each firm correlates with the model’s explanatory 
variables. If that is the case, consistent estimation is achieved through the medium of (fixed 
effects) within-group estimators.190 Otherwise, it is preferable to aim for a (random effects) 
estimator, obtained when using the generalized least squares (GLS) regression method. 
                                                
189 Referring to Baltagi (2001) 
190 Using the ordinary least squares (OLS) regression method 
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Whether the effects are random of fixed can be determined with the help of the Hausman 
(1978) test under the null hypothesis E;η°,³X°,) = 0. The effects are considered fixed 
(random) when the null hypothesis is rejected (accepted). 
García-Teruel & Martinez-Solano (2007) also take into consideration differences that may 
arise in operational financing requirements from one industry to another. However, given 
their use of panel data methodology, they are unable to introduce industry dummies in their 
regression analysis. Instead, the independent variables used to measure working capital 
management, namely AR, INV, AP, and CCC, were adjusted to their respective industry 
means. 
7.4.3. Main Results of Regression Analysis 
In line with Deloof (2003) and other studies previously mentioned, the results of the 
regressions run by García-Teruel & Martinez-Solano (2007) suggest a reduction in ROA to 
be associated with a lengthening of AR, INV, and AP. The coefficients obtained for all other 
control variables are significant and in line with the authors’ expectations, and controlling 
for industry effects does not change the results they obtain. Besides, cutting down the cash 
conversion cycle is, in contrast with the finding of Deloof (2003), found to increase the 
profitability of SMEs. 
A remarkable aspect of the study of García-Teruel & Martinez-Solano (2007) is that they 
specifically control for endogeneity problems that might be present by running their 
regressions using the first lag of AR, INV, AP, and CCC respectively as instrumental 
variable. The results therefrom confirm the results obtained without using instrumental 
variables save for the relationship between AP and ROA, which keeps the sign but loses its 
significance. 
In conclusion of this section, it is noteworthy to highlight the importance for any researcher 
of controlling for possible endogeneity concerns when aiming to make causal inferences 
about working capital management. 
7.5. Baños-Caballero et al. (2012) 
Contrary to the studies presented in sections 7.1. to 7.4., in which the relationship between 
a firm’s investment in working capital and its profitability was assumed to be linear in nature, 
the authors of the last study I would like to present to the reader in this chapter hypothesize 
a concave rather than linear association between those two. Indeed, Baños-Caballero et al. 
(2012), who focus on Spanish non-financial SMEs in the period 2002-2007 and employ a 
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similar sample selection method191 than that adopted in García-Teruel & Martinez-Solano 
(2007), take into consideration the higher risk of loss of sales and interruptions in the 
production process associated with an overly aggressive working capital management policy, 
and argue that a departure of a firm’s working capital from its optimal level may result in 
deteriorating of its profitability.  
Their argument goes as follows: Given that supplementary investment in inventories or 
receivables is generally associated with greater sales, a positive association among working 
capital and profitability might be anticipated. A firm holding larger inventories may avert 
interruptions in the process of production as well as loss of business owed to a shortage of 
product at hand, while at the same time decreasing supply costs and lowering price 
fluctuations for its customers.192 It thus not only enables its customers to enjoy a better 
service, but also results in lower production costs by reducing fluctuations in production.193 
Likewise, a firm that grants more trade credit gives its sales a stimulus as it allows enough 
time for its customers to assess the quality of products and services before paying for them,194 
therefore lowering asymmetric information among buyer and seller. It also provides, in 
periods of depressed demand, an incentive for its customers to purchase its products or 
services,195 and bolsters its relationship with its customers.196 
On the other hand, the costs of a greater investment in working capital may in some instances 
exceed its benefits, thus negatively affecting a firm’s operating performance. For instance, 
the costs of holding larger inventories, e.g. warehouse rent, insurance and security expenses, 
could rise197 to a level where the firm’s solvency may be reduced, and its risk of bankruptcy 
heightened,198 leading its own suppliers to cut back their supply of raw materials.199  
                                                
191 The selection of the firms to be included in the sample follows the criteria defining small and middle 
enterprises which are established in recommendation 2003/361/EC issued by the European Commission on 
the 6th of May 2003. Specifically, only those firms with fewer than 250 employees, a turnover of not more 
than 50 million € and total assets not exceeding 43 million € were considered. In addition, those firms with 
missing information over at least five consecutive years, with erroneous accounting data, lost or extreme 
values in all variables were rejected from the sample. 
192 As argued by Blinder & Maccini (1991) 
193 As argued by Schiff & Lieber (1974) 
194 As argued by Smith (1987), Long et al. (1993), and Long & Stowe (1993) 
195 As argued by Emery (1987) 
196 As argued by Ng et al. (1999) and Wilner (2000) 
197 As argued by Kim & Chung (1990) 
198 As argued by Soenen (1993) 
199 As argued by Cuñat (2007) 
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The argumentation brought forward by Baños-Caballero et al. (2012) thus suggests that the 
relationship between working capital investment and corporate profitability may be 
characterised by a (non-monotonic) concave function, and that there exists an optimal level 
of working capital that maximizes a firm’s profitability. Expressly, the authors expect a rise 
in profitability along with working capital increases up until an optimal level, and a decrease 
in profitability beyond that optimal level. In other words, at the optimum level of working 
capital, the marginal benefit of a change in working capital is offset by the marginal costs of 
that same change. Given these arguments, the link between working capital management and 
corporate profitability may thus be apprehended in a more appropriate way by a quadratic 
rather than a linear function. 
7.5.1. Variables under Study 
As their measure of choice for working capital management, Baños-Caballero et al. (2012) 
use the cash conversion cycle (CCC). They include its square value (CCC²) in their analysis 
to test the trade-off presented earlier between risk and return associated with working capital 
management. Following Deloof (2003), they use two measures as proxies for corporate 
profitability, namely the gross and net operating income, which they name PRO: and PRO= 
respectively. The authors use these profitability measures as they reflect a firm’s operational 
activities in a better way than the overall return on assets, and because they relate these to 
the cash conversion cycle, which is also an operating variable.  Moreover, they control, as 
in Deloof (2003) and García-Teruel & Martinez-Solano (2007) among others, for the size of 
a firm (SIZE), the growth of its sales (GROWTH) as well as its leverage (LEV) by using the 
natural logarithm of sales, the year-on-year growth in sales and the ratio of debt to total assets 
respectively as proxies. Finally, eight industry dummies are considered to control for 
industry-specific effects.  
Let me shortly present some descriptive statistics regarding the sample used by Baños-
Caballero et al. (2012). First, they document, using a t-statistic on the difference in means 
between the length of the cash conversion cycle of firms in 2002 and 2007 – under null 
hypothesis: equal means – that the working capital investment had increased significantly 
during this period. Correlation analysis further highlights, in line with previous studies, a 
negative correlation between profitability on the one hand and cash conversion cycle,200 
                                                
200 Consistent with the conventional wisdom that shortening the cash conversion per se leads to an increase in 
corporate profitability. 
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leverage201 and size202 respectively on the other hand. Moreover, Baños-Caballero et al. 
(2012) also formally test for and exclude multicollinearity for each independent variable of 
the sample under study using the Variance Inflation Factor (see Studenmund, 1997). 
7.5.2. Regression Model and Research Methodology 
To test their hypothesis of an inverted U-shaped relationship between a firm’s profitability 
and working capital investment, Baños-Caballero et al. (2012) assume profitability to be 
persistent over time and thus employ, as in Goddard et al. (2005) and Feeny et al. (2005), a 
dynamic panel data model, i.e. one that contains one or more lagged dependent variables as 
explanatory variables on the right-hand side of the regression equation. Specifically, their 
regression model takes the following form: 
 
- K,8 = ?T + ?:- K,8U: + ?=K,8 + ?@K,8= + ?V&¬K,8 + ?W* B/K,8
+ ?YMK,8 + c8 + ­K + \K,8 
 
The parameter λ in the above equation represents a time dummy variable designed to 
capture the time-variant influence of exogenous factors affecting the profitability of all firms, 
η° stands for the unobservable heterogeneity capturing firm-specific characteristics, and ε°, 
represents the random error term. Due to the quadratic nature of the above equation, its 
breakpoint can easily be determined by differentiating the profitability variable with respect 
to the CCC variable and setting the first derivative equal to zero. Thus, the breakpoint can 
be formulated as CCC°, = (− β= 2β@)⁄ . This breakpoint is a maximum, thus verifying the 
hypothesis formulated by Baños-Caballero et al. (2012) that the relationship between 
                                                
201 This result may be explained, as argued by Baños-Caballero et al. (2012), by the fact that the increased 
informational asymmetries (Jordan et al., 1998), the increased informational opacity (Berger & Udell, 1998) 
as well as the increased risk of bankruptcy inherent to SMEs are reflected in higher borrowing costs. A 
similar explanation is given by Benito & Vileghe (2000) who argue that the greater financing constraints 
faced by highly leveraged firms may hamper their undertaking of valuable investments, and thus negatively 
affect their profitability. 
202 Baños-Caballero et al. (2012) provide a twofold explanation for this result, which besides is in line with that 
found by Goddard et al. (2005): Firstly, the greater diversification apparent in larger firms may result in a 
lower profitability. Secondly, given that larger firms provide greater benefits to its managers (Stulz, 1990), 
both in terms of higher remuneration (Conyon & Murphy, 2000) and other possible private benefits, such 
as higher prestige (Dyck & Zingales, 2004), managerial decisions may be taken by these managers not to 
the end of increasing the firm’s profitability but in response to their own pecuniary and non-pecuniary 
interests.   
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profitability and working capital is concave, if and only if the second partial derivative of 
profitability with respect to CCC, 2β@, is negative, hence when β@ is negative.  
Like García-Teruel & Martinez-Solano (2007), Baños-Caballero et al. (2012) employ panel 
data methodology given the heterogeneous nature of firms and possible endogeneity issues 
related to unobservable firm-specific features than can influence profitability and which are 
not considered in the models. The risk of obtaining biased estimates may hence be 
alleviated.203 In addition, the authors consider first differences to get rid of the individual 
effect and employ the instrumental variable estimation methodology to tackle endogeneity 
concerns, which they contend may be of relevance in their sample. Particularly, they adopt 
the two-step generalized method of moments (GMM) estimator as recommended by 
Arellano & Bond (1991) which is more efficient than the estimator of instrumental variables 
in one stage in instances where heteroskedasticity is a concern.  
The empirical results obtained by Baños-Caballero et al. (2012) from the above-mentioned 
regression model indeed indicate that the relationship between working capital investment 
and corporate profitability is of concave nature, in other words that there exists an optimal 
level of working capital that maximizes profitability. Moreover, this result is maintained 
when regressions are run taking subsamples by size and age as well as by industry - although 
it is not significant for one of the four industries considered with similar mean CCC, namely 
the Agriculture and Mining industry, perhaps due to the low numbers of firms belonging to 
that sector. 
7.5.3. Robustness Analysis 
Although the estimation results of the first model described in the previous subsection 
corroborate the hypothesis posed by Baños-Caballero et al. (2012), it is useful to check, as 
they do, the robustness of their regression analysis. To do so, the authors apply a two-staged 
model inspired by Tong (2008) and assume any deviation from a firm’s optimum working 
capital level to negatively affect its profitability. In the first stage, the authors define, 
following Baños-Caballero et al. (2009), the benchmark regression for the factors 
influencing the length of the cash conversion cycle as follows: 
 
                                                
203 As argued by Hsiao (1985) 
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In the above equation, CCC°,∗  represents the optimal cash conversion cycle for firm i at time 
t, CFLOW its cash flow computed as the ratio of net profit plus depreciation to total assets, 
SIZE its size, computed as the natural logarithm of assets, AGE its age, computed using the 
natural logarithm of age, FA the investment in fixed assets, computed as the ratio of tangible 
fixed assets to total assets and ROA the return on assets, computed as the ratio of earnings 
before interest and taxes to total assets. The variables LEV and GROWTH are the same than 
those used in the first model (see subsection 7.5.2.).  
Establishing their approach on the idea that the current cash conversion cycle of firms may 
not necessarily represent their desired optimum level,204 the authors obtain the residuals from 
the above benchmark regression and use these to proxy for variations from the optimal cash 
conversion cycle length. 
In the second stage, Baños-Caballero et al. (2012) then go about to analyse how these 
residuals, which can take positive as well as negative value, impact a firm’s profitability. 
Specifically, they define the variable Deviation°, as the absolute value of the residuals 
obtained in the first stage, as well as a dummy variable, AOD°,, which takes the value 1 for 
positive residuals, i.e. when the actual CCC is greater than optimal CCC, and 0 otherwise. 
The following two profitability equations are then considered to test the effect of deviations 
from the optimum: 
 
- K,8 = `T + `:- K,8U: + `=
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204 Baños-Caballero et al. (2012) provide three reasons why this may be the case: First, as argued by Nadiri 
(1969), firms face a lot of unknowns in their efforts to accurately plan their sales as well as their purchases, 
they face difficulties in anticipating variations in the opportunity costs of trade credit and in managing 
default and bad debts on their trade credit accounts, and they may have to deal with a disequilibrium in 
other assets such as inventories. Similarly, Sartoris & Hill (1983) also point to the uncertainties which can 
arise when a firm modifies its credit policy, particularly with regards to the timing of payments, the 
proportion of sales paid at a discount or sales unpaid, or the sales volume. The second reason brought 
forward by the authors is that the hardship a firm may encounter when trying to access capital markets or 
its lack of bargaining power with both its customers and suppliers may force it to choose a level of working 
capital below or above the optimum, respectively. The third reason the authors advance relates to the 
conflicts of interests that exist between different major stakeholders, which could result in a suboptimal 
level of current working capital. 
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In the first of the two equations, the sign of the coefficient α=, which indicates in which 
direction a deviation from the optimal CCC affects firm performance, is expected to be 
negative. In the second of the two equations written above, both γ= and (γ=+γ@), which 
represent the influence of below-optimal and above-optimal deviations respectively, are 
expected to be negative. 
The empirical testing of this two-staged model in the authors efforts to check the robustness 
of the results of their first model (see subsection 7.5.2.) confirms their expectations, and thus 
corroborates their hypothesis that both below-optimal and above-optimal deviations from 
the optimal level of working capital reduce corporate profitability. 
In conclusion of this section, let me highlight an important policy implication derived from 
this utmost significant study in the research area of working capital management: For the 
sake of maximizing corporate profitability, CFOs as well as other managers involved with 
working capital management ought to maintain as near as possible a cash conversion cycle 
to the optimal level and avoid deviating either positively or negatively from that level.  
On a side note, I wish to inform the reader of the fact that the methodology used in the study 
of Baños-Caballero et al. (2012) has been refined in a later study by Baños-Caballero et al. 
(2014) covering a sample of UK companies. Specifically, the net trade cycle was considered 
instead of the cash conversion cycle, and financing constraints were explicitly accounted for 
in the model (see subsection 3.3.2.). I will however refrain from presenting the refined model 
in all its details as it would amount to a mere repetition. Nonetheless, it should be mentioned, 
for the sake of completeness, that the findings of Baños-Caballero et al. (2014) also provide 
strong evidence of a concave relationship between working capital investment and firm 
performance, pointing to the existence of a profitability-maximizing optimal level of 
working capital investment. What is more, the authors show this optimal level to be lower 
for firms which are more likely to be confronted with financial constraints. 
 
104 
 
8. Working Capital Management and Stock Performance 
 
After having presented the main research covering the link between working capital 
management and profitability in section 7, I now turn the reader’s attention to two studies 
that explore how working capital management affect stock performance. On a side note, I 
should mention that the study by Shin & Soenen (1998) presented in the previous section 
already brushed this topic by using risk-adjusted measures of stock returns as measures of 
corporate profitability. Nonetheless, the studies presented here, namely that of Kieschnick et 
al. (2013)205 and that of Aktas et al. (2015b) – both investigating samples of U.S. publicly 
listed corporations, exclusively aim attention at how a firm’s shareholders value its 
investments in working capital. Indeed, although consensus prevails among researchers of a 
significant effect of working capital management on corporate profitability, or, to the least, 
of a significant association between the two, it cannot necessarily be inferred from the result 
of these studies, as argued by Kieschnick et al. (2013), that firm value can be maximized, let 
alone enhanced, by means of WCM.206 To be able to make such an inference thus requires 
further analysis, as “the linkage between […] working capital management and firm value 
can differ from that between […] working capital management and firm profitability” 
(Kieschnick et al., 2013, p. 1832). 
8.1. Kieschnick et al. (2013) 
Kieschnik et al. (2013) consider their study to be the first piece of empirical research 
investigating the relationship between shareholder wealth and working capital management. 
Their work relies on the valuation framework used in Faulkender & Wang (2006),207 who 
argue that measuring valuation effects using an excess stock returns approach is more 
suitable than using the market-to-book ratio methodology developed by Fama & French 
(1998).208 Specifically, Kieschnik et al. (2003), using a free cash flow (FCF) valuation 
                                                
205 In their conference paper, Autukaite & Molay (2011) also investigate the question of how shareholders of 
French public listed companies value their cash holdings and working capital management. Since their 
methodology is based on the study by Kieschnik et al. (2013) and the evidence they provide is consistent 
with the results obtained by Kieschnick et al. (2013), I will refrain from presenting it in detail in this thesis. 
206 To strengthen their point, Kieschnick et al. (2013) use the standard free cash flow valuation model already 
described in subsection 4.2.2. of this thesis. I therefore refer the reader to the said subsection. 
207 Faulkender & Wang (2006) lay out what can be considered a hedonic price equation that relates the value 
of a firm to its shareholders, proxied by its excess stock returns, to those of its characteristics that influence 
shareholders cash flow.     
208 Faulkender & Wang (2006) give two reasons as to why their methodology represents an enhancement over 
that of Fama & French (1998). First off, their methodology controls for both the time-varying risk factors 
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approach slightly modified from that presented in subsection 4.2.2. of this thesis, assume 
that shareholders may value their equity based on the equity residual cash flow (ERCF) 
generated by the firm they hold shares of. Formally speaking, the FCF valuation model can 
be modified as follows to express shareholder value: 
 
MÀlÁK8Â =  18(1 + À)8
}
8~:
, 
 
where ERCF = FCF – Net Cash Flow to non-equity holders, and rÄ represents the cost of 
equity capital. Kieschnick et al. (2013) further argue that if this framework holds true, 
shareholder wealth is increased only if the firm generates excess returns to its equity. Hence, 
the effects on shareholder value of net operating working capital investments can be assessed 
by looking at the effects on the excess returns to holders of equity. 
8.1.2. Regression Models and Variables under Study 
As mentioned earlier, Kieschnick et al. (2013) ground their analysis on the valuation 
framework used by Faulkender & Wang (2006), which they formally spell out as follows 
(Model 1): 
 
8 − 8Å = ?T + ?:∆8 + ?=8U: + ?@∆8 + ?V∆.8 +  ?W∆8 +  ?Y∆&8 + ?Z∆8
+ ?[8 + ?Æ.18 + \8, 
 
where r − RÇ represents the excess, or benchmark-adjusted, stock return of a firm over the 
fiscal year t, r the realized return of the firm’s stock over the fiscal year t, and RÇ the 
benchmark return for the stock, i.e. the return of a portfolio sorted by size and book-to-
                                                
as well as the cross-sectional variation in exposure to these risk factors in their estimation by using a stock’s 
benchmark return. In contrast, the methodology used by Fama & French (1998), notwithstanding the fact 
that firm-specific characteristics affecting expected cash flow are controlled for, does not incorporate 
measures capable of seizing variations in sensitivities to risk factors, and hence variations in discount rates. 
Secondly, Faulkender & Wang (2006) argue that equity returns, contrary to the market-to-book ratio, are 
easily measurable and interpretable. Fama & French (1998) have themselves argued that they lack the 
necessary data to measure assets at replacement costs, which, to them, would be more desirable. 
Subsequently, “part of the variability in market-to-book may result from the cross-sectional differences in 
accounting for the book value of assets relative to their true replacement cost. If accounting methods across 
firms are correlated with liquidity, this correlation might bias the estimates of the marginal value of cash.” 
(Faulkender & Wang, 2006, p.  1966) 
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market to which the stock belongs, during fiscal year t.209 Furthermore, C represents the 
firm’s holdings in cash and marketable securities, E its earnings before interest and 
extraordinary items, NA its total assets net of cash, RD its research & development 
expenditures (0 if missing), I its interest expense, D the total dividends it paid, L its market 
leverage,210 and NF its net financing,211 ∆X is used to denote unexpected changes212 in X 
over the current year. In addition, all independent variables Xt, except Lt, are being scaled 
by the firm’s market value of equity at the start of the fiscal year (MVEt-1). This scaling thus 
permits a straightforward interpretation of the regression coefficients, namely as “a gage for 
how investors perceive each $1 investment in X; measured relatively to how ? ∗ ∆b is able 
to explain the unanticipated change in a company’s valuation ;(8 − 8Å) ∗ M8U:<.” 
(Kieschnick et al., 2013, p. 1834)  
It is worthy to note that when developing the valuation framework presented here, 
Faulkender & Wang (2006) acknowledged that both common risk factors and variations in 
firm-specific characteristics affect stock returns. Although firm-specific factors are highly 
noisy, Faulkender & Wang (2006), whose aim is to answer the question of whether 
shareholder wealth is affected by changes in cash holdings, need to investigate individual 
stocks and can therefore not diversify these firm-specific factors away by using portfolios as 
is common in the asset pricing literature. It is therefore necessary, as they argue, to control 
for other factors that may be correlated with variations in cash that may also have an impact 
on shareholder value. Hence, the excess stock returns are not only regressed on “the change 
in cash holdings, but also on changes in a firm’s profitability, financing policy, and 
investment policy.” (Faulkender & Wang, 2008, p. 1966)213 
Let me remind the reader that Kieschnick et al. (2013) are interested in evaluating the effect 
of net operating working capital investment (denoted ∆NWC) on shareholder wealth, 
                                                
209 Kieschnick et al. (2013) construct their benchmark portfolios following the method adopted by Daniel & 
Titman (1997) and Grinblatt & Moskowitz (2004). Specifically, from data obtained by merging CRSP stock 
return data and COMPUSTAT accounting data, they classify stocks monthly into size and book-to-market 
quintiles to form 25 benchmark portfolios and their returns. 
210 Market leverage is expressed as the ratio of total debt over total debt plus market value of equity. 
211 Net financing is computed as total equity issuance minus repurchases plus debt issuance minus debt 
redemption. 
212 As the unexpected change in a variable is unobservable, Faulkender & Wang (2006) first consider, focusing 
on their main variable of interest, cash, its realized change under the assumption of no expected change. In 
a second step, they conduct several robustness tests with changing estimates of unexpected cash variations. 
They find that using actual changes in cash appears to provide relatively unbiased results. 
213 For further motivations regarding the motivations of Faulkender & Wang (2008) regarding their choice of 
control variables, I refer the reader directly to their article. 
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particularly while accounting for the prior level of net operating working capital (denoted 
NWCt-1). The baseline model laid out above is therefore adjusted to incorporate for these 
variables as follows (Model 2): 
 
8 − 8Å = ?T + ?:∆8 + ?=8U: + ?@∆8 + ?V∆..8 +  ?W∆8 +  ?Y∆&8 + ?Z∆8
+ ?[8 + ?Æ.18 + ?:T.B8U: + ?::∆.B8 + \8 , 
 
where NNA represents total assets net of cash and marketable securities, account receivables 
and inventories, and NWC is computed as accounts receivable plus inventory minus 
accounts payable. 
Kieschnick et al. (2013) further expand their analysis by investigating the interaction 
between the variables NWCt-1 and ∆NWC, thus laying out, though not explicitly, the 
following regression equation (Model 3): 
 
8 − 8Å = ?T + ?:∆8 + ?=8U: + ?@∆8 + ?V∆..8 +  ?W∆8 +  ?Y∆&8 + ?Z∆8
+ ?[8 + ?Æ.18 + ?:T.B8U: + ?::∆.B8
+ ?:=(.B8U: ∗ ∆.B8) + \8 , 
 
In a final step in their research design, Kieschnick et al. (2013) are interested in answering 
the question of how other factors related to working capital, such as those presented in the 
first part of this thesis, may influence the value shareholders place on additional working 
capital investments. Specifically, they consider a firm’s expected sales growth, its debt load, 
its risk of going bankrupt, the financial constraints it faces, as well as macroeconomic and 
financial market conditions as factors potentially affecting the incremental value to 
shareholders of investments in net operating working capital and expand their second 
regression model as follows (Model 4): 
 
8 − 8Å = ?T + ?:∆8 + ?=8U: + ?@∆8 + ?V∆..8 +  ?W∆8 +  ?Y∆&8 + ?Z∆8
+ ?[8 + ?Æ.18 + ?:T.B8U: + ?::∆.B8 + \8 , 
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where β:: =  α:F: + ⋯ + αÉFÉ, and F:, … , FÉ the additional factors (or their proxies)214 
under consideration. 
It is worthy to note that all models are estimated, following both Faulkender & Wang (2006) 
and Dittmar & Mahrt-Smith (2007), as random effects models,215 and that sample data is 
being winsorized at the 1% and 99% level rather than trimmed216 as is common practice in 
other studies. 
8.1.2. Main Results 
Kieschnick et al. (2013) provide several valuable empirical results that highlight the 
significance of efficient working management policies to stockholders: First off, the authors 
report significant evidence that, for the average firm in their sample, an additional dollar 
invested in net operating working capital turns out to be worth about $0.52 to its 
shareholders, hence less than the dollar so invested and substantially less than an additional 
dollar held in cash, which shareholders value at around $1.49. Another intriguing result from 
their study is that the value of an incremental net operating working capital investment is 
lessening with increasing levels of prior net operating working capital. This result leaves out 
the possibility of the existence of an optimal level of (net operating) working capital and 
thus stands in contrast with the results provided by Baños-Caballero et al. (2012 and 2014) 
who uncovered an inverted U-shaped relationship between a firm’s profitability and its 
investment in working capital. I allow myself to carefully speculate that, if such an optimum 
indeed exists, the negative relationship between r − RÇ and NWCU: ∗ ∆NWC obtained by 
Kieschnik et al. (2013) may perhaps stem from a high concentration of firms in their sample 
characterized by excessively high levels of working capital. This explanation is quite 
plausible given that their study covers the period 1990 through 2006 and that the same 
authors (See Kieschnick et al., 2006) reported significant evidence of an overinvestment in 
working capital, on average, by U.S. corporations in the period 1990 through 2004. It may 
thus be interesting to modify the model used by Kieschnik et al. (2013) to incorporate for a 
non-monotonic concave relationship between shareholder value and working capital 
investment. Nonetheless, the authors provide insightful and significant evidence of the 
                                                
214 I refer the reader at this point to the original article of Kieschnick et al. (2013) for details regarding the 
measures the authors use to proxy for those factors. 
215 Using the Hausman (1978) test, Kieschnick et al. (2013) tested whether using a random effects model over 
a fixed effects model was appropriate and failed to dismiss its appropriateness. 
216 Kieschnick et al. (2013) consider trimming not to be appropriate when the concern is over data entry 
mistakes. 
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influence of a firm’s future sales expectations, its debt load, the ease with which it has access 
to external capital markets, and its bankruptcy risk on the value its shareholder places on an 
additional dollar in net operating working capital investment. Finally, they document that 
“[o]f the different components of net operating working capital, additional investments in 
providing credit to one’s customers appears to have the greater effects on shareholder’ 
wealth for the average firm.” (Kieschnick et al., 2013, p. 1851) 
8.2. Aktas et al. (2015b) 
Let me now turn to the empirical study of Aktas et al. (2015b) I need to present to the reader 
before I go on with presenting my own empirical research. To the best of my knowledge and 
belief, that study is the most recent study that considers the question of whether working 
capital management is value-enhancing. Besides, it addresses the weaknesses of the 
researched carried out by Kieschnick et al. (2013) and to which I have pointed in the previous 
subsection (8.1.2.). In line with Baños-Caballero et al. (2012 and 214), Aktas et al (2015b, 
p. 99) recognize that due to the potential costs and benefits associated with investment in 
working capital, its relationship with firm performance ought to be non-linear in nature, 
“with the expected relation being negative for firms with high level of working capital (i.e. 
overinvestment in NWC) and positive for firms with low level of working capital (i.e. 
underinvestment in NWC).” Furthermore, they advocate corporate investment to be the 
driving force behind the performance-enhancing feature of working capital management for 
firms characterized by excessive levels of working capital. Specifically, they argue that 
cutting back superfluous working capital leads to increased firm performance through the 
reallocation of underemployed resources to usages that have a superior value. Besides, it 
increases a firm’s financial flexibility both in the short run because of cash being freed that 
was previously unnecessarily tied-up in working capital, as well as in the long run because 
of comparatively fewer financial needs of operation. This increased financial flexibility, 
Aktas et al. (2015b) continue to argue, in turn provides the firm with a better capacity to 
undertake potentially profitable investments, as documented, among others, by Denis & 
Sibilkov (2010) and Duchin et al. (2010b). On the other hand, firms characterized by an 
excessively low level of working capital will find it futile to source corporate investment by 
cutting back their level of working capital. Hence, Aktas et al. (2015b) anticipate the relation 
between working capital and corporate investment to be negative only for firms 
overinvesting in working capital. 
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8.2.1. Preliminary Analysis 
First off, it is worthy to note that Aktas et al. (2015b) conduct their research using an 
exhaustive sample of accounting and stock prices data of U.S. listed non-financial firms 
covering the period 1982 through to 2011, thus including the period of severe downturn 
economic environment suffered by the global economy from 2007 onwards that is also of 
interest for my empirical analysis. To derive their independent variable of interest, they start 
their analysis by looking at aggregate accounting figures such as assets, sales, cash holdings, 
net operating working capital (NWC) and its components, namely inventories, accounts 
receivable, and accounts payable for each sample year, as well as the average yearly growth 
rate of the variables under consideration. This allows them to identify several noticeable 
trends: First, “while the aggregate cash tied up in NWC is more than three times of the 
aggregate cash holdings at the beginning of the sample period, cash holdings become as 
important as the aggregate investment in NWC towards the end of the sample period.” 
Second, the aggregate figures provide an indication “that firms hold on average relatively 
less working capital through time, and in particular inventories.” (Aktas et al., 2015b, p. 
102) Moreover, by plotting the cross-sectional average and median of the ratio of NWC-to-
sales per year as well as the progression through time of average inventories, accounts 
receivable and accounts payable, respectively, scaled by sales, the authors are able to identify 
a significant downward trend in the NWC-to-sales ratio as well as in the ratios of each of the 
three components of NWC to sales, with a relatively more pronounced downward trend for 
the average ratio of inventories to sales.217 By the same token, the authors carry out an 
industry analysis for the sake of checking whether the downward trend in NWC-to-sales 
ratio over time is common to all industries or restricted to specific industries. The authors 
hereby reveal the relative decline in NWC to commonly occur across a vast array of 
industries, and that, although different working capital practices are documented among 
industries, “the heterogeneity in terms of working capital management has also decreased 
through time in most industries.” (Aktas et al., 2015b, p. 104) 
8.2.2. Variables Under Study 
The preliminary analysis described in the previous subsection leads the authors to choose 
the industry-median adjusted NWC-to-sales ratio as their main independent variable of 
                                                
217 Aktas et al. (2015b) note that the considerable scaling back of inventories relative to sales is frequently 
linked to the endorsement of the Just-in-Time (JIT) inventory system, as documented, among others, by 
Chen et al. (2005). 
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interest and measure of the funds unnecessarily tied up in working capital. This variable, 
denoted excess NWC, is obtained by subtracting the ratio of the median firm in the 
corresponding industry/year from the NWC-to-sales ratio of a given firm. It can take both 
positive and negative values, indicating an over- and underinvestment in working capital, 
respectively. An implicit assumption is hereby made by the authors that the industry-median 
NWC level represents a firm’s efficient level of NWC “(i.e. the NWC level adopted by a 
shareholder value maximizing manager who trade-offs benefits and costs of investment in 
working capital)” (Aktas et al., 2015b, p. 104). 
In their study, the authors perform regressions using as dependent variables both the excess 
stock return adjusted for firm size and market-to-book, following Barber & Lyon (1997), as 
a measure of stock performance, and, following Bates et al. (2009), the capital expenditures 
(CAPEX) and cash outflows linked to acquisitions, as measures of corporate investment.218 
Regarding the excess return for time t, it is defined “as the difference between the return of 
the buy-and-hold investment in the sample firm i less the return of the buy-and-hold 
investment in a benchmark portfolio” (Aktas et al., 2015, p. 104), and formally expressed as 
follows: 
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where R°,Ì represents the return of firm i, RÍ,Ì the return of the benchmark portfolio for 
month m, and T the investment horizon expressed in number of months. Aktas et al. (2015b) 
compute excess returns underlying a 1-year horizon (i.e. T = 12). They further construct, 219 
as their benchmark portfolios, twenty-five Fama-French value-weighted portfolios sorted 
independently by size (proxied by the market value of equity, ME) and book-to-market 
(defined as the ratio of book value of equity to market value of equity, BE/ME) 
characteristics, and allocate each firm in their sample to both a size and a market portfolio 
with the help of Fama-French ME and BE/ME breakpoints. 
                                                
218 Aktas et al. (2015b) also perform regressions using operating performance, proxied by the return on assets 
(ROA), and firm risk, proxied by the annualized standard deviation of daily stock returns, following Coles 
et al. (2006) and Armstrong & Vashishtha (2012). These two regressions serve as complementary tests to 
gauge the robustness of corporate investment as the main driver behind the value-enhancing feature of 
working capital management. 
219 Following Daniel & Titman (1997) 
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Regarding the measures of corporate investment, the variables Aktas et al. (2015b) use are 
divided by total assets at the beginning of the period. Furthermore, given that only the 
unexpected part of an investment is anticipated to be related to superior performance of 
stocks when capital markets are efficient,220 the authors consider the change in investment 
as their dependent variable in the investment regressions. Besides, the argue that “the use of 
the change in investment as dependent variable controls to some extent for the maintenance 
investment (i.e., the investment which is necessary for the firm to keep functioning at current 
levels of growth in a competitive environment), and allows focusing only on the part of the 
investment devoted to firm growth” (Aktas et al., 2015b, p. 104) 
8.2.3. Regression Methodology 
Aktas et al. (2015b) start by laying out the following linear regression model in their effort 
to scrutinize to what extent firm performance and investment are impacted by excess net 
operating working capital: 
 
MK,8 = `8 + ­K + ?:O .BK,8U: + ?=K,8U: + \K,8 , 
 
where V is one of the dependent variables used as proxies for either firm performance or 
investment, and α and η° represent respectively year and firm fixed effects. The inclusion 
of year and firm fixed effects in all their regressions allow the authors to control, respectively, 
for changes in overall economic and financial conditions as well as for time-invariant firm 
characteristics, thus alleviating the issue of omitted variables. Industry fixed effects, for their 
part, are indirectly controlled for by using industry median-adjusted values of excess NWC.  
Given that the sample data used in the study is organized in a panel structure, the coefficient 
β: in the above regression equation can be interpreted as the sensitivity of either firm 
performance or investment to a marginal change in excess NWC. Specifically, a decrease in 
excess NWC in one period, in other words the adoption of a more aggressive working capital 
management policy, leads to an increase (decrease) in firm performance or corporate 
investment in the next period when the coefficient β: is negative (positive).  
Furthermore, the authors draw upon a second, asymmetric regression model to answer the 
question of whether the link between the main independent and the dependent variables 
under consideration is non-linear in nature. To that end, they introduce a dummy variable D 
                                                
220 Aktas et al. (2015b) here refer to McConell & Muscarella (1985) 
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being equal to 1 for positive observations of excess NWC and 0 otherwise. This permits to 
obtain different slope coefficients of the regression model under consideration depending on 
whether excess NWC is positive or negative. The authors formally express the corresponding 
non-linear asymmetric model specification as follows: 
 
MK,8 = `8 + ­K + 9:[O .BK,8U:  ×   ] + 9=[O .BK,8U:  ×   (1 − )]
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K,8U: + \K,8 , 
 
It is worthy to note that in both the linear and asymmetric regression equations mentioned 
above, the right-hand side variables are lagged by one period. This, Aktas et al. (2015b) 
argue, mitigates the possibility of having all three variables of interest, namely net operating 
working capital, firm performance and corporate investment determined simultaneously in 
equilibrium. Besides, the authors consider in all their regressions several control variables 
that are known to influence the dependent variable(s) as well as levels of working capital. 
This addresses endogeneity concerns related to unconsidered factors that may correlate with 
the main independent variable.  
The array of control variables under consideration and common to both the investment and 
performance regressions is quite ample: They follow Hill et al. (2010) and employ a firm’s 
sales volatility, its 1-year sales growth rate, its operating cash flow and a dummy variable 
for financial distress as control variables. Other control variables include firm age,221 and 
cash reserves.222 With regards to the performance regressions, Aktas et al. (2015b) extend 
the set of control variables to further include the market value of equity - as proxy for firm 
size, leverage, risk, intangible assets,223 research & development (R&D) expenditures,224 and 
fixed asset growth.225 With regards to the investment regressions, the authors consider the 
                                                
221 Following the argumentation by Damordan (2012) that a relatively lower level of working capital per unit 
of sales is necessary for mature firms 
222 The choice of Aktas el al. (2015b) to consider cash reserves as a control variable is motivated by their desire 
to mitigate the substitution effect that exists between working capital and cash reserves through time as 
documented by Bates et al. (2009) 
223 Following, among others, Coles et al. (2008) and Duchin et al. (2010a) 
224 As R&D expenditures are associated to future stock performance, as shown for instance by Chan et al. 
(2001) 
225 Contrary to Cooper et al. (2008) or Lipson et al. (2011) among others, Aktas et al. (2015b) consider fixed 
asset growth instead of total asset growth to exclude elements of working capital that are accounted for in 
the latter.  
114 
 
log of Tobin’s q226, known to interact with growth opportunities, in addition to firm size, 
leverage and risk. 
Aktas et al. (2015b) do not limit their analysis to the running of the two regression models 
outlined above. They also run two alternative regressions using as dependent variable a 
measure of operating performance (proxied by the return on assets) and a measure of risk 
(proxied by the annualized standard deviation of firm daily returns in year t) respectively. 
Moreover, in a final effort to cross-check the results of their main tests, they endorse an 
alternative two-staged regression-based approach to estimate excess NWC. Specifically, 
they estimate, in a first stage, a firm’s working capital requirements drawing upon variables 
known to influence the ratio of NWC-to-sales. This is done by regressing for each 
industry/year the ratio of a firm’s NWC-to-sales on the volatility of its sales, its sales growth, 
its free cash flow, its age, and a financial distress dummy. In a second stage, they use the 
residuals from the first stage regression as measure of the firm’s excess NWC in both the 
performance and investment regressions. 
8.2.4. Summary of Main Results 
The very exhaustive study by Aktas et al. (2015b) presented above can not only be 
considered to position itself at the cutting edge of research on working capital management 
with regards to the econometric methods grounded therein. It also provides comprehensive 
and significant evidence that has far-reaching implications for corporate policy. Expressing 
it in their words, the authors “document the existence of an optimal level of working capital 
investment. Firms that converge to that optimal level, either by increasing or decreasing 
their investment in working capital, improve their stock and operating performance over the 
subsequent period. [They] also uncover that corporate investment is the channel through 
which efficient [working capital management] translates into superior firm performance. 
[Their] results emphasize that firm appear to redeploy underutilized working capital 
resources to more efficient uses, such as funding growth investment. [Their] study implies 
that efficient [working capital management] is highly valuable, particularly in periods of 
expanding investment opportunity set. [They] also rule out the possibility that the results are 
driven by increasing firm risk following the adoption of aggressive working capital policy.” 
(Aktas et al., 2015b, p. 111) 
Given both these results and the large chunk working capital accounts represent relative to 
                                                
226 Following Lang et al. (1996) 
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a firm’s assets, Aktas et al. (2015b) summon managers of corporations to give higher priority 
to the maximization of the utility of working capital for their shareholder’s benefit. 
Particularly, they advise corporate managers to refrain themselves from holding too high 
levels of cash uselessly tied up in working capital and to focus on aiming for the optimum 
level of working capital. Following this advice would eventually lead to increased efficiency 
in the management of working capital, in turn opening sources of financing generated within 
the firm which could ultimately be put to work in more valuable investment opportunities 
for the benefit of the firm’s shareholders. 
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9. Empirical Study 
The following empirical study will be based on the methodology adopted by Aktas et al. 
(2015b) presented in the previous section. However, due to the unavailability of certain data 
required to perform the investment regressions, I will limit my empirical work to the 
performance regressions, the aim of which is twofold. The first set of regressions enables 
me to evaluate the impact on both stock and operating performance of a firm’s adjustment 
of its level of net operating working capital towards the median level of the industry the firm 
belongs to. The second set of regressions allows me to assess whether, as in Aktas et al. 
(2015b) and Baños-Caballero et al. (2012 and 2014), an inverted U-shaped relationship exist 
between an investment in working capital and a firm’s stock performance and profitability, 
respectively, for German publicly listed firms. 
9.1. Sample Construction 
To construct my sample, I use unbalanced panel data covering the period 2005 to 2014 and 
related to 112 unique (non-financial) firms that were included in the German DAX, MDAX, 
SDAX and TecDAX indices at the beginning of the second half-year of 2005 (i.e. June 1st, 
2005), with 1025 firm-year observations in total. The firms under study are classified, using 
the Industry Classification Benchmark227 supersectors, into the following 15 industries: 
 
. Automobiles and Parts . Health Care . Retail 
. Basic Resources . Industrial Goods and Services . Technology 
. Chemicals . Media . Telecommunications 
. Construction & Materials . Oil & Gas . Travel & Leisure 
. Food & Beverage . Personal and Household Goods . Utilities 
 
All accounting and earning related figures used in my study have been hand-picked by 
myself from the annual financial reports of the firms under consideration. Data related to 
stock prices have been drawn from the Bloomberg Professional terminal. Firms for which 
required data was not available from Bloomberg in one or more years, firms for which data 
                                                
227 See www.icbenchmark.com for details regarding the industry classification taxonomy. 
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was available for less than four years, and firms that reported their financial figures in 
another currency than the € were not included in the sample. 
9.2. Refining the Measure of Net Operating Working Capital 
The measure of working capital I employ in my study differs slightly from that employed by 
Aktas et al. (2015b). Indeed, I consider an alternative measure of working capital, which I 
denote by NWC* and which, in addition to the individual components of NWC, namely 
inventories (INV), accounts receivable (AR) and accounts payable (AP), accounts for the 
receivables and liabilities from construction contracts228 (RCC and LCC, respectively) as 
well as for the advance payments (AdvP) firms receive from their customers. The alternative 
measure of working capital I use can thus be expressed as follows: 
 
.B∗ = &.M + ( + ) − (- +  + +-) 
 
The rationale for the inclusion of the two components related to construction contracts as 
components of the net operating capital is straightforward. While in most industries, business 
processes follow cycles spanning a relatively short period, in other industries, such as most 
of those considered in my sample, it is common for the duration of an activity undertaken in 
construction contracts to extend beyond one year, thus leading the date of entrance into 
contract activity to fall into a different accounting period than the date of completion of the 
activity. The main accounting issue, in that case, is most certainly concerned with the 
attribution of contract revenue and costs to the periods in which construction work has been 
performed.229 IAS 11 (2014), which prescribes how revenue and costs associated with 
construction contracts ought to be treated for accounting purposes, specifically proposes to 
treat receivables from construction contracts as the difference between the amount billed to 
the customer as progress billing and the progress payments received from the customer. Note 
here that, following the accruals concept, any advance payment received from the customer 
in respect of contractual work to be performed at a future date is not included as receivables 
from construction contracts but rather should be recognized as a liability – hence the term 
                                                
228 IAS 11 (2014) defines a construction contract as “a contract specifically negotiated for the construction of 
an asset or a combination of assets that are closely interrelated or interdependent in terms of their design, 
technology and function or their ultimate purpose or use.” (IAS 11, 2014, p.1) 
229 See IAS 11 (2014) 
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liabilities from construction contracts230 –  until the work in respect of which the advance 
was given has been performed.  
Accounting for customer’s advance payments – which are generally stated as a current 
liability on a firm’s balance sheet - as a component of net operating working capital also 
makes much sense as firms may rely on advance payments requests for the sake of working 
capital management. Payments in advance of goods being delivered or services being 
provided may be effected for several reasons. A firm may for instance be unable or unwilling, 
due to the financial constraints or even distress itself or its customers, respectively, may be 
facing, to grant trade credit. Another reason may be that the product a customer orders from 
a firm is customized to such an extent that the firm may find it difficult to sell it to anyone 
else should the ordering customer be unable or unwilling to pay. A firm may also choose to 
request advance payments from its customers to reserve its annual production capacity, in 
which case advance payment requests can be considered as a tool serving the management 
of inventory. The reasons mentioned above are without any doubt of greater relevance in 
times of deteriorating economic conditions, as was the case in the wake of the 2007-2008 
global financial crisis. 
It will be shown in the next section why the use of the alternative measure of net operating 
working capital (NWC*) I propose is superior to that used in Aktas et al. (2015b), at least 
when investigating firms for which accounting for construction contracts is a relevant issue. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                
230 In this thesis, what I denote as liabilities from construction contracts should not be confounded with 
construction contractual liabilities arising when the contract terms are not being abided to by the contractor 
or his or her subcontractors. Though the latter are of great relevance in terms of a contractor’s insurance 
coverage, I define liabilities from construction contracts merely in accounting terms as advance payments 
effected in respect of contractual work to be performed at a future date. 
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9.3. Summary Statistics 
9.3.1. Looking at the Big Picture 
Year N Assets Sales Cash INV AR AP RCC LCC AdvP NWC NWC* 
2005 101 943 654 52 81 83 77 10 6 23 87 68 
2006 106 1097 790 59 96 93 88 11 10 26 101 76 
2007 111 1454 1009 78 124 118 106 12 14 32 136 103 
2008 112 1610 1110 73 140 129 113 14 7 34 155 128 
2009 107 1413 1011 105 127 115 108 13 16 37 133 94 
2010 104 1525 1114 109 141 135 127 14 17 40 149 106 
2011 103 1664 1284 106 166 148 140 15 18 48 173 122 
2011 103 1765 1418 112 170 148 143 17 19 48 175 124 
2013 97 1797 1437 119 170 151 142 19 18 48 178 130 
2014 94 1957 1451 115 184 159 151 17 19 47 191 143 
Growth rate N/A 9.0% 9.7% 10.4% 10.2% 7.9% 8.1% 6.2% 21.4% 8.5% 9.9% 9.9% 
             
  Table 2: Aggregate Values by Year  
 
Table 2 above reports yearly aggregate values for total assets, sales, cash holdings,231 both 
measures of net operating working capital (NWC and NWC*), inventories, accounts 
receivables, receivables from construction contracts, liabilities from construction contracts, 
and advance payments received from customers at order placement for all the firms in the 
samples and covers the period 2005 to 2014. All € values are in billion € and adjusted to 
2015 € by the HCIP index for Germany. N is the number of firms. It is lower than the number 
of unique firms in the years prior to 2008. Notwithstanding the mandatory rule for all 
publicly listed firms to report financial figures following the IFRS accounting standards from 
2005 onwards, some firms in the samples have used the transitional period to change to IFRS 
accounting rules granted by the European Commission232 to those publicly listed firms who 
already issued, in or prior to 2005, their financial statements based on US-GAAP. Therefore, 
the actual number of unique firms considered prior to 2008 is lower than 112.233 Thereafter, 
the number of firms decreases as some firms leave the sample either because they went into 
bankruptcy, were taken over by other firms, or have been delisted. The last row displays the 
average annual growth rate of the corresponding variables. Between 2005 and 2014, an 
increasing trend can clearly be observed in all the variables under consideration. While 
                                                
231 Figures include cash and equivalents. 
232 See EU regulation Nr. 1606/2002 
233 One firm in the sample, INFINEON, has only adopted IFRS standards in their 2007/2008 annual report 
given that its fiscal year-end is not the calendar year-end. 
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aggregate total assets and sales have grown at a yearly rate of 9.0% and 9.7% respectively 
over the period 2005-2014, the aggregate amount held in cash and equivalents has increased 
at a higher rate (10.4%). This pattern is consistent with those observed by both Aktas et al. 
(2015b) and Bates et al. (2009). In contrast to the observations by Aktas et al. (2015b), the 
aggregate investment in net operating working capital, as proxied by both NWC and NWC*, 
has increased by 9.9%, which is more relative to the annual growth of aggregate assets and 
aggregate sales and less relative to the annual growth of cash holdings. Among the six 
components of NWC*, receivables from construction contracts have grown at the lowest 
rate over the period under consideration in the sample, followed by accounts receivable 
(8.1%), advance payments (8.5%), inventories (10.2%), and liabilities from construction 
contracts (21.4%). It is noteworthy to point out to the significant drop in aggregate NWC* 
(-26.6%) in 2009 relative to 2008, which hints to the firms’ adoption of more aggressive 
working capital policies in direct reaction to the financial crisis of 2007-2008. More 
specifically, while the levels of inventories, accounts receivables, receivables from 
construction contracts and accounts payable dropped by -9.3%, -10.3%, -7.1% and -4.4%, 
respectively, advance payment increased by 8.8% and liabilities from constructions contracts 
increased by a staggering 128.6%. Moreover, during the same time, aggregate sales dropped 
by -8.9%, and cash holding increased by 43,8%. Let me remind the reader that what I denote 
as liabilities from construction contracts represent advance payments received from 
customers in respect of contractual work that has not yet been performed. Hence, the colossal 
increase in LCC from the years 2008 to 2009 can be the result of either customers postponing 
the completion and delivery of their orders or of firms requesting higher payments in 
advance from a customer in respect of contractual work to minimize the risk of having goods 
and services left unpaid by the customer upon completion of the construction contract. 
9.3.2. Comparative Cross-Sectional Time-Series Analysis 
The aggregate observations described above clearly highlighted the necessity to refine the 
measure of net operating working capital to also account for receivables and liabilities from 
construction contracts as well as advance payments, as well as the importance of their 
functions in the management of working capital. Beyond these observations, analysing, 
following Aktas et al. (2015b), the times series of summary statistics for both the NWC-to-
Sales ratio (see Fig. 12) and the NWC*-to-Sales ratio (see Fig. 13) leads me to assert that 
using the alternative measure of net operating working capital is superior to that adopted by 
Aktas et al. (2015b). 
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Figure 12: Time Series of Summary Statistics for NWC-to-Sales Ratio 
 
Indeed, although a slightly downward trend in the mean and median NWC-to-Sales ratio can 
be observed in Fig. 12, which plots the cross-sectional statistics of NWC-to-Sales ratio for 
German firms by year from 2005 to 2014, one can notice from Fig. 13, which plots the cross-
sectional statistics of NWC*-to-Sales ratio for German firms by year from 2005 to 2014, 
that the downward trend becomes clearly apparent for both the mean and median NWC*-to-
Sales ratio relative to the mean and median NWC-to-Sales ratio.  Performing regressions of 
both the mean and median NWC*-to-Sales ratio, respectively, on a constant and time 
measured in years, allows me to assess whether the observed time trend is statistically 
significant. The coefficient on the time trend for the mean (median) NWC*-to-Sales ratio 
corresponds to a yearly decrease of -0.26% (-0.46%), has a p-value of 0.002 (0.000), and an 
R² of 73% (82%), hence pointing to a significant decreasing time trend in NWC*-to-Sales 
ratio over the sample period.234 
                                                
234 The full results of these regressions, though not reported here in a table, are available on request. 
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   Figure 13: Time Series Summary Statistics for NWC*-to-Sales Ratio 
 
However, in contrast to the observations of Aktas et al. (2015b), the cross-sectional standard 
deviation of both the NWC-to-Sales and NWC*-to-Sales ratios, also depicted in Fig. 12 and 
Fig. 13, tend to follow an upward trend over the sample period, with values peaking in the 
year 2010, perhaps due to some firms in the sample only considering the short-term utility 
of working capital management as a means to weather a financial crisis, assuming it will not 
last too long, while other firms either recognize that the effects of the financial crisis might 
be long-lasting, or acknowledge the importance of adopting sustainable working capital 
policies.235 In any case, these observations indicate an increase in firm heterogeneity in terms 
of both the NWC-to-Sales and NWC*-to-Sales ratios over the entire sample period. 
Following here again the procedure adopted by Aktas et al. (2015b) in their study, I plot in 
Fig. 14 the cross-sectional averages of all individual components of NWC* scaled by sales, 
allowing to assess which one of the six components of NWC* contributed the most in the 
decrease of the NWC*-to-Sales ratio over the sample period. 
 
                                                
235 It is noteworthy in this respect to point out that from 2010 onwards, the decreasing trend in the mean 
NWC*-to-Sales ratio observed until 2010 tends to accelerate while the mean NWC*-to-Sales ratio tends 
to stagnate. 
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    Figure 14: Yearly Average of NWC* Components 
 
Surprisingly, the patterns displayed in Fig. 14 are inconclusive and do not allow to discern 
which component of NWC* contributes the most to the decrease of the NWC*-to-Sales ratio 
over the sample period. While mean RCC, on the one hand, and mean LCC and mean 
advance payments, on the other hand, appear to represent the tiniest components of NWC* 
relative to sales, their effects on receivables management and payables management, 
respectively, should not be underestimated. Indeed, combining these three components with 
accounts receivable and accounts payable provides a better picture of the average receivables 
management and payables management of the sample firms over the period 2005 through 
2014, as can be seen from Fig. 15, in which I display the evolution through time of the mean 
inventories, mean grouped receivables, which I define as accounts receivables plus 
receivables from construction contracts, and mean grouped payables, which I define as 
accounts payable plus liabilities from construction contracts plus advance payments, all 
scaled by sales.  
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Figure 15: Yearly Average of Grouped NWC* Components 
 
9.3.3. Adaptive Working Capital Management in the Wake of Financial Turbulence  
Analysing the patterns displayed in Fig. 15 provides several interesting observations: While 
the mean of the grouped receivables relative to sales displays a downward trend up until 
2008, it increases again in 2009 until it reaches its peak in 2010 only to drop to its lowest 
level in 2012 and increase again thereafter until 2014. In contrast, the mean level of 
inventories relative to sales increases steadily until 2010, drops sharply in 2011 to the level 
it held in 2009 and returns to its upward trend until 2014. Finallly, the mean level of grouped 
payables relative to sales increases until 2007, decreases in the subsequent year only to 
increase significantly until its peak in 2010. Thereafter, it follows a similar path than the 
levels of mean inventories and mean grouped receivables, decreasing until 2012 and moving 
upwards again until 2014. Even though the patterns observed do not allow me to isolate 
whether inventory, receivables or payables management contributed most to the statistically 
significant downward trend in NWC*-to-Sales observed in Fig. 13, they nevertheless allow 
to visualize the response of German firms to the financial crisis of 2007-2008 and its 
aftermath with respect to their working capital management. For instance, given that the 
aggregate level of sales grew constantly from 654 billion € in 2005 to 1110 billion € in 2008 
(see Table 2), one can argue that firms had built up high levels of inventory in expectance of 
ever growing sales. Moreover, given that sales were booming and money was far from being 
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tight, collecting grouped receivables must not have represented much of a challenge for firms 
in the sample; one can assume that the prevalent conditions up until 2008 in the real 
economy, as opposed to the monetary economy, have led the mean level of grouped 
receivables to decrease relative to sales in an automated manner. One noteworthy 
observation is that between 2008 and 2010, the average firm in the sample appears to have 
invested in inventories and grouped receivables while at the same time building up grouped 
payables, either by postponing payments to suppliers or by accumulating advance payments 
from customers both in relation to construction contracts and regardless of construction 
contracts. The situation appears to have been reversed after 2010 until 2012, where 
investment in all components of net operating working capital decreased, thus pointing to 
the adoption by the average firm in the sample of aggressive inventory and receivables 
reduction policies, while at the same time no longer being able to postpone payments to 
suppliers as well as collecting advance payments for customers as every firm seemed to be 
focusing on reducing their level of working capital. Finally, a renewed reversal is apparent 
after 2012, in which the average firm invests again in inventories and receivables and  
increases group payables. The analysis I provide in this subsection suggests that the average 
firm in my sample was compelled to continuously adapt its working capital management in 
the strong wake turbulence that ensued the 2007-2008 global financial crisis.   
9.3.4. Industry Analysis 
Following Aktas et al. (2015b), I also perform industry analysis to investigate whether the 
decreasing trend in net operating working capital through time, as proxied by the NWC*-to-
Sales ratio, can be generalized or whether it is just limited to a subset of specific industries. 
Table 3 below provides summary statistics for the NWC*-to-Sales ratio by industry. For each 
industry/year in my sample period, I compute the median and standard deviation of the 
NWC*-to-Sales ratio.236 Columns 1 and 2 report the corresponding median and standard 
deviation for the years 2005 and 2014. N denotes the number of observations. Besides, for 
each industry and using all the 10 yearly observations over the period 2005-2014, I regress 
the median and standard deviation of the NWC*-to-Sales ratio on a linear time trend and 
                                                
236 Values for the Travel & Leisure industry are not considered in the table as only one firm in the sample 
belongs to this industry. 
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report the slope coefficient in column 3 and 4 respectively. Slope coefficients in bold are 
statistically significant at the 10%-level (or below). 
 
  (1) 2005       (2) 2014       (3)   (4) 
 Median St. Dev. N  Median St. Dev. N  Slope Median  Slope Std. Dev. 
Automobiles & Parts 15.3% 8.9% 6   13.2% 10.3% 6   -0.0041858   0.00321 
Basic Resources 20.2% 7.2% 3  19.5% 10.3% 2  0.0032753  0.0029183 
Chemicals 21.3% 6.2% 9  21.6% 8.5% 8  0.0005803  0.0012599 
Construction & Materials 12.6% 10.8% 6  9.6% 8.6% 4  -0.0003619  -0.0033599 
Food & Beverage 21.6% 14.4% 2  20.5% 10.5% 2  -0.003093  -0.0041634 
Health Care 18.2% 15.5% 9  23.2% 24.3% 9  0.0041964  0.0032728 
Industrial Goods & Services 22.2% 16.2% 31  16.4% 18.2% 28  -0.0069092  0.0013567 
Media 1.9% 8.3% 2  4.2% 7.4% 2  -0.0039729  -0.0021281 
Oil & Gas 18.3% 13.5% 2  15.0% 0.0% 1  -0.0278509  -0.0058591 
Personal & Household Goods 22.1% 8.3% 9  16.8% 6.7% 8  -0.0077321  -0.0011024 
Retail 12.9% 10.2% 9  13.0% 19.1% 9  -0.0011182  0.0088148 
Technology 17.5% 12.0% 8  14.4% 12.0% 9  0.0006712  -0.0006766 
Telecommunications 2.9% 0.0% 1  3.9% 0.4% 2  -0.0000435  0.0000912 
Utilities 11.1% 5.3% 3   8.2% 13.9% 4   -0.0036717   0.0006814 
Table 3: Summary Statistics for NWC*-to-Sales Ratio by Industry      
 
In line with the results obtained by Aktas et al. (2015b) in their industry analysis, the 
distribution of the median and standard deviation of the NWC*-to-Sales ratio points to the 
existence of a great heterogeneity with respect to working capital practices across industries 
(see also Fig. 16). Moreover, a look at the coefficient estimates of the time trend variable 
indicates that the time trend is negative for 10 out of 14 industries and statistically significant 
for 5 of those industries. In contrast to Aktas et al. (2015b), the regression estimates of the 
time trend variable for the standard deviation is only negative for less than half of those 
industries (6 out of 14) and only statistically significant for one industry. Interestingly, the 
Industrial Goods & Services industry, to which the highest number of firms in my sample 
belong and for which it makes much sense to use the alternative measure of net operating 
working capital, NWC*, rather than that employed by Aktas et al. (2015b), displays a 
statistically significant downward time trend in its NWC*-to-Sales ratio. I ought to sound a 
note of caution regarding these results as the number of industry/year observations is 
relatively small for most of the industries under consideration in my sample. The results 
might have borne more similarity to those obtained by Aktas et al. (2015b) had I used a larger 
sample covering a longer period; nevertheless, the results obtained in Table 3 concerning the 
median and standard deviation of the NWC*-to-Sales ratio indicate that the decrease in 
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NWC* over the sample period is widely spread across many industries under consideration 
here, and that the heterogeneity in terms of working capital management has increased rather 
than decreased through time in most industries.  
 
    Figure 16: Yearly Industry-Median NWC*-to-Sales Ratio for Selected Industries 
 
Fig. 16 above, which plots the yearly industry-median NWC*-to-Sales ratio for those 
industries where I identified a statistically significant time trend and for which at least 6 
industry/year observations were available, illustrates the high heterogeneity with respect to 
working capital management practices across industries mentioned earlier. 
9.4. Regression Analysis 
9.4.1. Independent Variable of Interest 
As is apparent from Table 3 and Fig. 16 above, working capital requirements and 
management practices differ from one industry to another, an outcome which is in line with 
the existing body of literature.237 Similarly to Aktas et al. (2015b), it is therefore necessary 
to control for varying industry characteristics in my study. I do so by using an independent 
variable, which I denote by excess NWC*, and which is obtained by subtracting from the 
NWC*-to-Sales ratio of a given firm the ratio of the median firm in the corresponding 
                                                
237 See for instance Hill et al. (2010) for analogous reasoning and evidence. 
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industry and year. This variable measures the unnecessary cash locked up in working capital 
for every firm in each year. Following the interpretation provided by Aktas et al. (2015b), an 
overinvestment in working capital is reflected in a positive excess NWC*, implying “that 
there is room for the firm to increase the efficiency of its WCM across time by adopting a 
relatively more aggressive working capital policy (such as by reducing inventories and 
payment delays granted to customers). A negative excess [NWC*] indicates that the firm is 
currently adopting an extremely aggressive working capital policy, which potentially 
increases the risk of sales loss essentially due to potential stock-outs and customer 
dissatisfactions driven by aggressive receivables collection” (Aktas et al., 2015b, p. 104). In 
such a case, then, a supplementary working capital investment is predicted to enhance value. 
9.4.2. Dependent Variables of Interest 
Following the methodology adopted by Aktas et al. (2015b), I measure stock performance 
using the excess return adjusted for firm size and market-to-book, as described in subsection 
8.2.2. However, as my study focuses on the German stock market, I do not use the twenty-
five Fama-French value-weighted portfolios following Daniel & Titman (1997), as do Aktas 
et al. (2015b). Indeed, as shown by Brückner et al. (2015), despite the success of the Fama-
French three-factor model and the wide use of factor sets based thereon for non-US stock 
markets, it is inappropriate to simply export a specific factor model from the US to another 
country as Germany. Therefore, I construct sixteen Fama-French value weighted portfolios 
by independently sorting stocks on size and book-to-market (BM) using the monthly TOP 
shares Size-BM dataset for Germany developed by Brückner et al. (2015). Each firm in my 
sample is then assigned to size and book-to-market portfolio using the Size and BM 
breakpoints obtained by Brückner et al. (2015)238 It should be noted here that due to 
unavailability of the data covering the year 2014 in those datasets at the time my sample was 
drawn, I am only able to perform the regression analysis up until the year 2013. 
Furthermore, as in Aktas et al. (2015b), I conduct alternative regressions using as dependent 
variable the return on assets (ROA), which serves as a measure of a firm’s operating 
performance. 
                                                
238 The German TOP shares Size-BM factor dataset and the Size and BM breakpoints dataset are available at 
https://www.wiwi.hu-berlin.de/de/professuren/bwl/bb/data/fama-french-factors-germany. 
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9.4.3. Control Variables 
Due to unavailability of the required data, I am not able to use all the control variables 
considered by Aktas et al. (2015b) in their performance regressions. The reader should 
therefore keep in mind that the omission of some of the control variables raises concerns 
about missing factors correlated with the main independent variable, namely excess NWC*, 
which may lead to somewhat biased results. The firm-specific characteristics I employ as 
control variables are the 1-year growth of sales, a dummy variable for financial distress,239 
cash reserves,240 the market value of equity as proxy for firm size, leverage,241 research & 
development expenditures,242 and fixed asset growth. I also consider in my preliminary 
analysis of the summary statistics the values of Tobin’s q. 
9.4.4. Regression Models 
As already mentioned earlier, I follow the methodology employed by Aktas et al. (2015b) to 
investigate the relation between excess NWC* and firm performance. Specifically, I will run 
regressions of excess NWC* on the 1-year excess return and 1-year ROA using both the 
linear regression model as well as the non-linear, asymmetric regression model set out in 
subsection 8.2.3. For the asymmetric regressions, I thus create a dummy variable, D, which 
takes value 1 if the corresponding excess NWC* is positive and 0 otherwise. 
9.4.5. Summary Statistics of Regression Variables 
Table 4 below reports a range of summary statistics for the period 2005-2013 and referring 
to the dependent, independent, and control variables I use in my regression. Q1 and Q3 
denote the first and third quartiles, respectively. The values for total assets, sales, and market 
value of equity are expressed in million € and adjusted to 2015 € by the HCIP index for 
Germany. N is the number of firms. 
 
 
                                                
239 Following Aktas et al. (2015b, p.112), the financial distress dummy I employ relies on Hill et al. (2010), 
who argue that “a firm is financially distressed if two criteria are met: (1) the firm faces difficulty to cover 
its interest expenses and (2) the firm is overleveraged. The firm faces difficulty to cover its interest expenses 
if its interest coverage ratio (i.e. operating income before depreciation divided by interest expense) is below 
one for two consecutive years or less than 0.8 in any given year. The firm is considered to be overleveraged 
if it is in the top two deciles of industry leverage in a given year.”  
240 Cash and equivalents scaled by total assets. 
241 Total debt scaled by total assets. 
242 Scaled by total assets. (zero if research & development expenditure is not reported) 
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Variable Mean Median Q1 Q3 St. Dev. N 
NWC*-to-Sales 16.52% 15.60% 8.70% 24.46% 13.81% 918 
Excess NWC* -0.10% 0.00% -6.26% 5.71% 13.40% 918 
1-year excess return 1.92% -3.83% -22.84% 19.39% 47.77% 918 
1-year ROA 2.39% 3.65% 1.20% 6.62% 11.80% 918 
Total assets 1406895 150383 45589 709962 3472334 918 
Sales 1034449 152870 51230 742759 2210014 918 
MVE 670924.9 120113.5 34364 502592 1370361 918 
Tobin's Q 1.586535 1.2884 1.0799 1.6873 0.9861932 918 
R&D 3.11% 1.54% 0.03% 4.14% 5.07% 918 
Fixed asset growth 7.84% 2.41% -4.18% 9.89% 37.70% 808 
Sales growth 5.97% 5.20% -2.62% 12.73% 35.15% 808 
Leverage 22.59% 19.96% 9.73% 32.11% 17.93% 918 
Cash reserves 10.22% 7.85% 4.02% 13.79% 8.82% 918 
Financial distress dummy 3.05% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 17.21% 918 
Table 4: Summary Statistics of Regression Variables     
 
It is interesting to note that the average NWC*-to-Sales ratio for the sample firms in the 
period 2005-2013 is 16.52%, which is lower than the 19.99% and 19.79% NWC-to-Sales 
ratio reported by Aktas et al. (2015b) and Hill et al. (2010) respectively. The industry-median 
adjusted NWC*-to-Sales ratio, i.e. excess NWC*, displays a mean of -0,10%, implying that, 
on average, the firms in my sample are slightly underinvesting in working capital, and a 
median of 0.00% by construction. Moreover, regarding the dependent variables, the median 
firm in my sample has a 1-year excess stock return of -3.83%, while the mean 1-year excess 
stock return is 1.92%, consistent, as is Aktas et al. (2015b) and, among other, Barber & Lyon 
(1997), with the distribution of excess returns being positively skewed. The 1-year ROA 
displays a mean value of 2.39% and a median of 3.65% in my sample, which points to the 
distribution of ROA to be negatively skewed, in line with the results by Aktas et al. (2015b). 
Furthermore, Table 5 below reports the mean and median values of my dependent and 
control variables for subsamples based on the sign of the excess NWC*, thus allowing for a 
comparison of sample characteristics of firms with negative excess NWC* with those of 
firms with positive excess NWC*. The last two columns display the p-values from a t-test of 
mean differences and a Mann-Whitney two-sample rank-sum test243 of median differences 
between negative and positive excess NWC* subsamples, respectively. Values in bold are 
                                                
243 The Mann-Whitney two-sample statistic tests the hypothesis that two independent samples, i.e. unmatched 
data, are from populations with the same distribution. It is also known as the Wilcoxon rank-sum test. See 
Wilcoxon (1945) and Mann & Whitney (1947). 
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statistically significant at the 10% (or lower) level. Here again, the values for total assets, 
sales, and market value of equity are expressed in million € and adjusted to 2015 € by the 
HCIP index for Germany. 
Variable Negative excess NWC*   Positive excess NWC*   p-value for positive - negative 
 Mean Median  Mean Median  Mean Median 
1-year excess return 5.61% -0.90%   -2.25% -6.17%   0.0127 0.0182 
1-year ROA 2.48% 3.34%  2.30% 3.99%  0.8199 0.0771 
Total assets 1512624 142927  1287428 154665  0.3270 0.6148 
Sales 1124012 151596  933248.6 160216  0.1920 0.7508 
MVE 738837.9 112476  594187.8 126604  0.1105 0.7729 
Tobin's Q 1.572704 1.2594  1.602164 1.3216  0.6517 0.6263 
R&D 2.70% 0.44%  3.58% 2.28%  0.0089 0.0000 
Fixed asset growth 6.24% 2.42%  9.66% 2.35%  0.1985 0.9678 
Sales growth 8.57% 5.20%  3.03% 5.21%  0.0253 0.1193 
Leverage 22.93% 21.50%  22.21% 18.48%  0.5450 0.3855 
Cash reserves 10.62% 8.32%  9.77% 7.57%  0.1432 0.2096 
Financial distress dummy 0.0287474 0   0.032483 0   0.7429 0.7427 
Table 5: Sample Characteristics - Negative vs. Positive excess NWC*     
 
In line with the results reported by Aktas et al. (2015b), firms with positive excess NWC* 
had on average a significantly lower stock performance and invested slightly more in 
research & development relative to firms with negative excess NWC*. However, in contrast 
to Aktas et al. (2005), they tend to have experienced on average a lower growth rate in their 
pattern of sales. Unfortunately, the tests of mean and median differences reveal that only a 
few of the mean and median of the firm characteristics under consideration here are 
significantly different between the two subsamples. This may be due to the relatively small 
number of observations composing my sample. It nonetheless remains important to control 
for all the firm characteristics – except for Tobin’s q which Aktas et al. (2015b) only use in 
their investment regressions and which, as I have noted earlier, is prone to high measurement 
error244 – in the multivariate regressions which are presented in the next subsection, as again 
omitting variables from my regression analysis may lead to biased results. 
9.4.6. Empirical Evidence 
In this subsection, I present the empirical evidence I obtained - using STATA® - from the 
analysis of my panel data of the relationship between excess NWC* and stock performance 
and operating performance respectively. Since I use lagged variables and that some of my 
                                                
244 See subsection 3.3.3. 
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variables are growth variables, I am only able to use the data in my sample covering the 
period 2007 through 2013. The number of firm-year observations is hence reduced to 698. 
Moreover, in contrast to Aktas et al. (2015b), I perform random effects (RE) regressions in 
addition to firm-year fixed effects (FE) regressions and conduct a Hausman test to check 
which model is more appropriate for the regression analysis of the panel data under 
consideration in my study.  
9.4.6.1. Working Capital Management and Stock Performance 
Table 6 on next page presents the fixed effects (FE) and random effects (RE) stock 
performance regressions. Following Aktas et al. (2015b), the dependent variable is the 1-
year excess return and all the independent variables are lagged by one year relative to the 
dependent variable. Columns 1-2 (1’-2’) report the estimation of the linear FE (RE) model, 
and columns 3-4 (3’-4’) the estimation of the asymmetric model. The proxy used for firm 
size is the natural logarithm of the market value of equity.  
The relation between excess NWC* and stock performance is negative in column 1 as well 
as in column 1’. It is statistically significant at the 5%-level in column 1’ and the Hausman 
test indicates that using the random effects model is more appropriate when considering only 
the excess NWC* as dependent variable, though the R² is not as large than in the fixed effects 
model (0.006 vs. 0.043). In line with the results of Aktas et al. (2015b), this negative relation 
is not robust to the inclusion of the control variables in the fixed effects regression model 
(See column 2), which, following from the results of the Hausman test, is more appropriate 
to use than the random effects model. 
Since I also expect, as Aktas et al. (2015b), the cutback of only the unnecessary portion 
locked up in working capital to result in an increase in performance of the firms in my 
sample, the regression specifications I consider in Columns 3, 3’, 4, and 4’ include two 
interaction variables, [excess NWC* x D] and [excess NWC* x (1-D)], which interact the 
excess NWC* with the dummy variables D and (1-D) identifying firms in my sample with 
positive and negative excess NWC*, respectively. Unfortunately, and in contrast to Aktas et 
al. (2015b), the results of the fixed effects regressions reported in columns 3 and 4 – which 
are to be chosen over the random effects regressions following the Hausman tests – indicate 
that for firms in my sample characterized by a positive (negative) excess NWC*, an increase 
(decrease) in excess NWC* leads to an increase in stock performance. Moreover, this result 
is statistically significant only for firms in my sample displaying levels of net operating 
working capital below the median level of the industry it belongs to. 
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Variable (1) FE (1') RE (2) FE (2') RE (3) FE (3') RE (4) FE (4') RE 
 Coef. p-value Coef. p-value Coef. p-value Coef. p-value Coef. p-value Coef. p-value Coef. p-value Coef. p-value 
Excess NWC*(t-1) -0.554 0.11 -0.308 0.05 -0.471 0.17 -0.355 0.03                 
Excess NWC*(t-1)*D         -0.118 0.78 -0.520 0.04 0.095 0.82 -0.627 0.02 
Excess NWC*(t-1)*(1-D)         -1.737 0.02 -0.064 0.81 -2.028 0.01 -0.035 0.90 
Firm size     -0.444 0.00 -0.029 0.02     -0.445 0.00 -0.030 0.02 
Leverage     0.046 0.85 0.282 0.05     0.119 0.63 0.275 0.06 
R&D     -0.937 0.36 0.082 0.87     -1.503 0.15 0.167 0.74 
Fixed assets growth     -0.063 0.21 -0.076 0.11     -0.078 0.12 -0.713 0.13 
Cash Reserves     0.700 0.07 0.447 0.10     0.661 0.09 0.480 0.08 
Financial distress dummy     -0.329 0.02 -0.345 0.01     -0.338 0.02 -0.343 0.01 
Sales growth     -0.029 0.58 -0.075 0.13     -0.019 0.71 -0.080 0.11 
R² within (FE)/R² overall (RE) 0.043  0.006  0.187  0.027  0.049  0.009  0.195  0.032  
Fisher statistic (FE)/Wald chi² (RE) 3.77 0.00 3.85 0.05 9.4 0.00 24.76 0.00 3.7 0.00 5.06 0.00 9.24 0.00 26.38 0.00 
Number of observations 698  698  698  698  698  698  698  698  
                 
Result of Hausman test chi²=1.46, Prob>chi²=0.2269 chi²=54.66, Prob>chi²=0.00 chi²=8.73, Prob>chi²=0.01 chi²=86.61, Prob>chi²=0.00 
 RE model more appropriate FE model more appropriate FE model more appropriate FE model more appropriate 
Table 6: Excess NWC* and Stock Performance                           
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Hence, this result does not allow me to infer that an optimal level of working capital exist 
that maximizes shareholder value. Perhaps this result is obtained due to the lack of sufficient 
control variables, as hinted by the relatively low value for R² in column 4 (0.195), although 
the model including the control variables in use in my study (column 4) provides a better fit 
to my data than that in which the control variables are not included (column 3 with R² value 
of 0.049). This result may also suggest, following Frankel et al. (2016), that managing 
working capital goes undetected by shareholders. Another possible explanation for this result 
might be that shareholders, adhering to the conventional wisdom that reducing working 
capital levels is always a good strategy to follow, inherently consider investment in working 
capital to be detrimental to shareholder value. This view is supported by the results obtained 
for the control variables, per which only the coefficient estimates of firm size, cash reserves 
and the financial distress dummy are statistically significant at the 10% level or lower and 
display signs consistent with existing literature and as intuitively expected. Specifically, the 
positive sign obtained for the coefficient estimate of the cash reserves (0.661) corroborates 
the substitution effect documented by Bates et al. (2009) between cash reserves and working 
capital levels through time. 
9.4.6.2. Working Capital Management and Operating Performance 
Like Aktas et al. (2015b), I perform regressions of my measure of excess net operating 
working capital, excess NWC*, on a firm’s operating performance, which I measure using 
its return on assets (ROA), computed as profit attributable to shareholders from continuing 
operations245 divided by total assets. Table 7 on next page reports the results of both the firm 
and year fixed effects as well as the random effects regressions on operating performance. 
As in the stock performance regressions presented in the previous subsection, the 
independent variables are lagged by one period with respect to the dependent variable. 
Moreover, I use the same econometric methodology and the same set of control variables as 
in Table 6.  
Following the argumentation brought forward by Aktas et al. (2015b), I expect that for firms 
with a negative (positive) excess NWC*, an increase (decrease) in excess NWC* in one 
period leads to an increase (decrease) in those firms’ operating performance in the next 
period and that therefore, an optimal level of working capital exists that maximizes operating 
performance. Column 1’ in Table 7 reports a statistically highly significant negative 
                                                
245 Ergebnisanteil der Aktionäre aus fortgeführten Aktivitäten.  
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coefficient estimate of excess NWC* in a linear random effects regression on ROA – which, 
for my sample, is more appropriate than a fixed effects regression. This result is consistent 
with that obtained by Aktas et al. (2015b). 
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Variable (1) Fixed (1') Random (2) Fixed (2') Random (3) Fixed (3') Random (4) Fixed (4') Random 
 Coef. p-value Coef. p-value Coef. p-value Coef. p-value Coef. p-value Coef. p-value Coef. p-value Coef. p-value 
Excess NWC*(t-1) -0.255 0.00 -0.171 0.00 -0.194 0.00 -0.097 0.04                 
Excess NWC*(t-1)*D         -0.423 0.00 -0.419 0.00 -0.358 0.00 -0.335 0.00 
Excess NWC*(t-1)*(1-D)         0.198 0.16 0.234 0.01 0.257 0.07 0.254 0.00 
Firm size     0.048 0.00 0.021 0.00     0.049 0.01 0.020 0.00 
Leverage     0.275 0.00 0.124 0.00     0.254 0.00 0.110 0.00 
R&D     0.049 0.81 -0.228 0.09     0.213 0.29 -0.142 0.28 
Fixed assets growth     -0.009 0.34 -0.004 0.69     -0.005 0.61 0.001 0.92 
Cash Reserves     0.201 0.01 0.253 0.00     0.212 0.01 0.270 0.00 
Financial distress dummy     -0.048 0.08 -0.046 0.09     -0.046 0.09 -0.045 0.09 
Sales growth     0.013 0.21 0.021 0.04     0.010 0.32 0.016 0.10 
R² (within) 0.053  0.013  0.138  0.115  0.074  0.079  0.158  0.165  
Fisher statistic (FE)/Wald chi² (RE) 4.68 0.00 12.35 0.00 6.59 0.00 71.49 0.00 5.82 0.00 41.05 0.00 7.14 0.00 99.71 0.00 
Number of observations 698  698  698  698  698  698  698  698  
                 
Result of Hausman test chi²=2.73, Prob>chi²=0.10 chi²=111.93, Prob>chi²=0.00 chi²=0.08, Prob>chi²=0.9612 chi²=89.22, Prob>chi²=0.00 
  RE model more appropriate FE model more appropriate RE model more appropriate FE model more appropriate 
Table 7: Excess NWC* and Operating Performance              
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With respect to the asymmetric fixed effects model, the coefficient estimates for positive 
(negative) excess NWC* reported in columns 3’ and 4 are -0.419 (0.234) and -0.358 (0.257), 
with all values being statistically significant at the 1%-level (or lower).  These results are in 
line with those obtained by Aktas et al. (2015b) and Baños-Caballero et al. (2012 & 2014). 
They allow me to infer that for the firms in my sample, there exists an optimal level of net 
operating working capital. The implication for policy that follows from this result is that, 
following the argumentation provided by Aktas et al. (2015b), managers of German 
corporations that aim to get near that optimal level of net operating working capital, either 
by increasing or decreasing their investment therein, will eventually enhance the operating 
performance of their firms. Finally, regarding the control variables, firm size, leverage, and 
cash reserves carry a positive and statistically significant coefficient estimate at the 1%-level, 
while the financial distress dummy, as intuitively expected, is negatively associated with a 
firm’s operating performance as measured by the ROA at the 10% significance level. 
10. Conclusion 
 
The review of literature presented in the first part of this thesis (Sections 2 through 8) has 
highlighted the progress that has been achieved in both the theoretical and empirical research 
area of working capital management since the publishing of the article by Walker (1964), in 
which, I remind the reader, the author asked himself whether it was possible to develop a 
theory of working capital, pointing to the dearth of pertinent literature available at the time. 
Contemporary researchers as well as practitioners in the field of working capital 
management can now draw upon a clearer picture of the factors that influence working 
capital management. In addition, this allows corporate managers to move away from 
adhering to the conventional wisdom with regards to working capital management towards 
adhering to a sustainable approach in which specific factors such as corporate governance 
as well as the right managerial incentivization - allowing, among other things, to fathom the 
year-end decline in working capital - should play a greater role in achieving this goal.  
In the second, empirical part of this thesis, I first gave the reader on overview of the 
methodologies applied in existing research articles relating working capital management to 
both a firm’s profitability as well as the value to its shareholders. This allows me to clearly 
identify a change of paradigm from a state in which decreases in levels of working capital 
lead to an increase in firm valuation (e.g. Deloof, 2003) to a state in which an industry-
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specific optimal level of working exists that maximizes firm valuation (e.g. Aktas et al., 
2015b, and Baños-Caballero et al., 2012 & 2014), and that corporate managers should aim 
to attain and maintain this optimal level or eventually follow it as it changes over time. With 
regards to my own empirical study, in which I use an alternative and, for my purposes, 
superior measure of net operating working capital, the results I obtain are not entirely in line 
with those obtained by Aktas et al. (2015b), specifically with regards to the stock 
performance regressions. Although this might be due to the lack of sufficient control 
variables in use in my study, I bring forward another plausible explanation stating that 
shareholders of German corporations, who perhaps still adhere to the conventional wisdom 
that reducing working capital levels is always a good strategy to follow, inherently consider 
investment in working capital to be detrimental to shareholder value. Besides, it may also be 
an indication that a firm’s management of its working capital goes undetected to its 
shareholders, as argued by Frankel et al. (2016). Nonetheless, the results obtained from my 
operating performance regressions are clearly in line with those obtained by Aktas et al. 
(2015b) and Baños-Caballero et al. (2012 & 2014) and point to the existence of an inverted 
U-shaped relationship between working capital investment and a firm operating performance 
as well as to the existence of an optimal working capital level that maximizes operating 
performance for German corporations. Besides, I provide, using descriptive statistics, 
empirical evidence of how the firms in my sample adapted their working capital policies to 
the downturn economic environment they faced. As it turns out, the average firm in my 
sample was compelled to continuously adapt its working capital management in the strong 
wake turbulence that ensued the 2007-2008 global financial crisis.
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